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There was one other game that Julian did not like, because he was
afraid of the consequences. That was known simply as Five-Finger
Grab. . . . [S]ometimes after a tour of the store the gang would meet,
and two or three of the boys would . . . show what they had got in the
Five-Finger Grab . . . . The other boys would be ashamed, and the
next time they went to the store everyone would try to get something.
Julian at first would refuse to participate in the Five-Finger Grab,
but when Carter Davis abandoned his side and went over to the
grabbers, Julian had to do something. . . . And so he became a five-
finger grabber.1
I.   INTRODUCTION: THE CONCEPT OF BEING A LAWYER—ROMANTICS ,
ROBBER BARONS AND A CALL FOR ABANDONING PROFESSIONALISM AS THE
ORGANIZING PRINCIPLE
Lawyers are said to travel in packs, or at least pairs, and in the popu-
lar parlance are often compared to hoards of locusts, herds of cattle, or
unruly mobs. However, at least for purposes of assessing concerns with
professionalism currently surrounding the bar and the public, whether
attorneys are more or less social than other human animals does not
                                                                                                                                                
1. JOHN O’HARA, APPOINTMENT IN SAMARRA 151-52 (1934). This passage from O’Hara’s
novel about self-destructive behavior might equally bear upon the topic of lawyers’ reactions to
the changing practice of law. In the novel, Julian English, whose childhood mischief is de-
scribed in the passage, expends considerable energy attempting to restore and solidify his social
position in the mythical community, but his efforts only create more difficulties, which culmi-
nate in his suicide. Today, lawyer professionalism faces a similar battle. While many lawyers
have reacted by advocating a reinvigoration of professionalism, some have elected to reject the
professionalism construct. The potential futility of such flight is reflected in the parable with
which O’Hara begins the novel:
DEATH SPEAKS:
There was a merchant in Baghdad who sent his servant to market to buy provisions
and in a little while the servant came back, white and trembling, and said, Master,
just now when I was in the market-place I was jostled by a woman in the crowd and
when I turned I saw it was Death that jostled me. She looked at me and made a
threatening gesture; now, lend me your horse, and I will ride away from this city
and avoid my fate. I will go to Samarra and there Death will not find me. The mer-
chant lent him his horse, and the servant mounted it, and he dug his spurs in its
flanks and as fast as the horse could gallop he went. Then the merchant went down
to the market-place and he saw me standing in the crowd and he came to me and
said, Why did you make a threatening gesture to my servant when you saw him this
morning? That was not a threatening gesture, I said, it was only a start of surprise. I
was aston ished to see him in Baghdad, for I had an appointment with him tonight
in Samarra.
Id. at Epigraph (quoting W. SOMERSET MAUGHAM, SHEPPY  (1933)).
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matter. My point is simply that lawyers are social beings; like other hu-
man beings in social and occupational groups, lawyers behave largely in
accordance with group norms, in much the same way peer pressure led
Julian English toward juvenile delinquency in the passage quoted above
from O’Hara’s novel.2
My operating premise simply posits that lawyers will tend to act in
accordance with their social or peer incentive structures. The resulting
thesis holds that society will see better conduct by lawyers, in the legal
profession and as a whole, if attorneys continue to be regarded and
regulated as part of a profession rather than being primarily conceptu-
alized as actors in a market.
Lawyers and the legal profession have probably never been particu-
larly popular,3 despite the fact that some early American lawyers today
enjoy something of a posthumous honeymoon as the founding fathers or
framers.4 Even so, the reputation of counsel in general is at a particu-
larly low ebb in the late twentieth century. 5 Some of the antilawyer sign-
posts are so familiar that they have become hackneyed and trite: the
ubiquitous Shakespeare quotation, “first thing we do, let’s kill all the
lawyers”;6 the public opinion surveys putting attorneys a notch below the
                                                                                                                                                
2. See  id.
3. See  Marc Galanter, The Faces of Mistrust: The Image of Lawyers in Public Opin ion,
Jokes, and Political Discourse, 66 U. CIN . L. REV. 805, 810-16 (1998) (noting historical fluctua-
tion of lawyer stature against a baseline of significant public dislike for attorneys) [hereinafter
Galanter, Faces of Mistrust ].
4. John Adams, Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, Thomas Jefferson, and John Marshall
were all lawyers. See  LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 101, 303 (2d ed.
1985).
5. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); ANTHONY T. KRONMAN,
THE LOST LAWYER: F AILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993); SOL M. LINOWITZ &
MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION: LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY  (1994). Although each book displays the distinctive stamp of prominent authors, all
three generally portray a profession in decline, in some significant way, as compared to the
practice of law earlier in the 20th century. All three books could be termed nostalgic, not in the
pejorative sense, but in the literal sense that they mourn past incarnations of the practice of
law.
A wave of works has sounded a similar theme. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Devolu tion of
the Legal Profession: A Demand Side Perspective, 49 MD. L. REV. 869, 872 (1990) (attributing
the “devolution” of the legal profession to changing market conditions); Elizabeth A.
Kovachevich & Geri L. Waksler, The Legal Profession: Edging Closer to Death with Each
Passing Hour, 20 STETSON L. R EV. 419, 423 (1991) (urging that the billable hour will be the
death of the profession and that the legal profession has “degenerated into a ‘mean and merce-
nary calling’”). The organized legal profession itself has seemingly adopted this nostalgia. See
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM ’N ON PROFESSIONALISM, “. . . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SERVICE:” A
BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D.
243, 262 (1987) (hoping for a “rebirth of respect and confidence in [lawyers], in the services
they provide and in the legal system itself”) [hereinafter AMERICAN BAR ASS’N , PUBLIC SERVICE].
Although the dissatisfaction with modern law has focused largely on the public’s disenchant-
ment, lawyers themselves seem to view the lawyer’s life as worse today than in the past. See,
e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., “Practice” in Law and Other Professions, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 387,
391-92 (1997) (noting increased feelings of detachment among attorneys and widespread job
dissatisfaction); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal Profes-
sion, 68 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 85, 94 (1994) (describing how law practice has become a “war” for
business).
6. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE , HENRY VI, pt. 2, act 4, sc. 2.
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proverbial used car salesman in job and trustworthiness ratings;7 and
the perennial lawyer jokes.8
The image of the lawyer reflected in popular culture has always suf-
fered derision,9 but today’s image seems more cynical. In the impeach-
ment inquiry surrounding President Clinton, the favorite sound bite for
attacking his position was to describe Clinton as relying on “legal techni-
calities.”10 Lawyers are frequently villains of modern fiction.11 When law-
yers are heroes, the burnout rate is high, and even lawyer-novelists like
John Grisham and Scott Turow often have their protagonists exiting the
system while the getting is still good to ride off into the sunset for a new
life.12 In real life, Presidents, Vice-Presidents, and other politicians ap-
parently think lawyer-bashing, and judge-bashing as well, increases fa-
                                                                                                                                                
7. See  Randall Samborn, Tracking Trends, NAT’L L.J. , Aug. 9, 1993, at 20 (reviewing
public opinion poll reflecting decline in the public perception of lawyers); see also Marc Galan -
ter, Predators and Parasites: Lawyer-Bashing and Civil Justice, 28 GA. L. REV. 633, 663
(1994) (noting this trend in public opinion during 1980s and 1990s) [hereinafter Galanter,
Predators and Parasites]. But see ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM POWERS : A STUDY OF THE
INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF FORMAL KNOWLEDGE 56 (1986) (noting that lawyers rank fifteenth out
of ninety in prestige within the professional-technical category). Law is generally ranked high in
prestige, at least in relation to other occupations. See id. at 112.
8. See  Editorial, These Lawyers Are No Joke, SOUTH BEND TRIB., Dec. 21, 1998, at A8,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Sbndtr File (“‘What do you call 5,000 lawyers at the bottom
of the Atlantic Ocean?’ the old joke asks. The answer: ‘A good start.’”); see also  Galanter,
Predators and Parasites, supra note 7, at 634-37 (setting forth a sample of untrue or mislead -
ing antilawyer “facts” in common circulation and antilawyer jokes and sayings).
9. See, e.g., CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK H OUSE (Duane DeVries ed., Thomas Y. Cromwell
Co. 1971) (1853) (depicting how lawyers and legal system combine with family greed to bleed an
estate dry through two decades of litigation); see also  CHARLES DICKENS, G REAT EXPECTATIONS
(Heritage Press 1971) (1861) (offering a largely unflattering portrayal of Attorney Jaggers). Jag-
gers is described as “marginally scrupulous” by one lawyer-interpreter. Rob Atkinson, A Di s-
senter’s Commentary on the Professionalism Crusade , 74 TEX. L. REV. 259, 306 (1995) [here-
inafter Atkinson, Dissenter’s Commentary]. Atkinson also notes an example from Robert Tra-
ver’s Anatomy of a Murder (1958), in which an attorney “presses the edge of subornation of
perjury to suggest to his client a dubious but successful insanity defense to murder.” Id. at 307;
see also  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 28 (describing a more recent “antiprofessionalism” move-
ment of the post-World War II era); ANTHONY TROLLOPE , THE WARDEN 54 (Robin Gilmour ed.,
Penguin Books 1984) (1855) (presenting character Sir Abraham Haphazard, an attorney who
focuses on form rather than substance).
10. See, e.g., Harold W. Andersen, Clinton Strategy Is Public Relations Fiasco , OMAHA
WORLD HERALD, Sept. 20, 1998, at 31a, available in LEXIS, News Library, Omwhld File (refer-
ring to “the hair-splitting legal technicalities behind which Clinton’s strategists are attempting
to protect their client”); The End of Impeachment: Quotes from the Trial, ATLANTA J. & CONST.,
Feb. 14, 1999, at 2F (quoting Republican Senator Chuck Hagel, who spoke of “‘stripping away
the underbrush of legal technicalities and nuance’”); William Schneider, As the Trial Turns,
L.A. TIMES , Jan. 24, 1999, at M1 (“[Clinton] resorts to legal technicalities, infuriating his critics
and irritating his supporters.”).
11. See  THE USUAL SUSPECTS (Gramercy Pictures 1996). In the film, a lawyer actively as-
sists a surprisingly shadowy crime kingpin in a plan involving the murder of a government wit-
ness and the mass killing of those who could tie him to crime. See id. Several literary accounts
also provide overt examples. See, e.g. , JOHN GRISHAM , THE FIRM  (1990) (depicting an entire law
firm as a mob front); JOHN GRISHAM , THE RAINMAKER  (1995) (implying that the lawyer for an
insurer is complicit in or actively involved in fraudulent withholding of information and decep -
tion of policyholders).
12. See, e.g., J OHN GRISHAM, THE PARTNER  (1997) (depicting an attorney who fakes death
and absconds with the firm’s ill-gotten gains); JOHN GRISHAM , THE RAINMAKER  (1995) (ending
with the protagonist leaving the practice of law to teach high school); SCOTT TUROW , PLEADING
GUILTY (1993) (depicting an attorney who leaves a law practice for a country lacking an extra-
dition treaty after essentially restealing the firm’s ill-gotten funds).
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vorable votes. 13 Presumably, their private polling data confirm the effec-
tiveness of lawyer-bashing, or it would not be done.
Not only does criticism and rejection seem the profession’s lot, but
there also appears to be relatively little positive image-building of the
lawyer. Instead of Perry Mason,14 we have Ally McBeal,15 L.A. Law,16 and
The Practice.17 McBeal is embarrassingly airheaded, and more focused
on finding a good nightclub than practicing good law. The gang in L.A.
Law struck a number of blows for conspicuous consumption and moral
decline but relatively few for justice. The crew in The Practice does
somewhat better, but needs its share of material goods and torrid em-
braces as well. If popular culture is any indication, lawyer professional-
ism is not merely going through a low point—it has reached Death Val-
ley.18
If a negative public image were the only problem, it would be rela-
tively difficult to differentiate the 1990s from the rest of the century. To a
large extent, what makes the 1990s different is the upsurge in scholarly
works arguing that law and lawyers are in a serious slump and need
professional revitalization. Works by notable authors such as Mary Ann
Glendon, Tony Kronman, and Sol Linowitz all argue that lawyers and the
legal profession have indeed lost their way, largely through becoming
more elitist, selfish, separated from society, and greedy.19 Similarly, an
                                                                                                                                                
13. See, e.g., Galanter, Predators and Parasites, supra note 7, at 645-47 (reviewing for-
mer Vice-President Dan Quayle’s well-publicized attack on lawyers and the American legal
system designed as part of the Bush-Quayle 1992 re-election effort). See also Karen O’Connor,
Civil Justice Reform and Prospects for Change, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 917, 919 n.9 (1993) (noting
Dan Quayle’s remarks at the August 13, 1991, annual meeting of the Amer ican Bar Association’s
House of Delegates). During the 1992 presidential campaign, former President George Bush di-
gressed to mock fancy lawyers in “tasseled loafer[s].” George Bush, Acceptance Speech for the
Republican Presidential Nomination (August 20, 1992), in Transcript of Bush Speech Accept-
ing the Nomination for Another Four Years, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 21, 1992, at A14 (“After all, my
opponent's campaign is being backed by practically every trial lawyer who ever wore a tasseled
loafer.”). Bush undoubtedly thought that casting his opponent as the lawyer’s candidate was
good political strategy, although this assumption may have been faulty. See Lawyers Give Most
to Presidential Campaigns, TALLAHASSEE DEM., Apr. 30, 1999, at 5A (noting that lawyer dona-
tions to political campaigns are substantial across party lines).
Similarly, in Florida, State Senator Charlie Crist attacked the successful plaintiffs’ lawyers
over the large fees they collected in the tobacco litigation. See  Crist Wants Tobacco Suit Probe
to Go on, FLA. T IMES-UNION, June 4, 1998, at B-5; see also Margaret Taleve, Tobacco Probe Lit
Few Fires, TAMPA TRIB., May 17, 1998, at 1. But see John H. Cushman, Jr., The 1998 Elections:
State by State-South, N.Y. TIMES , Nov. 5, 1998, at B5 (suggesting that, while public opinion of
lawyers may be somewhat low, it is not so low as to render scapegoating or lawyer bashing a
fool-proof campaign tool).
14. See  Perry Mason (CBS television broadcast, 1957-66).
15. See  Ally McBeal (FOX television broadcast, 1997-99).
16. See  L.A. Law (NBC television broadcast, 1986-94).
17. See  The Practice (ABC television broadcast, 1997-99).
18. But alas, lawyers get it coming and going. It was not that long ago that Woody Allen,
as Boris Dimitrovich Grushenko, opined that “some people never even think about sex . . . they
become lawyers.” See  LOVE AND DEATH (Jack Rollins & Charles H. Joffe Productions 1975).
19. See  GLENDON, supra note 5; KRONMAN, supra note 5; LINOWITZ & MAYER, supra note
5. However, an academic trend exists toward observing a decline of professionalism that pre-
dates the past decades and these works. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 110 (no ting trend to-
ward this observation and citing sources).
One might gauge the decline of the lawyer’s image by comparing these writings to those of the
1960-1980 period that, although hardly promotional, generally portrayed the legal profession
in a more positive light. See, e.g., J EROME E. CARLIN , LAWYERS ON THEIR OWN (1962); JOSEPH C.
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inordinate number of prominent attorneys and judges have made similar
observations.20 Abusive litigation has become a particular target
prompting procedural reform, a “civility” movement, and criticism.21
Bench-Bar Committees or Commissions have developed with a mission
of restoring or enhancing professionalism.22
Still, not all of the profession’s actors and commentators have criti-
cized or opposed the modern lawyering trends. A number of lawyers and
commentators have refused to enlist in the developing “crusade” for
greater professionalism.23 Some entities have attempted to operate
multi-state and multi-country law firms much like multi-national corpo-
rations.24 Prominent legal commentators and observers have made law
firm operations and earnings front-page news, at least in their own pub-
lications authored by lawyers for lawyers. The message of this cadre of
                                                                                                                                                
GOULDEN , THE SUPERLAWYERS  (1971); PAUL H OFFMAN , LIONS IN THE STREET: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE GREAT WALL STREET LAW FIRMS (1973); ERWIN O. SMIGEL, THE WALL STREET LAWYER
(1964). Even a self-identified polemic is not as despondently critical and resigned as are the
1990s books cited above. See  RALPH NADER & MARK GREEN , VERDICTS ON LAWYERS (1976).
It is also probably worth noting that a higher percentage of the pre-1990s criticism came from
sources other than the legal academy.
20. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, The Decline Of Professionalism, 61 TENN . L. REV. 1
(1993). For the late Chief Justice Burger, concerns about eroding professionalism predated the
1990s explosion of lawyer criticism. See  Warren E. Burger, The Necessity for Civility, Address
Before the American Law Institute (May 18, 1971), in  52 F.R.D. 211 (1971) (decrying lapses in ci-
vility but targeting liberal activist lawyers for claiming political ove rtones in trials when un -
happy with outcomes); Warren E. Burger, The State of Justice, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1984, at 62
(calling for re-examination of lawyer professionalism and implying a precarious state). More
recent critiques make similar observations. See, for example, Louis H. Pollak, Professional At-
titude, A.B.A. J., Aug. 1998, at 66, in which the author, a prominent federal trial judge and for-
mer Dean of Yale and Pennsylvania law schools, defends the importance of civility, implicitly
suggesting that the legal profession has slipped in this regard. See also Jerome J. Shestack,
Taking Professionalism Seriously, A.B.A. J. , Aug. 1998, at 70, in which the then-ABA President
endorses civility and respect for others, implying some modern slippage and danger of further
slippage, and William Reece Smith, Jr., Professionalism? What’s That?, FLA. BAR J. , May 1998,
at 28, in which the former ABA President notes the widespread concerns about declining pro-
fessionalism that led to the establishment of the Center for Professionalism, “a joint venture of
the Supreme Court of Florida and The Florida Bar."
21. See, e.g. , FLORIDA BAR COMM . ON PROFESSIONALISM, THE RULES REGULATING THE
FLORIDA BAR AND IDEALS AND GOALS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1991); AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL
LAWYERS, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DISRUPTION OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS (1970) (ex-
pressing concern that growing use of “disruptive” litigation tactics may become permanent);
Robert N. Sayler, Rambo Litigation—Why Hardball Tactics Don’t Work, A.B.A. J., Mar. 1988,
at 79 (criticizing overly aggressive litigation behavior as both improper and ineffective).
22. See  Smith, supra note 20  (describing Florida Center for Professionalism); see also
AMERICAN BAR ASS’N , supra note 5, at 265.
23. See, e.g., Atkinson, Dissenter’s Commentary, supra note 9 ; Amy R. Mashburn, Pro-
fessionalism as Class Ideology: Civility Codes and Bar Hierarchy, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 657
(1994). Professor Atkinson’s dissent includes an opposition to what most lawyers would regard
as baseline courtroom decorum. For example, in his article in this Symposium, he cites a law-
yer’s purposeful spilling of a water pitcher in order to disrupt the examination of a witness and
implicitly labels this behavior fair advocacy and permissible zealous client representation. See
Rob Atkinson, Br’er Rabbit Professionalism: A Homily on Moral Heroes and Lawyerly Mores,
27 FLA. ST. U. L. R EV. 137 (1999).
24. See, e.g. , Paul M. Barrett, A Once-Stodgy Firm Makes a Flashy Return, but at What
Cost?, WALL ST. J. , Aug. 17, 1998, at A1 (describing revamping of Cadwalader, Wickersham &
Taft into leaner, meaner, more profitable firm, which led to litigation by ousted partners). The
article’s subheadlines convey some of the flavor of the criticism of the new Cadwalader: “Putsch
and Shove,” “Cadwalader Ousted Partners And Ushered in Profits: A View of Law’s New Face,”
and “The Maitre d’ Gets the Ax.” Id.
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the legal press is the promotion of business aspects of the law, including
the lionization of profitability and at least implicit criticism of law firms
that do not perform like Intel, Microsoft, or Berkshire Hathaway.25
This business-forcing movement of the law is somewhat difficult to
characterize as a school, but it is nonetheless a powerful theme moving
law in the direction of greater commercialism.26 In general, however,
these social forces could be characterized as arguing for a more business-
like approach by the legal profession rather than the replacement of the
professionalism paradigm.
In the academy, most of the commentary has been what might be
termed “pro-professionalism” in that it takes exception to at least some
of the monetary strains imposed on modern practice and promotes a
return to a more socially responsible model of lawyering.27 Although
there have long been works criticizing lawyers for being insufficiently
businesslike, most of these criticisms have come from outside the acad-
emy.
Professor Russell G. Pearce is one critic who stands apart from the
pack in a number of ways.28 Pearce’s work evokes concern that the anti-
lawyer movement is in full swing. He is not a senior fellow at an institute
                                                                                                                                                
25. For example, American Lawyer compiles the AmLaw 100 , a listing of the largest,
most profitable law firms in the nation, and ranks them accordingly. See  By the Numbers:
Firms A-Z, AMERICAN LAW., July 1998, at Supp. The National Law Journal compiles the NLJ
250, a listing of the largest firms in rank order, with information about their income, profi t-
ability, and deployment. See  Patrick Oster, Index to Law Firms on the NLJ 250 Survey for
1998 , Nov. 16, 1998, at C5. Firms and their competitors follow these statistics closely. See, e.g.,
Barrett, supra note 24 , at A1 (noting with prominence that the Cadwalader Firm had profits of
only $425,000 per partner prior to reorganization, but in 1997 each partner enjoyed profits of
nearly $800,000).
26. Representative figures are Steven Brill, the founder of American Lawyer magazine,
and Howard Finkelstein, founder of the National Law Journal. See  supra note 25 . Although
their editorial stances often invoke professionalism values by criticizing conflicts of interest and
lawyer self-dealing, they have also spearheaded a move to a world where lawyers are more con -
scious than ever of firm size, profits, and projected growth. See  William H. Simon, Babbitt v.
Brandeis: The Decline of the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. R EV. 565, 579-80 (1985). Simon
compares The American Lawyer to “How to Put Pep in Salesmanship,” a work recommended
by the fictional Dr. Geake to a class of medical students with the admonition not to spend so
much time thinking about ethics that they forget that they will be judged by their wealth. See  id.
at 570 (quoting SINCLAIR LEWIS, ARROWSMITH 85 (1925)). Similarly, government leaders such
as the Clinton Administration’s Assistant Attorney General Joel Klein can be seen as part of this
movement for actions such as pursu ing an antitrust claim against the American Bar Association
accreditation process for law schools and obtaining a consent agreement backing the ABA away
from collecting and sharing comparative law school salary data.
27. See, e.g. , Symposium, Conference on the Commercialization of the Legal Profession,
45 S.C. L. REV. 883 (1994); Symposium, The Future of the Legal Profession, 44 CASE W. R ES. L.
REV. 333 (1994); Symposium, Professionalism in the Practice of Law: A Symposium on Civil-
ity and Judicial Ethics in the 1990s, 28 VAL. U. L. R EV. 513 (1994). Although there are many
trenchant commentaries criticizing a romanticized or doctrinaire version of professionalism,
these works generally argue for a different vision of the profession rather than a rejection of
professional self-identification altogether. See, e.g. , Atkinson, Dissenter’s Commentary, supra
note 9 , at 343 (characterizing professionalism movement as being “reductionist” and having an
“intolerant tone”); Mashburn, supra note 23 , at 662 (suggesting that the professionalism ideol-
ogy and related codes are used to suppress di ssent and marginalize outsiders); Nancy J. Moore,
Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM . B. FOUND . R ES. J. 773, 775-77 (reviewing AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N , PUBLIC SERVICE, supra note 5, and criticizing the ABA’s Commission on Profession -
alism for inadequate exploration of the concept of professionalism).
28. Russell G. Pearce is a Professor of Law at Fordham University School of Law.
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funded by polluters, economic imperialists, or vice-peddlers. He does
not operate a mixed practice of law, accountancy, and consulting. He
teaches Professional Responsibility at a mainstream law school.29 He is
not a drafter of Sam Adams-like broadsides but a serious legal scholar
whose past writings have been supportive of the lawyer-statesman ideal
and the application of law for the greater public good.30 Consequently,
when Pearce adopts as his mantra for the coming century the axiom that
law should abandon the professionalism paradigm that has so long been
its underpinning, it is hard not to take notice. Pearce argues that law
should be characterized as a business rather than a profession and
regulated accordingly under a business paradigm.31 To be sure, others
have suggested that law could profit from greater importation of eco-
nomic and business principles, or at least the use of such principles to
analyze the state of the practice of law. 32 In doing so, however, these
commentators have not forsaken the basic core of the professionalism
paradigm.33 Pearce is the first to take the proverbial plunge and urge re-
placement of the professionalism organizing thesis with the business or-
ganizing thesis.
As a result (and with some risk of oversimplification and overperson-
alization), this commentary focuses on Pearce’s working thesis.34 He de-
serves considerable credit not only for being a contrarian voice resisting
to some degree the nostalgia and romance characterizing some modern
writings defending professionalism, but also for refusing to rest upon
mere criticism of the status quo. Instead, he articulates a clear, if incom-
plete, alternative vision that draws the entire whither goest the practice
of law debate into sharper definition.
                                                                                                                                                
29. He takes it seriously. See  Russell G. Pearce, Teaching Ethics Seriously: Legal Eth ics
as the Most Important Subject in Law School, 29 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 719 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Russell G. Pearce, Rediscovering the Republican Origins of the Legal Eth ics
Codes , 6 GEO. J. L EGAL ETHICS  241 (1992).
31. See  Russell G. Pearce, Law Day 2050: Post-Professionalism, Moral Leadership, and
the Law-as-Business Paradigm, 27 FLA. S T. U. L. R EV. 9 (1999) [hereinafter Pearce, Law Day
2050]; Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional
Ideology Will Improve the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. R EV. 1229 (1995)
[hereinafter Pearce, Paradigm Shift].
32. See, e.g., MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT OF LAWYERS (1991); Gilson,
supra note 5, at 871 (“By applying economic analysis to highlight the critical role of profession -
alism in the market for legal services, it is possible to demonstrate the importance of both pro-
fessionalism as a concept and economics as a means to analyze it.”); Ronald J. Gilson and Rob-
ert H. Mnookin, Sharing Among the Human Capitalists: An Economic Inquiry into the Corpo-
rate Law Firm and How Partners Split Profits, 37 STAN. L. REV. 313 (1985) (applying portfolio
theory and the economic theory of agency to analysis of the corporate law firm).
33. For example, Gilson describes himself as in alliance with the more traditionalist writ-
ers William Simon and Robert Gordon in what he terms the “Stanford Neo-Radical Rehabilita-
tion of the Professionalism Project.” See  Gilson, supra note 5, at 888 n.41. Although Gilson
makes this comment with his tongue at least partially in his cheek, it is clear that Gilson, on
economic grounds, supports retention of the basic edifice of the professionalism paradigm. See
also Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism? , in  LAWYERS’
IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES 230 (Robert L. Nelson et al. eds.,  1992); Robert W. Gordon, The
Independence of Lawyers, 68 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1988).
34. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1265-76; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 18-19 (suggesting that the professionalism paradigm is contradictory and predicting
its ultimate rejection by lawyers).
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Pearce, however, sacrifices some clarity and contrarian quality of his
vision by arguing for a “kinder, gentler” business paradigm for law.35 Ap-
parently, he is unwilling to embrace a complete laissez-fair business of
law. Instead, he argues for a moderate way, or “Middle Range,” between
a pure market regime for lawyering and what he characterizes as the
haute professionalism ethos that has traditionally strangled the law but
has decreased in force so greatly as to lose its descriptive power.36 To
some extent, this Article not only takes the liberty of focusing on one
particular vision of law as a business, but it also paints the business the-
sis as a straw man, although Pearce’s actual business paradigm is a more
nuanced figure.37 In addition, the Pearce “Middle Range” business king-
dom, if shaped to respond to my criticisms, would look remarkably like a
professionalism paradigm. Consequently, it loses its identity, suggesting
that law needs the professionalism paradigm, at least in fact if not in
name.
Nonetheless, this Article argues that even if the law-as-business con-
struct is molded into something less radical than a Spencerian night-
mare of pure laissez-faire lawyering, Pearce’s project points American
law and American lawyers toward a potentially disastrous fork in the
road of sociopolitical development. No matter how refined the final
product, a business-based construct of lawyering holds inherent evils.
The mere act of adopting an organizing schema utilizing a business
paradigm must be rejected—not because it removes lawyers from a ped-
estal, but because it fails to regulate lawyers in a manner that will bring
out the best and suppress the worst in them, the law, and society. This
Article argues that although the professionalism paradigm has its prob-
lems, it remains the organizing principle most likely to lead to a better
practice of law across the many dimensions of lawyering. For lawyers to
shun defining themselves as professionals and instead characterize their
work as business is to embrace the descent of the modern lawyer rather
than resist it.
In Part II, I will briefly set forth the propositions underlying Pearce’s
thesis that a shift to the business paradigm in the regulation of lawyers is
imminent and necessary. I will then explore the rationale underlying
professionalism, including nontraditional justifications for the model;
the nature of Kuhnian paradigm shifts, concluding that the evidence is
insufficient to support the prediction of an imminent shift; and the na-
ture of the proposed business paradigm, concluding that it is too incom-
plete to be functional and, due to the impoverished nature of business
ethics, would likely aggravate law’s modern woes further.
                                                                                                                                                
35. Pearce states:
More appealing than the status quo and market alternatives is a Middle Range ap -
proach. It combines the advantages of a market system with a communitarian
moral vision and retains a place, though a limited one, for the current institutions
of the bar.
Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1269.
36. See  id.
37. I do this not to be rhetorically unfair to Pearce or his thesis, but to draw in higher re-
lief the pitfalls I fear should the law-as-business ethos take hold.
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Part III will discuss the sociology of the legal community today, pro-
viding a brief historical glance at legal regulation, an overview of the
teachings of sociology regarding group norms, and a discussion of the
importance of these ideas in evaluating and selecting a paradigm for
governing lawyers. Part IV will then analyze and compare the profes-
sionalism and business paradigms in the light of sociology’s teachings,
concluding that professionalism continues to offer a superior approach
to influencing the behavior of attorneys in the way most beneficial to so-
ciety. Part V then assesses the inevitable shortcomings of the business
paradigm, using specific examples from the business world and from
other professions such as medicine. I conclude that the consequences of
departing from a professionalism model are quite dire and will result in
further decline of lawyers and the practice of law rather than the renais-
sance suggested by Pearce.
II.    The Incomplete Case for a Paradigm Shift to Law-as-Business
A.   Pearce’s Thesis
Pearce’s thesis, first argued in 1995 and implicitly reiterated in this
Symposium, can be reduced to the following propositions:
(1) The underlying rationale for crafting law as a profession was a l-
ways inherently flawed;38
(2) The flaws of the professionalism paradigm have become more
pronounced in the modern era.39
(3) These modern pressures have so undermined the professionalism
model as to place American law on the precipice of a Kuhnian para-
digm shift.40
                                                                                                                                                
38. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1230-32, 1237-40; Pearce, Law Day
2050, supra note 31, at 17.
39. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1237-50; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 17.
40. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1246-63; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 17-19. Indeed, in Law Day 2050, Pearce predicts that the paradigm shift will take
place and essentially be complete by the mid-twenty-first century, burying the professionalism
paradigm. One can only hope that Pearce’s prognosticative powers are no better than those of
Soviet leader Nikita S. Khrushchev, who made a similar boast in the 1960s.
By “Kuhnian,” I refer to the prominent work on the sociology of science and the manner in
which change occurs in the prevailing theories governing a discipline. See  THOMAS S. KUHN,
THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed. 1970) [hereinafter Kuhn, SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS], a book described by Richard Rorty as “the most influential English-language
philosophy book of the last half-century.” Richard Rorty, Untruth and Consequences, NEW
REPUBLIC , July 31, 1995, at 32, 33 (reviewing KILLING TIME: THE AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF PAUL
FEYERABEND  (1995)).
Kuhn argued that prevailing theory and doctrine within a scientific or scholarly community is
to some degree socially constructed and does not flow ineludibly from empirical observation
and consequent deductive conclusion. In times of “normal science,” however, a prevailing para-
digm that organizes the discipline dominates both the academy and the practice of the art.
Practitioners of normal science give the discipline practical application or work for further dis-
covery and to resolve outstanding questions or “anomalies” arising from differences between
theoretical prediction and observed reality. However, when too many or too serious anomalies
arise and cannot be adequately explained within the framework of the prevailing paradigm,
pressure builds for a revision of the paradigm. Ultimately, a substantial alteration or shift in the
paradigm takes place and the formerly dominant paradigm is either replaced or substantially
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(4) We are in the midst of a “crisis” not only of political attack on law-
yers but also “professional insecurity” because of the cognitive disso-
nance felt by lawyers whose real world challenges are inconsistent
with the professionalism paradigm purportedly governing the practice
of law.41
(5) Lawyers (I am trying not to talk about “the profession” in order to
avoid loaded words) are divided over these issues in fundamental
ways that cannot be resolved through the existing professionalism
construct.42
(6) Efforts to “fix” the professionalism paradigm will not cure current
problems.43
(7) A complete shift to a law-as-business organizing principle is neces-
sary to resolve the modern woes befalling the law.44
(8) Aspects of law nonetheless distinguish it from an “ordinary” busi-
ness, requiring that the law-as-business regulatory system (the “busi-
ness paradigm”) operate in the “Middle Range” between the status
quo of professionalism and a pure market-based system.45
B.   The Incomplete and Unconvincing Critique of the Status Quo
My critique of Pearce’s proposition begins with an examination of the
traditional rationale underlying professionalism and Pearce’s criticism of
it. Pearce criticizes several aspects of the rationale underlying the profes-
sionalism paradigm in addition to criticizing the professionalism para-
digm in action. He certainly thinks that the historical case for such a
characterization, even if compelling a century ago, has become out-
moded.46 While there may have been some flaws in previous formula-
tions of the rationale, any analysis must account for the important so-
ciological works documenting the impact of social norms on behavior.47
                                                                                                                                                
altered. New theory ousts old, and this is reflected not only in daily operations of the discipline
but also in the teaching and theorization of the academy.
For more expansive descriptions of Kuhn’s analysis, see Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note
31, at 1230-37. See also  Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm, Normal Science, or Crumbling
Construct? Trends in Adjudicatory Procedure and Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 659,
695-705 (1993) (comparing changes in civil litigation to scientific paradigm shifts discussed by
Kuhn) [hereinafter Stempel, New Paradigm]; Steven L. Win ter, Bull Durham and the Uses of
Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 639, 647 n.44 (1990) (explain ing that Kuhn used “paradigm” to mean
“disciplinary matrix,” “exemplar,” and “model”); Thomas S. Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Para -
digms, in  THE ESSENTIAL TENSION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE 293
(1977).
41. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1256-63; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 18-19.
42. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1263-65; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 18-19.
43. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1263-65; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 22.
44. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1265-70; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 20-22.
45. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1269-76; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 20-22.
46. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1238-56; Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra
note 31, at 16.
47. See  discussion infra Part III.
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However, the basis for crafting law as a profession may not be inher-
ently flawed. Rather, our dominant explanations for why law must be
viewed as a profession may be flawed. Previously persuasive rationales
for a professionalism paradigm may be outdated, but the system of pro-
fessionalism remains well justified by more modern policy goals. For ex-
ample, a precept or doctrine may emerge based on one rationale but may
maintain its value under a different rationale after the original justifica-
tion becomes outdated.48
Pearce’s analysis focuses on the traditional rationale offered for pro-
fessionalism. As he articulates it, regulating an economic actor as a pro-
fessional is justified where the activity in question:
a) involves esoteric knowledge or great complexity;
b) is thus beyond the capacity of lay regulation;
c) thus requires professional self-regulation;
d) and thus requires autonomy.49
As Pearce points out, proponents of this rationale consider the altr u-
istic ideology accompanying professionalism to be derived from the po-
tential for abuse occasioned by autonomy.50 According to these theorists,
this danger requires that the self-regulating professional reject financial
self-interest and profit maximization in favor of a credo of altruism and
client service in return for professional autonomy.51
The failure of the altruism rationale for professionalism hardly in-
validates the professionalism paradigm in its entirety. As Pearce, other
scholars, and mass media have shown, the case for lawyer altruism is
spotty and often more humorous than persuasive. Lawyers practice law
primarily to earn a living. Becoming a professional does not negate the
laws of nature or an individual’s adherence to Maslow’s hierarchy. Even
the most professional lawyer wants to put food on the table before saving
the world, but acknowledging this degree of lawyer self-interested moti-
vation does not make lawyers unprofessional.52 The professionalism
paradigm can be vital in preventing a lawyer’s perfectly understandable
economic self-interest from metastasizing into socially undesirable be-
havior.
                                                                                                                                                
48. For example, the insurable interest doctrine, which requires a policyholder to have a
legal or factual interest in the object of the insurance, was initially justified as a means of dis-
couraging the purchase of insurance as a form of gambling. Over time, social aversion to gam-
bling subsided; for example, the betting line is now a regular feature on the sports page. How-
ever, the doctrine is useful in discouraging moral hazard and insurance fraud. Policyholders
with an insurable interest in the property or in the life-insured are less likely to engage in arson
or murder to collect policy benefits. See  JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT
DISPUTES §1.04[a] (1999); KENNETH S. ABRAHAM , INSURANCE LAW AND REGULATION 301 (2d ed.
1995).
49. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1238-40.
50. See  id.
51. See  id.
52. Just as being compensated does not make one unprofessional, neither does being an
employee. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 122 (noting that members of the five traditional pro-
fessions of medicine, law, clergy, military, and university teaching have historically and fre-
quently been salaried employees rather than independent contractors). However, lawyer pro-
fessionalism may in some cases be significantly undermined by employee status, which may re-
quire revision of the Rules of Professional Conduct in order to give employee-attorneys greater
autonomy. See  discussion infra notes 278 -318  and accompanying text.
1999]                         E M B R AC I N G  D E SC E N T  37
1.   Complexity and Specialized Knowledge
Despite a century of development of the definitions of professional-
ism, Pearce’s standard indicia of being a professional tend to miss the
mark or understate the case for professionalism, at least for today’s de-
bate surrounding lawyers. Although lawyers have knowledge of complex
matters, so do many workers. By this criterion, computer programmers,
electricians, and auto mechanics are at least as professional as lawyers.53
To a large degree, almost every aspect of modern life in a society gov-
erned by division of labor involves a considerable degree of specialized
knowledge that is at least as esoteric as law. Use of the complexity crite-
rion, at times, proves distinctly unhelpful for separating the professional
from the nonprofessional. Whatever one’s position on non-lawyer prac-
tice, it is hard to justify lawyer self-regulation and autonomy on com-
plexity grounds, particularly when other complex fields are not as
autonomous.
At the same time, however, as Pearce points out, legal knowledge is
accessible to the laity. Ironically, it may be easier to find out about the
law than the proper method for trimming trees.54 In fact, many nonlaw-
yers have successfully mastered at least a corner of legal complexity, cre-
ating the current debate about the proper boundaries of non-lawyer
practice.55 Still, a failure of the complexity rationale for professionalism
is hardly fatal to the professionalism paradigm so long as other, more
persuasive rationales for professionalism hold force. As discussed below,
there are alternative and more persuasive grounds for conceptualizing
law as a profession. In addition, Pearce appears to undervalue the edu-
cational factor in professionalism. Professionalism scholars have tradi-
tionally stressed its educational component as well as the informational
component in delineating the boundaries of “professionalism”.56 Al-
though an intelligent layperson can find the law and obtain sufficient
grasp of it to conduct legal activity, this does not give that layperson an
                                                                                                                                                
53. At least, I do not fix my car, and I bet most mechanics do not draft their own wills or
file lawsuits pro se. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 52-54 (noting that occupations such as ar-
chitecture, dentistry, engineering, etc., are recognized as “professional, technical, and kindred
workers,” by the federal government).
Using only the complexity criterion, one can make a strong case that all of these workers
really are “professionals.” Common sense tells us that this cannot really be the case. At some
point, a professionalism definition weighted too heavily toward complexity or specialized
knowledge produces an awfully long list of professionals. Surely, when everybody is a profes-
sional, nobody is a professional, and the term has been drained of meaning. Consequently, ad -
ditional criteria must be considered to categorize professionals today and to determine if a
professionalism paradigm remains apt for application to law and the other traditional profes-
sions of medicine, the clergy, the military, and university teaching, as well as to relatively recent
professional groups such as accountants and architects. See  id.  at 122 (listing five traditional
professions).
54. And that is, on the whole, a good thing, even if it serves to fuel the misdirected busi-
ness paradigm movement. A democratic citizenry should possess basic legal knowledge, and
information about the law should be relatively accessible.
55. See  Richard B. Schmitt, Advocates Act as Lawyers, and States Cry ‘Objection!’, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 14, 1999, at B1 (discussing a case against an advocate for disabled children and the
debate over who is really protected by bans on unauthorized practice of law).
56. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7 at 25, 59-60.
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appreciation of the full warp-and-woof of law that we believe is imparted
by formal legal training.57
Perhaps the narrowness of Pearce’s definition of “professional” can be
gauged by comparing it with that of the National Labor Relations Act,
which includes as criteria whether an individual’s work is “predomi-
nantly intellectual and varied in character;” whether it involves a “con-
sistent exercise of discretion and judgment;” whether it resists stan-
dardization; and whether it requires the kind of complex or specialized
knowledge usually acquired after a prolonged period of formal study
(rather than general education and apprenticeship).58
In contrast to the NLRA, Pearce focuses relentlessly, but too nar-
rowly, on the complexity and esoteric aspects of professionalism. As dis-
cussed further below,59 discretion and judgment in the face of uncer-
tainty surrounding important problems and life events, together, form a
major part of lawyering, but this dimension of the practice is essentially
unexamined in Pearce’s critique. Although it remains to be seen whether
wise discretionary judgment results more under a professionalism para-
digm or a business paradigm,60 any analysis and comparison must give
sufficient appreciation to this aspect of professionalism, generally, and
lawyering, in particular.
2.   Autonomy
Another aspect of professionalism as traditionally defined is that
professionals, to a large degree, manage their own time and activity. 61
Scheduling flexibility, as a component of professionalism, should not be
                                                                                                                                                
57. This is one major reason that America moved from informal legal education via ap -
prenticeship to full-time law schools. See  ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN
AMERICAN FROM THE 1850S TO THE 1980S (1983) (describing the development of American law
schools).
58. See  29 U.S.C. § 152(12)(a) (1994) (added in 1947 by the Taft-Harley Act, ch. 120, § 101,
61 Stat. 136, 137), discussed in FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 138-39. Similarly, the American Bar
Association Commission on Professionalism found the elements of professionalism to be:
1. Receipt of special privileges from the state;
2. Substantial intellectual training;
3. Clients are required to trust the professional because their relative lack of train -
ing and knowledge prevents them from fully and accurately evaluating the profes-
sional’s work;
4. The client’s vulnerable position of trust is acceptable because the professional’s
self-interest is modulated by devotion to serving the client and the public interest;
5. Self-regulation by the professional.
See  AMERICAN BAR ASS’N , supra note 5, at 10, 11. Pearce addresses these elements more directly,
largely in an attempt to debunk them; like the ABA, however, he pays insufficient attention to
the underlying premises. The ABA does not ask hard questions about whether anything other
than precatory language really prevents lawyers from taking advantage of comparatively less-
informed clients. Similarly, Pearce does not ask whether the lawyer’s potential to fleece clients
is any greater than that of the auto mechanic, the plumber, or the electrician. My answer, elabo-
rated in text, is that the lawyer’s opportunity for self-dealing is only marginally greater than
that of other vendors and that it is best controlled by stringent regulation and deterrent penal-
ties rather than hoary platitudes about professionalism.
59. See  infra notes 169-252 and accompanying text.
60. See  id.  (arguing that such judgment is more likely to be inculcated in lawyers under a
professionalism paradigm and providing examples of business behavior arguably in conflict
with this ideal).
61. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 149-55.
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confused with true autonomy. A lawyer may be completely non-
autonomous yet intrinsically vested with a good deal of discretion over
time management because of the nature of the enterprise. For example,
a lawyer told to write an opinion letter confirming the legality of the em-
ployer’s conduct is hardly autonomous.62 Still, in constructing the re-
quired document, the lawyer, nonetheless, retains substantial control
over the manner in which the document is created. For example, the
lawyer might decide, for example, the order of research, the sources em-
ployed, the format of the letter, and the tone and argument, as well as
the lawyer’s own use of time—drafting the letter at midnight, for exam-
ple, because she went to her child’s school play in the afternoon. Never-
theless, it would be a mistake to call this lawyer autonomous unless she
is actually using independent, professional judgment in crafting the
opinion letter.
Autonomy remains an important hallmark of professionalism—one
indeed strained by modern developments. Historically, lawyers have had
great autonomy. They get to decide for whom they will work and for
whom they will continue to work.63 Lawyers in traditional practice can
fire clients, just as clients can fire lawyers. As discussed below,64 the
growth of in-house counsel and captive law firms has changed this land-
scape, generally making lawyers less autonomous, perhaps to a degree
that violates the professionalism paradigm.
Nevertheless, lawyers as a group, without doubt, satisfy the autonomy
criterion of professionalism. The problem is that, by this definition of
being able to walk away, businesspersons are similarly autonomous. In-
tel and Microsoft are required to do something only by contract. They
can pick and choose business partners and terminate contracts for mate-
rial breach. Even without material breach, they can terminate contracts
if they are willing to pay damages. Nonetheless, by the autonomy yard-
stick, lawyers as a group are still more professional than businessper-
sons, because lawyers, by virtue of their license to practice, hold an asset
of value and can, in reality, earn a living without doing tasks they find
wrong or distasteful. Although this is also a problem with the profes-
sionalism paradigm—that it insulates lawyers from pure market forces
and thus may create more expense or inefficiency in the delivery of legal
services—it also enhances autonomy and thereby makes lawyers less
likely to be mere “business servants.” 65 Nonetheless, autonomy, alone,
does not distinguish lawyers from businesspeople.
                                                                                                                                                
62. Furthermore, in a situation of such slavishness, this lawyer would cease to be a lawyer
under my concept of the professionalism paradigm. See  infra notes 169-252 and accompanying
text. For purposes of discussion, however, one can concede the autonomy issue and continue to
inquire whether a professionalism construct remains a better means of regulating lawyers than
a business construct.
63. Thus, if the client in the example above tells the lawyer to author an opinion le tter
blessing the client’s conduct by, for example, predicting for a prospective investor that there
will be no adverse effects from pending litigation, even though the lawyer knows the client will
be held responsible for millions of dollars in damages, the lawyer can refuse to write the letter.
64. See  infra Part V.E.
65. Pearce and I would unite in criticizing this type of lawyer. See Pearce, Paradigm Shift,
supra note 31, at 1237-50.
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To the degree that it gives lawyers greater autonomy, I posit that the
professionalism paradigm generally serves society, by encouraging at-
torneys to refuse to engage in frivolous or antisocial conduct merely to
make a buck, more than it harms society through the protectionist li-
censing enjoyed by lawyers. Despite what Pearce identifies as the inevi-
table Zeitgeist leading us toward “Law Day 2050,” I believe the burden
of persuasion rests with him and other advocates of the business para-
digm. Unless they can show that society wastes so much on over-priced
legal services as to far exceed the value of greater lawyer autonomy, we
should not be rushing to tear down the professionalism paradigm.66
Ironically, the ravages of lawyering under a business paradigm are
succinctly illustrated by Pearce himself in his contribution to this Sym-
posium. Through the dramatic vehicle of a “Law Day” speech given dur-
ing the mid-twenty-first century, Pearce, as the mythical speaker, re-
flects on law’s move from a professionalism paradigm to a business
paradigm. Extolling this change, he cites a few examples of law practice
in the year 2050 that would not have been permitted during the profes-
sionalism era.
Pearce predicts that the use of “Legal Maintenance Organizations, or
LMOs, [will become] common parts of employee benefit packages, as
well as viable options for individual consumers who could afford
them.”67 He further predicts that consumers will find that “LMOs, like
HMOs . . . , make services more affordable . . . by limiting the consumer’s
control of the delivery of services.” 68 As discussed below69 in connection
with the absence of professionalism in some HMOs, the predicted
growth of the LMO may be no cause to celebrate.
The extension of the contingent fee to criminal and family law cases,
will, according to Pearce, make “counsel of choice more affordable in
these areas.” 70 If this is the future under a business paradigm, I can only
                                                                                                                                                
66. To an extent, of course, by placing the burden of persuasion for change on Pearce I am
being a bit unfair. Not only would it be hard for him to “prove” the cost increase result ing from
the restricted entry into the practice of law, it would also be hard to convince me and other de-
fenders of the professionalism paradigm that the loss of lawyer autonomy would not carry a
high price tag. Lawyer autonomy and its value are intrinsically hard to measure, however, be-
cause, so often, the benefits occur out of public view. We simply cannot know with certainty
how many times a lawyer, because of her ability to say “no,” requires clients to do the right
thing.
I posit that this happens a great deal and creates substantial value for society, although much
of my belief is premised on intuition and personal experience rather than systematic study and
measurement. For example, as a litigator in practice I frequently saw that clients initially resis-
tant to providing reasonable discovery material or accepting a reasonable settlement offer came
around on the issue because they heeded counsel’s advice. Neither I nor my former colleagues
ever actually threatened to “fire” the client if the client was unreasonable or urged improper
conduct. Nonetheless, the effects of lawyer autonomy were palpable in that we refused to ac-
cede to wishes for improper behavior; the nature of the professionalism paradigm made it im-
plicit that we could cease working on the matter at any juncture. As noted previously, business-
persons can quit at any time as well. I simply argue that fewer businesspersons have the practi-
cal ability to quit—and the autonomy it brings—than lawyers.
67. Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 31, at 12.
68. Id. at 12 n.21.
69. See  infra notes 277-94 and accompanying text.
70. Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 31, at 13.
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take comfort in knowing I will be safely retired (and probably buried) by
2050.
In Pearce’s 2050, “most lawyers work for the ‘Big 11,’ LMOs, or legal
service providers like H&R Block.”71 As discussed throughout this article,
lawyers working for nonlawyers in the course of performing legal serv-
ices is highly problematic because it inevitably leads to pressures tending
to compromise lawyers’ independent judgment. Although it is probably
too late to turn back the clock on in-house counsel, threats to lawyer in-
dependence engender concern and scrutiny rather than a rush to expand
its reach. Similarly, the concentration of law into “megafirms” is consid-
ered by many a highly problematic trend. Two well-regarded experts on
legal ethics have proposed that law firms be limited in size to fifty law-
yers to reduce the tendency of economic expansion and profit maximi-
zation which cloud the attorney’s commitment to the system of profes-
sional responsibility.72
Perhaps more disturbing is what Pearce’s brave new world entails for
conflicts of interest: The business paradigm will apparently make society
so confident in lawyers’ ability to resist temptation and avoid inadver-
tent intra-organizational leaks that we will permit lawyers in the same
office to work both sides of the street in the same matter . He predicts
that “the Federal Code [will] make all conflicts personal”73 and end the
current law of imputed disqualification,74 although “requir[ing] strict
screening procedures to ensure confidentiality and loyalty within a
firm.”75
If these examples of the future are indicative of life under the busi-
ness paradigm, Pearce has hardly made much of a brief for change. Each
of these “achievements” of the business paradigm is, at least arguably, a
decline in the quality of law and society.
A fundamental weakness of Pearce’s critique is its de facto focus on
specialized knowledge, an element of professionalism most associated
                                                                                                                                                
71. Id. at 14.
72. See  R ICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS OF THE AMERICAN
LAWYER 238-40 (1999). But see Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline in 2050: A Look Back,
60 FORDHAM L. REV. 125 (1991) (espousing a contrary view by arguing that bigger institutions
with more at stake make for prominent and cooperative targets of regu lation).
In my own view, critics of large law firms and money, as a common denominator, have a
compelling point, but it also appears true that large firms often are better at establishing sys-
tems for avoiding professional lapses such as undiscovered conflict checks, missed statutes of
limitation, or failure to cover open cases of the vacationing partner. There may indeed be
slouching toward greed in the large law firm, but the economically secure large law firm is also
more likely to have the fortitude to say “no” to clients who seek to bend the rules. After all,
Pearce’s mythical Cravath & Wachtel firm does not need the money that badly. See  Pearce, Law
Day 2050, supra note 31, at 10. Many small firms or solo practiti oners will be unable to say no
and lose a large fee. Rather than focusing on size alone, it is more important to focus on firm
culture, which shapes lawyers, and occupational culture, which shapes firms and lawyers.
73. Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 31, at 16.
74. See  MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (providing that if lawyers
practice in a firm, “none of them shall knowingly represent a client when any one of them prac-
ticing alone would be prohibited from doing so” by the conflict rules applicable to individual
attorneys) [hereinafter RULE].
75. Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 31, at 16.
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with a particular school of writings about professionalism.76 Pearce uses
this school of thought as his traditional definition of professionalism,
finds it wanting, and then essentially adopts a “market control or collec-
tive project model” of professionalism espoused by one school of profes-
sionalism writers. 77 Finding market control a better explanation of the
lawyer professionalism phenomenon leads Pearce to resolve the per-
ceived hypocritical contradiction by embracing a market-based business
paradigm.78 Although the knowledge-based observations of profession-
alism are important, Pearce gives them insufficient appreciation in his
relentless explanations of professionalism based on market-oriented
protectionism. In doing so, he not only gives insufficient attention to the
nuances of the knowledge-based views of professionalism but tends to
overlook, almost entirely, the sociological school of professionalism as-
sociated with Talcott Parsons, Emile Durkheim, and others.79 This soft-
pedaling of the sociological perspective on professionalism, in favor of
professionalism’s focus on specialized knowledge, is a real Achilles’ Heel
in the Pearce thesis. Most defenders of the professionalism paradigm
base their case much more on the sociological perspective than on the
special expertise of lawyers.80 A richer understanding of professional ac-
tivities requires a greater appreciation not only of the professional’s
marketplace but also of the sociology of professionals as compared to
other workers. Appreciating these factors leads to considerable trepida-
tion regarding Pearce’s proposed business paradigm and furthers greater
appeal for the professionalism paradigm.
3.   Altruism
As Pearce argues, the traditional rationale for treating some workers
as professionals is flawed and, at times, unrealistic. For example, Pearce
has considerable fun with Roscoe Pound’s romanticized and flowery de-
scription of a profession as the “[p]ursuit of the learned art in the spirit
of a public service” where “[g]aining a livelihood is incidental” to the
                                                                                                                                                
76. See, e.g. , Andrew Abbott, The New Occupational Structure: What Are the Questions?
16 WORK AND OCCUPATIONS 273-91 (1989); FREIDSON, supra note 7.
77. See, e.g., R ICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS (1989); MAGALI SARFATTI LARSON , THE
R ISE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977).
78. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1267 (“The anomaly arising from the
Professionalism Paradigm’s failure to curtail the business conduct of lawyers disappears under
the Business Paradigm. If law is a business, the business conduct of lawyers is expected, not
problematic.”).
79. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (Cornelia
Brookfield trans., 1957); TALCOTT PARSONS, ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY (rev. ed. 1954);
HARRISON M. TRICE, OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURES IN THE WORKPLACE (1993).
Although he did not focus on the professions per se, prominent sociologist Robert Merton’s
writings on social behavior buttress quite formidably the writings of Durkheim and Parsons.
See  ROBERT K. MERTON, S OCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter
MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY]; ROBERT K. MERTON, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY: F IVE ESSAYS, OLD
AND NEW  (rev. ed. 1967) (including updated portions of material first published in 1949)
[hereinafter MERTON, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY].
80. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 26 , at 575 n.27 (citing writings of Adolph Berle and Lon
Fuller).
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lawyer.81 Probably more accurate is the famous New Yorker cartoon in
which several law firm partners chastise a young associate for expressing
corny idealism at a firm cocktail party: “We practice law to make money,
Hawkins. If you can think of a better reason to practice law, let’s hear
it.”82
According to Pearce, the traditional rationale for defining professions
and permitting them to self-regulate was always flawed, but these prob-
lems have become more pronounced in the modern era. He identifies
two particularly dangerous types of problems emerging from the dys-
function of professionalism: the “profit-maximizer” attorney and a vari-
ant, the “business servant” attorney.83 The former uses the professional
perch to reap enhanced profits from clients and others without adding
value.84 The latter are so rabidly wrapped up in the fiduciary-morality-
of-lawyering-as-zealous-advocacy that they assist clients in antisocial
endeavors.
To the extent that Pound’s vision of the lawyer community suggests
that professionals are saints,85 it is of course wrong, and Pound’s great
                                                                                                                                                
81. Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1245 n.75 (quoting ROSCOE POUND , THE
LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES  5 (1953)).
82. The quote is from memory; the cartoon appeared sometime in the 1970s in the New
Yorker. Indeed, many attorneys were quite open about enhancing professional status through
self-regulation. For example, in 1933, Second Circuit Judge Martin Manton urged the bar to
regulate strongly in order to limit the number of lawyers and address a pe rceived danger of
overcrowding. See  Martin Manton, A “New Deal” for Lawyers, 19 A.B.A. J.  596 (1933). Per-
haps, in retrospect, it was not altogether surprising that Judge Manton later was found to have
taken bribes. See  GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE J UDGE 141-43, 257-61,
503-10 (1994); Rayman L. Solomon, Five Crises or One: The Concept of Legal Professionalism,
1925-1960, LAWYERS’ IDEALS/LAWYERS’ PRACTICES, supra note 33 , at 157.
Manton’s fall from grace remains well known; it is so provocative that it probably continues
to serve as a deterrent to tempted judges, in addition to whatever criminal law dete rrent exists.
See  In re Levy, 30 F. Supp. 317, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1939) (disbarring attorney for, among other
things, giving Manton $50,000 unsecured “loan” that was never repaid while representing cli-
ent before Manton). As discussed below, in the world of the business paradigm, criminal and
other regulatory deterrents become the overriding bulwark against an tisocial behavior; under
the professionalism paradigm, however, there are additional important deterrents and incen -
tives that arguably make for better conduct by lawyers. See  infra Part IV; see also GUNTHER,
supra, at 278, 503-13 (noting that, even prior to Manton’s bribery coming to light, Learned
Hand thought him a poor judge exhibiting unprofessional approach to deciding cases); Alfred
S. Konefsky, Freedom and Interdependence in Twent ieth-Century Contract Law: Traynor and
Hand and Promissory Estoppel, 65 U. CIN . L. REV. 1169, 1192-3 (1997) (criticizing Manton’s
reasoning and decision in contract litigation).
83. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1231, 1237-50.
84. Arguably, he also undermines value. For example, the plaintiff’s bar, particularly class
action lawyers, has been subjected to substantial criticism for at least two decades. The stan -
dard allegation is that these lawyers abuse the professional prerogative by filing litigation that
has settlement value for them but has a negative impact on society through disruption of useful
enterprises. Another critique has been that plaintiffs’ class action lawyers may settle a meritori-
ous case too cheaply in order to pocket fees without incurring the substantial financial risk of a
long time investment and a low damages award or loss. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., Class
Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Tort Class Action, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1343 (1995) (discussing,
among other things, collusive settlements and proposing solutions); Susan P. Koniak,  Feasting
While the Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045 (1995)
(discussing ethical problems raised by case in which settlement was reached before the class
was certified); Symposium, The Institute of Judicial Administration Research Conference on
Class Actions, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1996) (devoting the conference to a discussion of the relative
costs and benefits of class-action lawsuits).
85. See  supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Pearce’s critique of Pound’s altruistic model).
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contributions to law and society do not make the statement any less
wrong. Nonetheless, pointing out that lawyers are not saints hardly deals
a crushing blow to the professionalism paradigm. Because lawyers are
not saints, the professionalism paradigm in fact takes on greater force.
The choice is not between the professionalism model and Nirvana. The
choice is between the professionalism paradigm and competing methods
of regulating lawyers, such as the business paradigm. On this count,
Pound’s views retain a good deal of truth. He observed that “in a busi-
ness or trade [gaining a livelihood] is the entire purpose.”86 Imperfect as
it may be, the professionalism paradigm may be the best-known means
of exacting socially useful behavior from lawyers.
4.   Additional Considerations in Characterizing Professions Favor
Continuing to Consider Law as a Profession
(a)   Judgment
On one hand, Pearce observes that there is nothing particularly spe-
cial about lawyers as human beings.87 On the other hand, he ignores
what sociologists and psychologists tell us about the impact of social or-
ganizational structures on human behavior.88 Rather than focusing so
intently on a few criteria for assessing classification of the professional
and nonprofessional, a shift in perspective is required. Lawyers should
continue to be regulated as professionals rather than businesspersons,
not because of the traditional bases for professional self-regulation such
as the complexity rationale, but because the professionalism paradigm
does a better job of fostering judgment with regard for public as well as
private interests among lawyers than does the business paradigm.89
One significant feature of legal practice is that it requires the applica-
tion of reasoned and seasoned judgment in the face of uncertainty. Law-
yers conduct implicit cost-benefit analyses on a rolling basis and venture
predictions regarding the future and their ability to impact the future.
                                                                                                                                                
86. ROSCOE POUND , THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES  5 (1953), quoted in
Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1245 n.75.
87. See  supra text accompanying notes 50 -60 (discussing Pearce’s argument that profes-
sionalism cannot be adequately justified by traditional rationales because lawyers are no more
altruistic than anyone else and because they cannot be distinguished from many “nonprofes-
sionals” on the basis of the complexity of their work or their possession of esoteric knowledge).
88. See infra Part III for discussion of the impact of informal norms, such as those en -
forced by the professionalism paradigm, on human behavior.
89. As others have stated:
[E]ven private lawyers committed to unswerving loyalty to client interests still must
assume a quasi-public responsibility for honest observance of the basic rules and
procedures of the framework, even in the face of the many opportunities they have
to ignore the rules with impunity. Once this is acknowledged, the free market lib-
eral faces the problem of how such islands of civic virtue might be secured in a
word of generalized self-seeking. It is unlikely that he will be able to come up with a
better answer than the one offered by professionalism.
Gordon & Simon, supra  note 33  at 235. See also, TALCOTT PARSONS, A Sociologist Looks at the
Legal Profession, in  ESSAYS ON SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY, supra note 79 , at 370, 384 (noting that
the lawyer acts “as a kind of buffer between the illegitimate desires of his cl ients and the social
interest”).
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While this aspect of lawyering is related to complexity,90 nevertheless, it
is the “judgment” required by the complexity that sets law apart from
most other occupations. The workings of a modern automobile are at
least as complex as many legal issues. When a car breaks down, however,
the course of action is usually clear: Fix the car. Issues of the efficacy of
action simply do not arise in the same manner as takes place in law.
Putting in a new distributor cap has a more predictable impact than fil-
ing a summary judgment motion. Deciding whether to sue a long-time
supplier is quite a bit more involved than deciding whether to change the
oil at three thousand miles, even if the oil change and the complaint
drafting are deemed equally complex.
This point is hardly novel. A number of commentators, most notably
Dean Anthony Kronman, have made essentially this argument for pro-
fessionalism by stressing the importance of judgment and wisdom in
lawyering.91 My additional comment is not only to restate the importance
of these qualities in lawyers. Rather, it is to stress that these aspects of
practicing law are what make it a profession rather than merely another
complex or technical occupation. In Tony Kronman’s contribution to this
Symposium, he not only reiterates that values are at the core of legal
professionalism but also notes the degree to which work satisfaction and
pride relate to the social utility of work.92 One aspect of law as tradition-
ally practiced that makes it an attractive field for talented persons is its
operation under a professionalism paradigm. Perhaps society should
consider the potential impact of the proposed paradigm shift on this as-
pect of lawyering.
(b)   Social Harm and Incompetent Legal Representation
As other commentators in the field of professional responsibility have
pointed out, there are several unique hazards and difficulties posed by
poor lawyering. First, consumers of legal services are particularly vul-
nerable to harm if services provided are incompetent or self-serving,
since representation frequently deals with matters extremely important
to the client. Second, improper or incompetent lawyering is difficult to
detect in a timely fashion. Third, legal activity has potentially long-
lasting and wide-ranging effects on society, requiring that its regulatory
paradigm curb self-dealing by lawyers as much as possible.
For example, Stephen Pepper has noted that in a profession the serv-
ices rendered are “frequently of the utmost personal concern” to a cl i-
ent,93 and the quality of the services rendered “is untestable from the
                                                                                                                                                
90. For example, it is harder to estimate an appellate court’s ruling on a complex point of
law than on a simple and long undisturbed legal doctrine.
91. See  Anthony Kronman, Legal Professionalism, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. R EV. 1, 5 (1999)
[hereinafter Kronman, Legal Professionalism].
92. See  id.  at 4.
93. Stephen L. Pepper, The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role: A Defense, a Problem, and
Some Possibilities, 1986 AM . B. FOUND . R ES. J. 613, 615 [hereinafter Pepper, Amoral Ethical
Role]. Pepper recently reaffirmed his adherence to this indicium of professional activity and
other traditional bases discussed in this article. See  Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Funda-
mentals of Lawyers’ Ethics to Insurance Defense Practice , 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 27, 43 n.42 (1997-
98) (setting forth “definitional characteristics” of a profession, including among others the
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perspective of the layman.”94 Thus, the client is particularly vulnerable if
the professional fails to perform adequately.95 Moreover, the client nor-
mally “needs” the legal services or representation, and lawyer retention
is not really discretionary.96 Obvious examples for lay persons are di-
vorce and will probate. For even small commercial entities, legal services
are often needed for start-up, regular operation, compliance with the
law, taxation, and reorganization compelled by commercial forces. Liti-
gation, particularly defense of criminal charges or a third party’s civil
suit, also tends to render legal representation indispensable.97
Lawyers’ clients are more vulnerable than other consumers. One can
be extremely dependent on a vendor but not particularly vulnerable.98 By
contrast, the client is far more vulnerable to the lawyer as well as more
dependent.99 For example, clients with counsel are normally forbidden,
or at least strongly discouraged, from participating in certain aspects of
adjudication such as sidebar conferences on evidentiary objections. The
client depends on the lawyer to represent her or his interests. The client
is extremely vulnerable to the lawyer’s performance at sidebar, in cham-
bers, in negotiation, and in discovery. If the lawyer concedes an impor-
tant evidentiary point, waives privilege, or makes unduly revealing
statements to opposing counsel, the vulnerable client is often stuck with
the consequences.
Lawyers are agents with the power to bind clients, 100 which makes the
client inherently vulnerable to lawyer error, especially if the matter is
                                                                                                                                                
unique need for the services by individuals, the inability of laypersons to evaluate their worth,
and the requirement of specialized training and education) [hereinafter Pepper, Fundamen-
tals]. This important concept underlying the professionalism model has been set forth by a
number of scholars. See, e.g., BURTON J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM 87
(1976); ELIOT FREIDSON, PROFESSIONALISM REBORN: THEORY PROPHECY , AND POLICY 201 (1994);
WILBERT MOORE , THE PROFESSIONS: ROLES AND RULES 4-22 (1970).
94. See  Pepper, Amoral Ethical Role, supra note 93 , at 615; see also Gilson, supra note 5,
at 889 (discussing this and related traits of the delivery of legal services as matters of in forma-
tion asymmetry between lawyer and client).
95. As Freidson puts it:
In the vast majority of cases of professional work, however, clients are neither so-
phisticated nor powerful, so that the professional’s position as gatekeeper of de-
sired resources combines with a monopoly of organizationally relevant knowledge
about how the system works to create a position of interpersonal power that few are
in a position to challenge.
FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 174.
96. See  Pepper, Fundamentals, supra note 93 , at 43-44 n.42; Pepper, Amoral Ethical
Role, supra note 93 , at 615-17.
97. The consequences of litigation, however, are somewhat more readily apparent than
other types of representation; for this reason, malpractice in this area is not as likely to create
the “time bomb” problem discussed infra. See  text accompanying note 101.
98. For example, I am dependent on the refrigeration system of the local grocer when I
buy milk. I have no idea whether the milk has been kept sufficiently refrigerated, but, at home, I
will discover instantly upon opening the product whether it has spoiled. I have the option to
throw it out, avoiding whatever harm it may have posed.
99. I acknowledge the line is blurred where certain trade services have an element of dan -
ger. Even so, the provision of trade services, to the extent it has qualities of consumer impor-
tance, vulnerability, and undetectability, has aspects of a profession. There is specialized train -
ing and apprenticeship for these trades. In addition to external government regulation, there is
often some form of professional self-regulation through trade associations and unions.
100. See, e.g. , Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 417-18 (1988) (noting that a criminal defen -
dant was precluded from calling a witness due to lawyer’s oversight or, possibly, calcu lated de-
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important to the client. Counsel’s broad agency authority of counsel is
quite distinct from that enjoyed by other service providers. In this way,
lawyers are also different from other professionals such as doctors and
accountants. Unless a patient is undergoing a procedure such as surgery,
the doctor’s authority is not self-executing. Unless the patient takes the
pill, exercises more, loses weight, or gets more sleep, the doctor’s pre-
scription is not implemented. Similarly, a tax return must be signed by
the client. By contrast, lawyers have a considerably larger realm of ab-
solute binding power, triggered more readily by the nature of legal rep-
resentation.
On the whole, legal representation is full of potential time bombs.
Even in fast-track dispute resolution, clients may not be able to gauge
the potential consequences of lawyer strategy and tactics until appeals or
collateral attacks are exhausted.101 For example, deficiencies in separa-
tion agreements may not be realized until years later. Tax returns may
look correct but may ultimately lead to an IRS audit seven years after the
initial filing. The adequacy of wills and trusts is often not tested until
decades after legal services are rendered.
Thus, while it may be true that consumer dependence and complexity
do not adequately distinguish lawyers and others traditionally viewed as
“professional” from other vocations, legal services continue to be set
apart from most daily commercial activity by the unique vulnerability of
its consumers and the time bomb problem. These attributes call upon
society for an organizing construct that will maximize the chances that
such services will be rendered proficiently. “Ordinary,” nonprofessional
business activity, for the most part, either does not need the constraints
of professionalism,102 or is not conducive to self-regulation because of in-
appropriateness or impracticality.103
                                                                                                                                                
cision not to include witness on pretrial witness list); Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983)
(noting that a lawyer has authority to determine the content of briefs, pleadings, motions, and
other papers until discharged by the client); Cotto v. United States, 993 F.2d 274, 281 (1st Cir.
1993) (finding that the client is bound by the court’s determination to dismiss a claim for lack of
prosecution due to a lawyer’s inattentiveness). But see RULE 1.2 (providing that although an
attorney generally controls the means of di scharging representation, the client generally has
control over the objectives of representation and has absolute authority over whether to accept
a settlement in a civil matter and, in a criminal case, whether to plead guilty, waive a jury trial,
or take the stand).
101. This can happen, for example, in cases involving issues like whether the client should
take the stand, which theory of damages is most persuasive, or whether to make a motion for a
pretrial evidence ruling.
102. For example, most product failures do not pose the serious consequences that may en -
sue from legal malpractice or self-dealing. If a new suit rips, one returns it to the cloth ier. If
bread is stale, one complains and asks for a refund or takes future business to another grocer.
Some product failures are, of course, serious. The bread might be contaminated. In this in -
stance, the danger is so life-threatening and immediate (neither of which is true with the ma-
jority of legal services) that self-regulation by grocers is not an option. Rather, tradition has es-
tablished government safety regulations for food, including possible criminal prosecution, sup -
plemented by private tort actions by victims.
103. For example, the consequences of using pharmaceutical or biomedical products may
not surface for years. Thus, it is not surprising that the drug industry is subject to stringent
regulation by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), a fact criticized by business interests
who frequently argue that new drug approval takes too long.
Self-regulation by the drug industry does not exist in an official sense but is, to some degree,
present in a de facto sense. The FDA trusts drug companies to file truthful and complete appli-
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(c)   The Gate-Keeping Mechanisms of Professionalism
Although a business construct can encourage the delivery of high-
quality products and services, there are fewer guarantees of a minimum
level of quality than typically exist under a system deemed profes-
sional.104 Law attempts to achieve, and probably succeeds in achieving,
some minimum level of quality through its selective admissions policies;
for the most part, only A and B students with minimally acceptable LSAT
scores are accepted, even at non-prestigious law schools. Moreover, the
bar examination prevents a significant number from practicing law
without some measurable expertise. By comparison, the business para-
digm provides almost no formal gatekeeping and informally restricts the
activity only at the upper echelons of the field.105
In sum, a number of factors essentially unexamined by Pearce and
other proponents of a business paradigm provide good reasons for con-
tinuing to configure law as a profession rather than a business. At the
risk of sounding tautological, the professionalism paradigm is better able
to prompt valuable lawyer behavior while constraining undesirable at-
torney actions; it is a regulatory program designed for regulating profes-
sionals. Many of the ethical rules for lawyers are designed to preclude or
manage some of the negative possibilities that may ensue when the cli-
ent is represented under typical circumstances.
For example, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.1 establishes a
duty of competent representation.106 Model Rule 1.2 establishes at least
minimal client control over important matters of representation and es-
tablishes the basic framework for client control over objectives, while
allowing the attorney a zone of professionalism in representing the cl i-
ent.107 Other provisions of Model Rule 1 impose additional duties or pro-
                                                                                                                                                
cations for approval and continuously monitor reports of any adverse reactions and side effects.
When this trust is violated, it makes headlines and engenders lawsuits.
However, drug development and manufacturing could not be self-regulated in the same
manner as the practice of law precisely because this field is now mature and developed under
the aegis of a business paradigm rather than a professionalism paradigm. To state the obvious,
the pharmaceutical industry lacks the professional self-regulatory infrastructure of state su -
preme courts and the organized bar. In addition, years of development have given the world a
pharmaceutical industry that is innovative and profitable—but dominated by business decision
making that, if left unchecked, would almost certainly result in more drug-related injuries and
deaths. For example, but for external regulatory prohibition, thalidomide and other harmful
products would have been marketed in the United States by drug companies operating under a
business paradigm. See, e.g. , Myron L. Marlin, Comment, Treatment INDs: A Faster Route to
Drug Approval?, 39 AM . U. L. R EV. 171, 177 & n.49 (1989) (noting that the FDA refused to ap -
prove thalidomide despite its use in Europe, but that application for its approval remained
pending in the United States until it was di scovered that the drug had caused over 1,000 defec-
tive births).
104. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 23-24 (“To characterize something as an amateurish
job, or the work of an amateur, implies poor work, while to characterize something as a profes-
sional job implies good, reliable work of skill and quality.”).
105. For example, you may need a Wharton M.B.A. to get in the door at a prestigious Wall
Street investment bank. However, you can engage in a myriad of business activities with a
bachelor’s degree or less. By contrast, one may not enter even the lowest rung of the attorney
pecking order without having been admitted to law school, passed law school, and passed the
bar exam.
106. See  RULE 1.1.
107. See  RULE 1.2.
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hibitions on counsel, largely to minimize the dangers presented by need,
vulnerability, complexity, difficulty in evaluation, outside pressure, or f i-
nancial self-interest. The lawyer’s work for the client must be diligent,108
there must be adequate communication, 109 and fees must be reason-
able.110 The lawyer must observe strict duties of confidentiality111 and
avoid conflicts of interest between current or former clients112 as well as
avoiding activities that may cloud the lawyer’s professional judgment
and zealous representation of the client.113 Lawyers also have stringent
duties regarding the safekeeping of client property114 and may be sus-
pended or disbarred for merely commingling client and office funds.
I am not naive enough to suggest that the mere existence of these
ethical rules makes every attorney always behave ethically. Nevertheless,
the ethical regulation brought about under the professionalism para-
digm is considerably more extensive than that governing ordinary busi-
ness. Regulations also respond to the traits of the lawyer-client relation-
ship generally associated with professionalism. To a large degree, the
professionalism paradigm and the resulting legal rules run counter to
the business considerations that would otherwise govern the activity of
practicing law. The nature of legal services requires a regulatory regime
that is unlikely to result under a business paradigm, including even the
“Middle Range” hybrid proposed by Pearce.115
C.   The Unpersuasive Empirical Case for a Paradigm Shift
According to Pearce, the modern and growing businessification of law
reveals the decay of the professionalism paradigm. Although the official
ethos of lawyers is altruism and service, their actual activity is more at-
tuned to obtaining clients, generating fees, and improving their financial
fortunes through the sale of legal services. Pearce contends that today’s
“normal science” of lawyering is not well explained or regulated by the
professionalism paradigm.116 As a result, the professionalism paradigm is
no longer doing what Thomas Kuhn said paradigms should do—organize
and explain the phenomena of the world.
Thus, according to Pearce, lawyers are in the midst of a professional
insecurity crisis because the professionalism paradigm increasingly has
less explanatory power for organizing their actual daily practice activ-
ity. 117 In short, the traditional professionalism paradigm has become far
less relevant to their lives. This disjunction of the professionalism theory
and the daily practice of law creates cognitive dissonance for lawyers.
                                                                                                                                                
108. See  RULE 1.1.
109. See  RULE 1.4.
110. See  RULE 1.5.
111. See  RULE 1.6.
112. See  RULE 1.7, 1.9.
113. See  RULE 1.8.
114. See  RULE 1.15.
115. Pearce’s “Middle Range” hybrid is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 35 -37,
45  and infra in text accompanying note 135.
116. See  supra note 40  (describing Thomas Kuhn’s theory of paradigm shifts that take
place when normal science under the prevailing paradigm does not adequately explain reality).
117. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1256-63.
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They are governed as professionals but their activity is that of business-
persons.
To Pearce, these fissures run so deep that they cannot be resolved by
merely adjusting the traditional paradigm; something new is needed. 118 A
new paradigm is in the offing, according to Pearce, as the professional-
ism paradigm threatens to collapse under the weight of its inadequacies
and inconsistencies.119 Lawyers attempting to resolve these problems
through redoubled self-regulatory efforts are doomed to failure, because
the problem cannot be solved by the existing paradigm. Furthermore,
lawyers are divided over the best means to correct the situation. The in-
firmities and inconsistencies of the professionalism paradigm are so
pronounced that attorneys attempting to work within it will be unsuc-
cessful.120
Pearce asserts that the legal community’s difficulties and profession-
alism’s inability to resolve them indicate that American law is on the
precipice of a Kuhnian paradigm shift. Thus, the time is ripe for a com-
plete shift to a law-as-business model that will resolve the anomalies of
the current model and better conceptualize modern legal practice for
regulation.121
A commentator once observed that in law, “a little fact goes a long
way.”122 I am at least as guilty as Pearce of applying “Kuhn Light” to legal
issues;123 still, it is an inferential leap of no small proportion to observe
difficulties in the professionalism paradigm and immediately conclude
that the paradigm is so useless that its displacement lies just around the
corner.
As to Pearce’s contention that modern lawyers are suffering cognitive
dissonance from the discrepancy between the tenets of professionalism
and the realities of the day-to-day world, it is true that there are real and
important problems in the legal community today which remain un-
solved by the professionalism paradigm. However, none of these prob-
lems equate to the paradigm paralysis Kuhn described in his examples.124
The inconsistency between a paradigm holding that the earth is flat and
the fact that sailors are circumnavigating the planet is far greater than
that created by the mere observation that lawyers occasionally act with
avarice or dishonesty. The former is a clear failure of the paradigm, but
the latter may simply be a failure of humans to adhere to the paradigm.
                                                                                                                                                
118. See  id.  at 1263-65.
119. See  id.
120. See  id.
121. See  id.  at 1265-67.
122. David Cole, Against Literalism, 40 STAN. L. R EV. 545, 545 (1988) (reviewing J AMES
WHITE, HERACLES’ BOW: E SSAYS ON THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF LAW (1985)). Cole states:
“From the recognition that law is transmitted through words springs the school of law and ‘lit -
erature.’ From the fact that legal disputes involve the allocation of costs comes ‘law and eco-
nomics.’” Id.
123. See  Stempel, New Paradigm, supra note 40 , at 695-705 (applying Kuhn’s theory of
paradigm shifts to litigation reform and related issues).
124. See  KUHN, SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, supra note 40 , at 136-59 (providing as examples
the Copernican Revolution, which first posited that the earth revolved around the sun; the re-
placement of the view that light was made of particles; and the shift from Newtonian physics to
Einstein’s theory of relativity and quantum physics).
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While a lack of adherence may result because the paradigm’s standards
are too high, it may also result because more enforcement is needed.
Nor has Pearce set forth a persuasive case that a well-administered
system of lawyer regulation based on professionalism cannot work, or
even work well. Moreover, under Kuhn’s criteria, Pearce’s observation
simply is not enough to suggest a crisis of normal science, let alone an
impending paradigm shift. According to Kuhn, a dominant paradigm
during a time of normal science attracts an “enduring group of adherents
away from competing modes” of thought in the area; is sufficiently
“open-ended to leave problems to solve”; and is studied by students of
the discipline in order to join the community.125
Despite the ongoing debate over professionalism in law, there is no
doubt that the professionalism paradigm enjoys the status of a dominant
paradigm. Although there are many like Pearce who have criticized the
professionalism regime and have argued for more practice of law as a
business, there is not even a separate school of law-as-business thought
to which these lawyers can retire to study the new gospel. There is not
even a law school espousing the law-as-business paradigm that prospec-
tive students can attend.126 If students want to join the community, they
must attend a conventional law school which is structured around the
traditional paradigm of lawyer identity.
Law schools require students to take a course on professional respon-
sibility, but do not require them to take a course on law office opera-
tions, marketing, total quality management, or searching for excellence.
Legal scholarship has increasingly focused on the business of law; how-
ever, law schools do not include classic case studies such as the dissolu-
                                                                                                                                                
125. See id. at 160-91; see also Stempel, New Paradigm, supra note 40 , at 699-700.
126. One might argue that law schools stressing economic analysis such as those at the
University of Chicago and George Mason University are closer to the business paradigm than to
the professionalism paradigm. However, such an assessment seems incorrect. For example, the
curriculum at the University of Chicago and the textbooks employed there are found at virtually
every accredited American law school. George Mason’s curriculum, which was designed to be
different (for example, it has a required course in quantitative methods) is only marginally dif-
ferent. American law schools tend to be similar regarding professional education, which is not
surprising since the organized bar plays a major role in the accreditation process. Hence, al-
most by definition, there cannot be a full paradigm shift in law unless legal education is exten -
sively deregulated, which appears unlikely.
Even if one could staff a law school only with teachers and scholars adhering to the economic
analysis school (and George Mason University may have done something close to that), these
lawyers do not necessarily operate within a business paradigm. Students are taught to be law-
yers sensitive to economic issues. They are not taught to be businesspersons with substantial
knowledge of the law. For example, one does not see a large law o ffice management curriculum
at the University of Chicago.
Similarly, faculty sensitive to market issues can hardly be said to have forsaken the profes-
sionalism paradigm. For example, Judge and University of Chicago Professor Richard Posner, a
leading lawyer-economist, has rendered decisions quite consistent with the ethics rules pro-
pounded under the professionalism paradigm, implicitly finding much of that paradigm con-
sistent with economic analysis. See, e.g., Greycas, Inc. v. Proud, 826 F.2d 1560, 1565 (7th Cir.
1987) (holding an attorney liable for misstatements to a reasonably relying nonclient based on
economic analysis of loan collateral that was consistent with professionalism norms); Analytica,
Inc. v. NPD Research, Inc., 708 F.2d 1263, 1266 (7th Cir. 1983) (disqualifying firm from subse-
quent representation based on its access to financial information during prior representation).
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tion of the Finley, Kumble Firm, 127 or Kodak leaving Donovan, Leisure
for Sullivan & Cromwell during its fabled antitrust litigation.128 Further-
more, even if law schools did not teach a vision of lawyering informed by
the professionalism paradigm, the mere existence of a consistent, sub-
stantive legal curriculum itself tends to define the school as one that fa-
vors professionalism.129
As to this lack of activation energy for a paradigm shift, Pearce would
undoubtedly respond that this is precisely the problem he attacks. Law is
a considerably closed fraternity. Law schools must be accredited by the
American Bar Association.130 All of these schools teach the same essen-
tial professionalism paradigm. Every casebook on professional responsi-
bility, published by a major law book publisher, appears to be premised
on the professionalism paradigm.131 Legal ethics treatises also remain or-
ganized around the professionalism paradigm. 132 The same can probably
be said about nearly every law school text on any subject, in that these
authorities implicitly work within the professionalism paradigm, even if
legal education fails to inculcate sufficient professionalism values in our
students.
To state the obvious, Pearce’s or other scholars’ disagreement with
this state of affairs does not displace the paradigm. The paradigm shift
                                                                                                                                                
127. See  KIM ISAAC EISLER, SHARK TANK: GREED, P OLITICS AND THE COLLAPSE OF FINLEY,
KUMBLE , ONE OF AMERICA’S LARGEST LAW FIRMS (1990); see also  STEVEN J. K UMBLE & KEVIN J.
LAHART, CONDUCT UNBECOMING: THE R ISE AND RUIN OF FINLEY, KUMBLE  (1990); MARK
STEVENS, POWER OF ATTORNEY: THE R ISE OF THE GIANT LAW FIRMS 38 (1987) (characterizing
Finley, Kumble as the “P.T. Barnum of the legal profession”); Steven Brill, Bye, Bye, Finley,
Kumble, AM . LAW., Sept. 1987, at 3, 40.
128. See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), in which
Kodak, represented by Sullivan & Cromwell, obtained the reversal of an adverse an titrust deci-
sion; and Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co. , 457 F. Supp. 404 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), in which
Kodak was represented by Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Irvine at trial. See also NANCY LISAGOR
& FRANK LIPSIUS , A LAW UNTO ITSELF: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE LAW FIRM OF SULLIVAN &
CROMWELL  (1988).
129. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 215 (stating that “formal knowledge of any discipline
can be characterized by a single, central paradigm, and one can employ its textbooks as the
authoritative source for portraying it”).
130. The ABA accreditation process calls for review of accredited schools every seven years.
See  George B. Shepherd & William G. Shepherd, Scholarly Restraints? ABA Accreditation and
Legal Education, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 2091, 2132 (1998) (describing the “‘sabbatical site
evaluations’”). If schools are not in compliance with certain minimum standards, the school
may be ordered to rectify the problem or face the loss of accreditation. The ABA Law School
Rules are, however, quite general and are focused more on ensuring adequate resources such as
enough building space, a law library, acceptable student/teacher ratio, and a sufficient number
of course offerings, rather than particular curricular offerings. To the extent that the organized
bar sets some curricular standards, most of this push during the past quarter-century has been
in favor of more clinical and skills training offerings, a segment of the curriculum more com-
monly linked to law as a business than to law as a profession. Thus, although the bar’s role in
accreditation may bring some uniformity to legal education, it hardly thwarts any momentum
that might otherwise exist for a shift to the business paradigm for law schools.
131. See, e.g., NATHAN CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: P ROBLEMS OF PRACTICE
AND THE PROFESSION (1996); STEPHEN GILLERS , REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS  (5th ed. 1998); DAVID LUBAN & DEBORAH L. RHODE , LEGAL ETHICS  (2d ed. 1995);
THOMAS D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA , PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (6th ed. 1995);
DEBORAH L. R HODE, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD  (1994);
R ICHARD A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1995).
132. See, e.g., GEOFFREY C. H AZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING (2d
ed. 1998); CHARLES W. W OLFRAM, M ODERN LEGAL ETHICS  (1986).
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will occur when textbooks are rewritten to adopt a competing theory,
when criteria for licensing change, and when scholarly prestige varies
according to the institution’s allegiance with the winning paradigm. In
short, there simply is no Kuhnian paradigm shift on the immediate hori-
zon. As Judge Richard Posner once observed, “one can beat a theory only
with a better theory.”133 Pearce recognizes this and has made efforts in
that direction in his writings urging a paradigm shift.134 His efforts, how-
ever, and those of any advocate of the law-as-business movement remain
a long way from articulating a sufficiently comprehensive alternative
system for lawyer regulation, let alone triggering a paradigm shift. For
example, what will the statutes or guidelines look like under a business
paradigm? Will the Model Rules be revised, replaced, or eliminated alto-
gether? The legal world is unlikely to enlist under a business paradigm
unless the marching orders are more firmly defined.
On one Kuhnian dimension, the continuing power of the profession-
alism paradigm seems obvious—it is sufficiently open-ended that there
remain many problems to solve. Indeed, critics of the professionalism
system have provided a lengthy list of problems for the paradigm to ad-
dress. At this juncture, it seems premature to conclude that the profes-
sionalism paradigm has failed in the task.
To some extent, it is quibbling to suggest that Pearce’s thesis be re-
jected merely because it does not perfectly fit the Kuhn topology. I make
this point only to note that there is a substantial difference between in-
tellectual controversy and intellectual crisis. We have, I think, the former
but not the latter in law today. On the contrary, my fear is that crisis will
ensue if too many lawyers and other opinion leaders adopt the view that
lawyer professionalism must be jettisoned for the law-as-business sys-
tem.
D.   The Proposed Shift Will Not Fix Current Problems
1.   The Generality of the Proposed Solution
While he savages the current system of lawyer regulation, Pearce is
unwilling to move to an entirely market-based paradigm. According to
Pearce, aspects of law continue to distinguish it from an ordinary busi-
ness, requiring that the law-as-business regulatory system operate in the
“Middle Range” between the status quo of professionalism and a pure
market-based system.135
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of Pearce’s proposal is understand-
ing its operation and ultimate breadth and its application. He proposes
to organize legal regulation under a business paradigm, but it is a para-
digm without parameters. He offers no central organizing construct for
the law as business and leaves many open questions unaddressed.
                                                                                                                                                
133. R ICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 373 (1990).
134. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1232; see also Pearce, Law Day 2050,
supra note 31, at 18-19.
135. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1267-75.
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(a)   Is the Credo of the Law-as-Business Regulatory World “The
Customer Is Always Right”?
“The customer is always right” is a wonderful sound bite but a poten-
tially disastrous marching order for the lawyer representing Marc
Rich,136 Charles Keating, 137 or a securities fraud manipulator. Even if this
credo is accepted, it will have significant definitional and operational
problems left unaddressed by Pearce. For example, what does the lawyer
do when there is an entity customer? Or where the entity customer is a
diffuse one? For example, the constitutional mini-crisis faced by the na-
tion during late 1998 and early 1999 can be viewed not only as the result
of the President’s lapses of judgment or character but also as the result
of having a well-financed lawyer, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr,
who is effectively under little or no client control.138
(b)   Conversely, Should the Credo of the Business Paradigm Be “Caveat
Emptor”?
Although it grates on modern ears, the ancient maxim of “let the
buyer beware” has, at least historically, been part and parcel of a market-
based business paradigm. In modern post-industrial societies, the
maxim has given way to calls for ethical business conduct and to the ne-
cessity for regulation, including the informal regulation flowing from the
adjudication of lawsuits by victimized consumers.139
                                                                                                                                                
136. Rich is a Swiss financier who has been accused of engaging in a longstanding pa ttern
of deceit and manipulation of both the financial markets and the legal system. See  Action S.A. v.
Marc Rich & Co., Inc., 951 F.2d 504, 507 (2d Cir. 1991) (rejecting Rich’s choreographed effort to
divest U.S. courts of subject matter jurisdiction by acquiring Spanish citizenship in order to
avoid creditors or prosecution of civil actions); see also  Marc Rich & Co., A.G. v. United States,
739 F.2d 834 (2d Cir. 1984); Marc Rich & Co. v. United States, 736 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1984);
Steven Brill, The Marc Rich Puppet Show, AM . LAW., Oct. 1983, at 1, 1 (recounting some of
Rich’s activities and implying that his lawyers were excessively cooperative).
137. See  infra Part V.G.1. (regarding “Keating Five” scandal).
138. My own opinion is that the Starr investigation has wreaked detriment upon America
largely because it lacks the hallmark of the professional: detached wisdom and reasoned judg-
ment, rather than rabid prosecutorial zeal, in the face of a difficult and uncertain situation.
For example, in what may be a new low in prosecutorial discretion, the Independent Counsel
obtained an obstruction of justice indictment against a single mother from Richmond whose
apparent “crime” was having known presidential accuser Kathleen Willey and having given
anti-Willey and pro-Clinton comments on the alleged incident, some of which appeared on
Larry King Live rather than under oath). See  Jeffrey Rosen, Steele Trap: Kenneth Starr’s Last
Crusade, NEW REPUBLIC , Apr. 26 & May 3, 1999, at 44.
The excesses of the Starr investigation result not merely from zealous representation by an
officer of the court but also from a “win-at-all-costs, bottom line, the-end-justifies-the-means”
approach—one more indicative of the business or political world. There are too many prosecu -
tors who lose sight of other professional values in the pursuit of victory via convictions. See,
e.g., United States v. Kojayan, 8 F.3d 1315, 1318 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing how prosecutor
isolated a key witness from the defendant and then misrepresented the witness’ arrangement
with prosecutor). Under a business paradigm, where success is the venerated value, would this
sort of lawyer misbehavior not likely increase?
139. The oldest informal regulation of bad business conduct is, of course, punishment by
the market, where consumers choose not to patronize the offending business and also warn
their acquaintances, leading to lost business and revenue for the business offender. However,
these market mechanisms have inherent limits. For example, a truly fraudulent business op -
eration may have placed its profits and its principals in a country without an extradition treaty,
as did Robert Vesco of Fund of Funds fame. See  Fund of Funds v. Arthur Andersen Co., 567
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Pearce expressly rejects a caveat emptor version of his business
paradigm, and other law-as-business proponents also seem to have
something less harsh in mind. 140 This raises the question: If markets are
so great, why has modern business theory moved away from caveat
emptor? To answer this question in the context of lawyering is to rein-
vent the wheel of the business theory evolution—an evolution still far
from comprehensive.141
Thus, I fault Pearce on two counts in this portion of the inquiry. First,
there is an inherent inconsistency in advocating a business/market solu-
tion to the problems of legal services and then refusing to embrace a
pure market approach. Second, resolution of the problem requires
modification of the market approach beyond that already taking place in
the business arena. What results in Pearce’s “Middle Range” approach
could be described as simply an impoverished version of the profession-
alism paradigm, or wishful thinking about modern business ethics.
(c)   Should Legal Services Be Judged According to the Degree to Which
They “Add Value”?
It is true that the degree to which a product or service adds value to
the client or customer can provide a more sophisticated measure of its
utility. While this measurement smacks of market-based ideology, it is,
nevertheless, not inconsistent with the professionalism paradigm. For
example, Model Rule 1.5 and its commentary set guidelines for assessing
the reasonableness of legal fees. In essence, the factors listed in Model
Rule 1.5 and accepted by lawyers at large state that lawyer fees should
reflect the utility of the legal services to the client.142
Today’s lawyers, operating under the professionalism paradigm, do
add value to clients, even if it comes at a higher price than might some-
times obtain in an unregulated market. A powerful modern example is
the state-sponsored litigation against tobacco manufacturers. These
suits have been successfully settled with states receiving billions of dol-
lars in reimbursement of Medicare and Medicaid expenditures arising
                                                                                                                                                
F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1977). Litigation is then required to assist the victimized consumer, and even
it may be only moderately effective.
140. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1269 (“More appealing than the status
quo and market alternatives is a Middle Range approach.”).
141. Recent years have seen a comparative explosion in the literature of business eth ics, a
development that is helpful to the call for a business paradigm but insufficient to establish the
infrastructure of enforceable standards required for regulation of lawyers. One publisher has an
entire series of books on business ethics. See, e.g., NORMAN BOWIE AND RONALD DUSKA,
BUSINESS ETHICS  (2d ed. 1990); ROBERT C. SOLOMAN , ETHICS AND EXCELLENCE: COOPERATION
AND INTEGRITY IN BUSINESS (1992); BUSINESS ETHICS: THE STATE OF THE ART (R. Edward Free-
man ed., 1991); ETHICS AND AGENCY THEORY: AN INTRODUCTION (Norman E. Bowie and R. Ed -
ward Freeman eds., 1992).
142. See  RULE 1.5 (allowing lawyers to charge fees unrelated to the value conveyed, in that
it approves hourly billing and allows enhancement if the matter takes the lawyer away from
other work). Still, this is not a failure of professionalism. It is only a concession to economic re-
ality and a reflection of risk allocation between vendor and buyer. In other words, Rule 1.5 per-
fectly reflects Pearce’s business paradigm ethos. My point is that necessary elements of busi-
ness reality have been or can be incorporated into the professionalism paradigm; it is not nec-
essary to jettison professionalism to obtain useful aspects of bus iness theory or to adjust to the
inevitable market pressures of the day.
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from smoking-related illnesses. 143 Florida is a good example; the state
authorized the litigation but refused to fund it. The lawyers on Florida’s
trial team advanced the funds for the costs. 144 When the case was suc-
cessfully settled, these lawyers were paid well.145 They were also the sub-
ject of considerable negative publicity because of internal squabbles re-
garding whether the proper compensation was the contingency fee of
twenty-five percent, negotiated at the outset, or the “reasonable” fees, set
by arbitration, arranged as part of the settlement. In the end, the fees
came via arbitration and equaled or exceeded the twenty-five percent
figure, resulting in billions of dollars for the state’s independently con-
tracted lawyers.146 Billions is a lot of money, and it is a bit unsettling to
have attorneys collect fees for one case that outstrip the average lifetime
earnings of entire neighborhoods and towns. Nevertheless, these fees
were separate from the more than thirteen billion dollars Florida gained
from the tobacco settlement; the state’s compensation was not reduced
by the lawyers’ fees.147
Without doubt, counsel’s investment, risk-bearing, and services pro-
vided substantial value to the state. If additional economic value is con-
sidered a social value under the business paradigm and one can write a
fees rule that embodies the concept, how does this suggest that today’s
professionalism paradigm must be displaced by a business paradigm in
order to expand the services provided by lawyers to clients and the pub-
lic?
Moreover, while on the subject of large fees, I cannot resist asking:
How will the business paradigm, even the middle range business para-
digm, deal with large fees? Judging from the real world of business com-
pensation, compensation issues would exist under a business paradigm
that are at least as vexing as any under the professionalism paradigm.
Under the business paradigm, there would be no such thing as an un-
conscionable or obscene fee, judging from corporate America’s track re-
cord on executive compensation.148 In light of those business precedents
                                                                                                                                                
143. See, e.g., Christa Sarafa, Note, Making Tobacco Companies Pay: The Florida Medi-
caid Third-Party Liability Act, 2 DePaul J. Health Care L. 123, 138 (1997) (describing Florida’s
$11.3 billion settlement).
144. See  Symposium, Transcript of the Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium—Fact,
Law, Policy and Significance, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 737, 741 (1998) [hereinafter Florida To-
bacco Litigation Symposium].
145. See  Melissa J. Kozlowski, Tobacco Arbitration Panel Awards $8.2 Billion, N.J. L.J.,
Dec. 14, 1998, at 14; Tobacco Fee Arbitration Panel Awards $8.16B to Florida, Mississippi,
Texas Attorneys, ANDREWS TOBACCO INDUSTRY LITIG. REP ., Dec. 28, 1998, at 3, available in
LEXIS, Legnew Library, Andtob File; Bob Van Voris, Tobacco Road Not Gold for All, NAT’L
L.J.,  Dec. 28, 1998, at A4 (discussing award to Florida trial team to be paid out over years,
which will likely exceed $3 billion).
146. See  supra note 144 and accompanying text. See also  Charles W. Wolfram, What Will
the Tobacco Fees Set in Motion? , NAT’L L.J., Dec. 28, 1998, at A25 (criticizing fees as excessive
and creating a “new political class” of wealthy attorneys able to effect tort reform and other po-
litical issues and criticizing the value of fees in relation to the settlement, no ting that the bulk of
the settlement “represented the value of claims the states were giving up for future injury that
the tobacco companies, in effect, are being licensed to con tinue to inflict”); Editorial, Tobacco
and Torts, ST. PETE . TIMES , Dec. 19, 1998, at 18A (criticizing the fees as unreasonably high).
147. See  Florida Tobacco Litigation Symposium, supra note 144, at 742.
148. See, e.g., Mark A. Clawson & Thomas C. Klein, Indexed Stock Options: A Proposal for
Compensation Commensurate with Performance, 3 STAN. J.L. B US. & FIN . 31, 32-33 (1997)
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perhaps the big bucks will come even where the lawyer has not added
value. For example, business CEOs frequently are paid millions, even in
years when their companies perform poorly. 149 Is the answer to this rid-
dle that the company would have fared even worse without the intrepid
CEO? Or is the more likely explanation that the business paradigm con-
trols costs and metes out rational rewards no better than the profession-
alism paradigm?
In law, we see some highly skilled and capable attorneys toiling away
for salaries hovering in the $30,000-$50,000 range, as, for example, do
many government lawyers, legal aid attorneys, and judicial clerks, while
others make millions from large class action settlements. Similarly, in
business we see the CEO, and other executives, routinely making more
than hundreds of times the annual pay of rank-and-file employees. Is
worth and value adequately measured under either system? If that ques-
tion is too philosophical, let me limit myself to asking: On what basis
does anyone think business compensation operates more rationally and
morally than lawyer compensation?150
Ultimately, multiple questions are unanswered by the proposed shift
to a business paradigm: (1) What are the boundaries of the market’s role
                                                                                                                                                
(arguing that surge in executive pay during bull market of 1980s and 1990s irrationally out of
proportion, even for executives who have performed well); Gary Minda, Opportunistic Down-
sizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version of Age and Pension Discrimination in Employ-
ment, 48 HASTINGS L.J.  511, 525 n.61 (describing how AT&T Chair Robert Allen receives multi-
millions in compensation despite bad decision to acquire NCR for billions); Dana Canedy,
Nothing Toylike in Mattel Chief’s Compensation, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 28, 1999, at C1 (explaining
that Mattel CEO Jill E. Barad was paid $4.75 million in 1998 even though the company’s per-
formance was considered mediocre or worse by Wall Street analysts); Louis Lavelle, The $11M
Question; What’s a CEO Worth? , RECORD  (Bergen Co., N.J.), May 2, 1979, at B1, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Njrec File (noting that the current AT&T CEO was paid more than $6
million in 1998 and American Standard CEO, Emanuel Kampouris, received a $2 million bonus
in 1998, constituting a raise even though the company’s stock dropped six percent).
Apart from the compensation issue is the matter of reward for an increase in the equity value
of an entity. In that arena, business thinking has historically been “the sky’s the limit,” on the
theory that ownership and attendant risk deserve whatever rewards befall the enterprise. For
example, no one criticizes the wealth of Warren Buffett or Bill Gates based on their respective
ownership of the stock of Berkshire Hathaway or Microsoft and the growth in share value, al-
though high executive pay is sometimes attacked where the executive is less lionized or com-
pany performance is substandard. See, e.g., Timothy D. Schellhardt, To a Pile of CEO Perks,
Add the ‘Special’ Bonus, WALL ST. J. , Apr. 29, 1999, at B1.
149. See  GRAEF S. CRYSTAL, IN SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN
EXECUTIVES  (1991) (criticizing many executive compensation packages as far too lucrative and
unlinked to company results and executive performance); see also  Canedy, supra note 148 ;
Schellhardt, supra note 148 .
150. For example, Prof. Lester Brickman, perhaps the best-known academic critic of high
lawyers’ fees, calculates that the tobacco fees were the equivalent of $82,000 per hour. See  Van
Voris, supra note 145. Assuming the average law partner’s billable hours of 2,200 per year, a
hypothetical $82,000/hour lawyer would earn gross receipts of $18 million that year, assuming
all clients paid. From this, overhead expenses would need to be deducted, making this hypo-
thetical partner’s net earnings something less (a paltry $17 million or so). This is of course a
great deal of money. But contrasted to the $4.75 million given Mattel CEO Jill Barad in 1998
and the functional equivalent of $26.3 million she received in 1997, the tobacco fees seem rea-
sonable, particularly in light of the breakthrough result obtained by the tobacco lawyers as
compared to the mediocre 1997 and 1998 had by Mattel. See  Canedy, supra note 148 , at C1. As
Babe Ruth unapologetically noted when asked if he was embarrassed to earn more than the
President of the United States (then Herbert Hoover): “I had a better year.” See  David Rampe,
Contracts: In Another League, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 1996, at s.4, p.2.
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under this regulatory system? (2) Is the market to be completely open or
are there restrictions on market behavior? How many restrictions exist?
What form do the restrictions take? (3) Who enforces restrictions on the
market? (4) What are the penalties for violating a restriction? (5) How is
entry into the field to take place? Will it be restrictive in any way?
It is, of course, more than a little unfair to criticize Pearce for failing
in one article, or even two, to develop a system of lawyer regulation akin
to the Model Rules and state bar enforcement. It is not unfair, however,
to require at least some articulation from Pearce regarding the basic
ground rules of his proposed brave new world. To date, however, the
confines of the law-as-business theory are simply unestablished. To the
extent Pearce has ventured a vision of the “Middle Range” professional-
ism paradigm, he appears to borrow heavily from what I thought was the
ethos of professionalism. This again prompts the question of why any
organizational shift is required. Why throw out professionalism merely
to reinvent it?
2.   The Narrowness of the Inquiry
Throughout his article, Pearce writes as though the only role of law-
yers in modern society is private client representation.151 This glaucomic
focus permits him to build a case for the business paradigm based on a
situation most receptive to a business approach: the rendering of legal
services to persons or entities who require legal assistance, or stand to
gain from it, and the compensation of counsel, directly.
Yet, a portion of the legal world lies beyond private practice. Legal
professionals also work for the government as prosecutors, public de-
fenders, agency attorneys, and other regulatory counsel. Moreover,
many attorneys serve as judges. In addition, many lawyers serve private
clients as in-house (inside) counsel, 152 for whom the tension between
business imperatives and the social good may be different from that of
outside counsel.
(a)   Inside Counsel
One could concede to Pearce that inside counsel should be analyzed
by the same yardstick governing lawyers in firms. However, as discussed
below in the context of insurance defense, there is a good deal of evi-
dence to suggest that the business-ethics tension is more pronounced for
in-house lawyers.153 Still, even if inside and outside counsel must be
treated alike, there remains a dramatically large segment of lawyers and
legal services for which a business-uber-alles approach is simply inapt. If
this is true, however, then it is all the more important to evaluate the ef-
                                                                                                                                                
151. See, e.g. , Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 31, at 10 (discussing the market for legal
services and mentioning only private practice); id.  at 14 (discussing employment of lawyers, but
mentioning only private practice).
152. In 1985, ten percent of the bar was employed as in-house counsel. See  BARBARA A.
CURRAN , KATHERINE ROSICH , CLARA CARSON , AND MARK PUCCETTI , LAWYER STATISTICAL
REPORT : A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE U.S. LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE 1980 S (1985). This per-
centage has undoubtedly increased during the last fifteen years.
153. See  infra Part V.E.
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fect of solutions designed to address problems encountered by Pearce’s
typical firm lawyer on this growing segment of the bar. I believe that the
business-ethics tension is more pronounced today for in-house lawyers.
(b)   Judges
Judges, like in-house lawyers, were unaddressed by the Pearce arti-
cle; the business paradigm is particularly unsuitable for judicial regula-
tion. There are intractable problems if the legal system instructs judges
to behave as businesspersons first and professionals second, or not at all.
Consider a judge presiding over a case in which the plaintiff is a spurned
job applicant charging race discrimination; the defendant is a large, local
employer with a large, in-house legal department and is represented by
the locality’s largest, most prestigious, most lucrative firm. Even working
under the auspices of the professionalism paradigm, a judge with
thoughts of returning to practice or becoming an Alternative Dispute
Resolution specialist after retirement will have a subconscious desire to
retain popularity with the large corporate defendant and its prestigious,
lucrative firm.154 Ideally, the judge is constrained by the norms of impar-
tiality reflected in the ABA Code of Judicial Conduct and relevant stat-
utes regarding recusal,155 which not only theoretically shape the judge’s
self-concept and values but also threaten the judge with discipline and
disgrace should too much favoritism appear.156 It remains diff icult to
conceptualize effective judicial ethics under a business paradigm. Nor-
mally, it is good business sense to ingratiate oneself with wealthy entities
that can provide a stream of future business.
Similarly, the judge in the business of self-advancement is unlikely to
render rulings that displease political authority. One does not rise from
the trial bench to the court of appeals by ruling against the appointing
executive. Human beings are seldom, if ever, textbook “profiles in cour-
age,” but the track record of judges operating under the professionalism
paradigm has been rather impressive, on the whole.157 One can hardly
expect it to improve under a business paradigm—and it could get much
worse.
                                                                                                                                                
154. Where the plaintiff’s law firm is sufficiently prominent to be a source of repeat busi-
ness or future employment, the judge’s business instincts could, of course, run in that direction.
155. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 455 (1994) (requiring disqualification of judges where a judge or
close relative has even a slight financial interest in the case and requiring recusal where a
judge’s impartiality is subject to reasonable question). See also MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL
CONDUCT Canon 3(E) (1990) (requiring disqualification when a judge may be affected by per-
sonal bias, relationships to parties or counsel, or economic in terests).
156. So strong is the aura of regulation created under the professionalism paradigm that
judges may be disciplined severely even for lack of candor in matters unrelated to their judicial
duties. See, e.g., In re Davey, 645 So. 2d 398, 408 (Fla. 1994).
157. See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (rejecting the President’s as-
sertion of executive privilege over tape recordings of White House meetings in opinion
authored by Chief Justice Warren Burger, a Nixon appointee, with three other Nixon appoint-
ees sitting on the Court); see also  In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 910, 923
(8th Cir. 1997) (holding that personal lawyer’s notes of meetings involving Hillary Rodham
Clinton were not protected by executive privilege); Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 1,
10 (1998) (ruling that privilege survives the death of a client in a politically charged case in -
volving Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr’s investigation of President Clinton and Starr’s ef-
fort to obtain the lawyer’s notes of the late Vincent Foster, a White House aide).
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(c)   Government Attorneys
For federal, state, and local government attorneys, the temptations
for self-advancement at the expense of the system are as strong or
stronger than those affecting judges. The undesirable influences go be-
yond the revolving door between private- and public-sector employment
or the hope for promotion. The typical government attorney has far less
job security than the typical judge. Judges may worry that displaying
courage will bring a career dead-end, but attorneys may worry about
losing their jobs.
Government counsel are frequently given discretion in highly politi-
cized matters or where the executive branch’s political preferences are
clear. In such cases, society presumably wants counsel to assess any
regulatory situation on its merits, a task requiring independence and
detachment. This becomes a harder task if the prevailing ideology of law
reflects a business paradigm. Under such circumstances, the lawyer has
great incentives to go with the political flow and relatively few incentives
to embrace other principles. Although the professionalism paradigm will
never eliminate self-interest or cowardice in the face of pressure, it
surely provides more insulation of independent legal judgment than
would a business-based construct.
For government prosecutors and defenders, the issues are analogous.
Although both have a duty to zealously represent their clients, currently,
they also have substantial duties to the system; this is particularly true of
prosecutors. At a minimum, neither can suborn client perjury or defraud
the court. Both face hard decisions, however, such as whether to cross-
examine a truthful witness so as to make the witness appear untruthful;
how to exercise discretion in commencing prosecution and withholding
or modifying claims; and what degree of zealousness to adopt in enforc-
ing judgments. These issues are hard enough when counsel is guided by
norms designed for such situations and given some protection from par-
tisan pressure. Without this guidance and insulation, it becomes ex-
tremely difficult to reach correct resolution of close questions.
If the primary theme of law is business, why should the prosecutor
behave with restraint or anything beyond minimal fairness?158 His ob-
jective, of course, is obtaining convictions, and business generally lion-
izes the commercial actor who plays as hard as the rules will allow—and
plays to win. For this sort of business-paradigm prosecutor, there may
be no act left unindicted, no disclosure beyond the constitutional mini-
mum, and theatrics galore designed to secure victory, even if it confuses
or positively misleads the jury.
Although prosecutors unleavened by professionalism are a particular
worry, the government defense lawyer, as well as the privately retained
defense lawyer, faces similar questions under the business paradigm.
                                                                                                                                                
158. According to one recent book, prosecutors try to do the right thing by not abusing
their power. See  MARK BAKER, D.A. PROSECUTORS IN THEIR OWN WORDS  (1999), reviewed by
Lisa Stansky, Witness for the Prosecution, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 76, 77 (“If you’re looking for
all kinds of true confessions from the shark tank, look someplace else. ‘[P]rosecutors generally
try to do what’s right, whether or not it fits the letter of the law,’ Baker writes, ‘I didn’t find
many knee jerkers . . . I found more compassion among them than dogma.’”).
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For example, if the defense lawyer thinks an appeal to racial prejudice
will work, should it be made? The professional lawyer would at least
have many things to ponder before playing any “race card,” but the busi-
ness construct lawyer may see no restraint. Winning is the object estab-
lished by the business paradigm, and there is nothing other than the
consuming public’s opprobrium to stop the lawyer from doing whatever
it takes to win.
The potential cultural gap between the business paradigm and the
professionalism paradigm may be similar for criminal defense counsel,
whether employed privately or by the government. For prosecutors and
regulatory lawyers, the difference seems significant. They possess gov-
ernment power that can easily be abused. In addition, they are not sub-
ject to the market discipline that, presumably, is one of the selling points
for the business paradigm. A zealous compliance attorney or prosecutor
can continuously and diligently work without worrying about sources of
payment, cost-benefit analysis, or the marginal utility of a continued
pursuit of quarry.
The unguided missile or zealot without perspective is the flip side of
an overly politicized government lawyer. The former is so invisible to the
political system that he or she may abuse power without being called to
account for their actions or to cease when appropriate. According to tes-
timony before Congress, this is the type of behavior occasionally dis-
played by IRS agents who come to view an investigation as pursuit of the
taxpayer rather than an inquiry into the appropriate resolution of a
payment question.159 An attorney freed from the professionalism para-
digm may be pressured to do what is politically advantageous rather
than what is legally wise or even required. Both situations seem more
likely if the practice of law by government counsel is not subject to some
system of professional norms and regulation. Accordingly, society needs
a professionalism paradigm rather than a business paradigm.
3.   Is “Business Ethics” More of an Oxymoron than “Lawyer
Professionalism”?
One reason Pearce has difficulty constructing an operational business
paradigm without borrowing from the professionalism paradigm is the
impoverished nature of business ethics. By “impoverished,” I do not
mean to suggest that all, or even a significant percentage of, business-
persons are unethical. Nor do I suggest that lawyers are on average more
ethical than those in business or other walks of life. Rather, I suggest the
following: Currently, business lacks a well-developed and widely ac-
cepted code of conduct.160 Even if there were “Model Rules of Business
                                                                                                                                                
159. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, Senate Panel Applauds Changes at IRS, N.Y. TIMES ,
Apr. 15, 1999, at C8; William Roth, Fighting the Power to Destroy, INVESTOR’S BUS. DAILY, Apr.
14, 1999, at A24; Richard W. Stevenson, Senate Votes 97-0 to Overhaul I.R.S. After Com-
plaints, N.Y. TIMES , May 8, 1998, at A1.
160. In part, this is an inevitable consequence of not being a profession. One hallmark of a
profession is its organizational structure and relatively high level of control over education and
entry, which permits the profession to establish and transmit “formal knowledge” of how the
profession is to be practiced. See  FREIDSON, supra note 7, at 25-26.
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Conduct,” there would be no adequate means to enforce such rules, save
the government. 161 Furthermore, business lacks a consistent system for
teaching ethics and requiring ethical training as a criterion for conduct-
ing business. Available data suggest that an adequate system of business
ethics will not emerge from market activity.
It is far more difficult to remove a destructive business actor from
business than to remove destructive lawyers from law—lawyers can be
disbarred. Although businesspersons can be banned from certain indus-
tries, they cannot be effectively banned from commercial life. Despite the
boom in business ethics courses and writings during the past decade,
one is hard-pressed to find any realtors, salespersons, or entrepreneurs
drummed out of these fields by their peers or any regulatory authority
except, perhaps, the state. States often have significant departments of
business and professional regulation. Under Pearce’s business paradigm,
would these replace lawyer self-regulation or would lawyers become an
essentially unregulated industry? Although one hates to be a contrarian
in an era when markets are worshiped and entrepreneurs are modern
folk heroes, Cardozo’s words about important duties that can arise other
than by contract come to mind.162
My skepticism of a business paradigm improving upon the profes-
sionalism paradigm status quo is also fueled by contemporary instances
where wrongful, even reprehensible conduct has occurred in the busi-
ness community—and been ignored or even embraced.163 The force cor-
recting business wrongdoing continues to come from law rather than
from within the business community.164 Consequently, it is most odd that
Pearce urges law to emulate business. The metaphor of the fox guarding
the henhouse irresistibly comes to mind.
In sum, the real world of business ethics gives cold comfort if one’s
mission is to improve lawyering by organizing it more like business.
While business writers frequently exhort commercial actors to behave
                                                                                                                                                
161. Freidson has observed:
Weak professions can only use moral suasion and the issuance of official standards
that have none of the force of organized institutional credentialing. An example of
this is the series of “professional standards” for social work in various settings is-
sued as “policy statements” by the National Association of Social Workers . . . .
[which are precatory unless adopted by a supervising government agency, a process
in which the Social Workers have had some success].
In the case of stronger professions, we find not mere recommendations but the es-
tablishment of a legal requirement . . . .
Id. at 85. At this juncture, it is probably overly generous to characterize business even as a
“weak” profession.
162. In upholding a cause of action against a service provider by a buyer, even though there
was no privity of contract, Judge Cardozo wrote:
We state the defendants’ obligation, therefore, in terms, not of contract merely, but
of duty. . . . The defendants, acting, not casually nor as mere servants, but in the
pursuit of an independent calling weighed and certified at the order of one with the
very end and aim of shaping the conduct of another. Diligence was owing, not only
to him who ordered, but to him also who relied.
Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 277 (1922).
163. See  discussion infra Part V.
164. The importance of group norms in influencing behavior is explained in Part III in fra.
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honorably,165 there is, to date, relatively little institutionalization of ethi-
cal responsibility in business.166 Further, more concrete proposals for
ethical business conduct tend to resemble the way legal ethics would ad-
dress the issue.167
III.   THE PSYCHOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND THE
REGULATORY CONSTRUCT FOR LAWYERS
Although I am less critical of the status quo than Pearce and others,
my objection to a proposed business paradigm is not premised on the
notion that things are perfect in the kingdom of the professionalism
paradigm. Rather, I fear that things will only worsen under a business
paradigm or an overly business-like professionalism paradigm, such as
Pearce’s “Middle Range.” This misgiving stems not from reverence for
lawyers but appreciation of their human frailties. It is in fact this very
frailty, combined with the nature of lawyering,168 which requires that any
paradigm governing lawyers be effective in fostering desirable conduct.
Something other than traditional, external, governmental regulation or
de facto regulation—via criminal or civil liability—is needed to ensure
effective functioning.
Human beings are imperfect—but still, they respond to environ-
mental stimuli; better behavior results from an environment and regu-
latory system that encourages better behavior. The professionalism
paradigm provides this by helping to create and sustain a culture that,
despite its failings, reduces unwanted conduct. It helps build ethical law-
yers by creating group norms, including rules of ethics, and enforcing
ethical behavior. Where law has failed in these areas, the failure has oc-
curred not because of a deficiency in the professionalism paradigm, but
because business considerations and business thinking have been al-
lowed to intrude too greatly into the professionalism paradigm.
The professionalism paradigm provides a more effective framework
for encouraging better behavior than any imaginable form of the busi-
                                                                                                                                                
165. Se e, e.g., Dan  Lon  ke v ic h  , P r  of  it  s, Et  h  ic s Not  Mu  tu  a  lly Exc lu  sive, NAT ’ L UNDERWRITER
(Life & Health/Fin. Servs. ed.), May 5, 1997, at 26.
166. See  G. Mick Smith, Can Insurance People Be Taught Ethics?, NAT’L UNDERWRITER
(Life & Health/Fin. Servs. ed.), Nov. 16, 1998, at 61 (positing that ethical training of business-
persons is feasible, but advocating ethical training that is more philosophical and less regula-
tory than that found in law). Even participants in the business ethics movement at least tacitly
acknowledge that business ethics are a long way from being institutionalized.
Business ethics . . . is strictly speaking a philosophical field, a division of applied
philosophy, in this instance of applied eth ics.
The threat to business ethics as thus conceived is fourfold: (1) the threat from di-
luted competence; (2) the threat from unfulfillable expectations; (3) the threat from
co-optation; and (4) the threat from the replacement of critical by descrip tive eth -
ics.
Richard T. DeGeorge, Will Success Spoil Business Ethics?, in  BUSINESS ETHICS: THE STATE OF
THE ART 42, 45 (R. Edward Freeman ed., 1991).
167. See, e.g., Sam Friedman, Disclosure Is the Only Way to Reassure Clients that Brokers
Are Not Double-Dealing, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.),
Nov. 16, 1998, at 55 (advocating required disclosure to affected parties and implicit consent to
continued agency as solution for concern over possible insurance broker self-dealing).
168. See  supra notes 37-103  and accompanying text (discussing the definition of “profes-
sional occupation,” client dependence and vulnerability in the delivery of legal services, and the
need to maintain lawyers’ independence from political and economic pressures).
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ness paradigm because the business paradigm simply has no such cul-
ture- and norm- building apparatus.169 Business ethics, as currently for-
mulated, would not offer sufficient guidance for lawyers or standards for
disciplining lawyers who violate rules of conduct or professional norms.
In fact, the business paradigm could only achieve such an apparatus if it
borrowed from legal professionalism, again raising the question whether
Pearce’s proposed shift is really necessary.
Thus, the professionalism paradigm comes as close as anything we
have yet developed to an effective means of regulating lawyering activity.
It is worth retaining because it has fostered the creation of a regulatory
framework with workable, although sometimes problematic, rules that
are widely publicized and offer the necessary guidance and standards. To
adapt Gertrude Stein’s famous aphorism, there is a “there” there for legal
ethics that has yet to emerge for business ethics.170
Furthermore, lawyer professionalism and the professionalism para-
digm are simply not in the bad shape Pearce suggested. Without doubt,
there are many instances where attorneys fail to act according to the
demonstrated tenets of professionalism. However, just as we should not
be blind to the legal profession’s shortcomings, neither should we paint a
darker picture than is warranted.
A.   Before and After: The Historical Backdrop to Lawyer Behavior
Some historical perspective is in order. De facto lawyers 171 have ex-
isted since the dawn of early culture as village elders, religious leaders,
and military disciplinarians. More de jure lawyering appears to have ac-
companied the rise of more advanced civilizations in China, India, Per-
sia, Greece and Rome. Still, the more familiar legal profession is a crea-
ture of only the past few hundred years. Although it is now fashionable
to lionize the English Inns of Court system and attempt to rekindle its
spirit of community and professionalism, the fact remains that law was,
until the nineteenth century, a field that one entered through self-taught
apprenticeship and on the job training.172
In the United States, legal education moved from the ad hoc appren-
ticeship style of lawyering to formal law schools during the nineteenth
                                                                                                                                                
169. See  ELIZABETH WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON : LOST RESPONSIBILITY IN
PROFESSIONS AND ORGANIZATIONS 2, 28-36, 58-95 (1992) (explaining that work for corpora-
tions, governments, and other artificial entities tends to detach constituents of these entities
from feelings of individual responsibility, fostering more antisocial behavior); See also  LEE
ROSS & RICHARD E. NISBETT , THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION 3-6, 27-58 (1991) (explaining that
the context in which individuals operate shapes behaviors and attitudes).
170. GERTRUDE STEIN, EVERYBODY’S AUTOBIOGRAPHY 289 (1937).
171. I am referring here to individuals whose roles in society were very lawyer-like, in that
they frequently had specialized knowledge about their societies’ laws or customs not widely
available to most and in that they frequently provided advice and guidance to others in their
community. However, what I will refer to as a “de jure” lawyer is an individual for whom this
very specialized function defines his role in society. The roles of de facto lawyers, on the other
hand, are broader, and encompass other skills and knowledge which do not relate directly to
the function of a lawyer.
172. See  Jeffrey W. Stempel, All Stressed Up but Not Sure Where to Go: Pondering the
Teaching of Adversarialism in Law School, 55 BROOK. L. REV. 165, 166-69 (1988) (reviewing
STEPHAN A. LANDSMAN , READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL J USTICE : THE AMERICAN APPROACH TO
ADJUDICATION (1987) and summarizing the development of legal education in United States).
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century—a positive development.173 In addition to employing law profes-
sors, newly established law schools provided a more consistent basis of
lawyer training, and one more divorced from market forces. Students
were taught “the law” without the instant need to serve clients or deliver
legal analysis influenced by client needs—another good thing. The im-
plicit notion behind a full-time law school with full-time faculty is that
market influence, with both its corruption174 and its disciplinary insight,
will come soon enough.
The Watergate scandal appalled lawyers and nonlawyers alike with
the level of attorney misconduct brought to light and had a significant
impact on both legal education and regulation of attorneys. Among the
many developments was renewed interest in the teaching of professional
responsibility in law schools; it soon became a required course and the
focus of a dramatic upsurge in scholarly attention.
Not coincidentally, state bar regulation of lawyers also increased in
the wake of Watergate. It is true that some of the regulation can be un-
charitably described as a rear-guard action by the forces of legal privilege
and protectionism, as, for example, efforts to ban or strangle lawyer ad-
vertising.175 Still, on the whole, this has been a good development and
reflects improvement of the profession rather than its decline.176
Therein lies the attendant paradox. We see more instances of lawyer
discipline and are tempted to take the increase as evidence of a growing
professionalism problem; however, it is probably evidence of improving
professionalism. Many transgressions detected, reported, and punished
today probably went unscathed fifty or seventy years ago. Yet, because
we now have better records for discovering lawyer transgressions, there
is a tendency to misread this development as evidence of decline. Statis-
tics on lawyer discipline may be like statistics on crime; better reporting
and enforcement yields more data. This may seem to indicate an “up-
surge” in crime, but an apparent increase should not be confused with
an actual increase, in crime or lawyer misconduct.177
                                                                                                                                                
173. See id.
174. I regard the business aspects of law as unavoidable and something of a necessary evil.
Some business influences are of course useful to law. A law office need not be run ine fficiently.
The hunger for business success often helps to promote zealous, even courageous, client repre-
sentation. Certainly, lawyers are entitled to be paid, and it is always useful in Professional Re-
sponsibility class to discuss the means of effecting this without becoming unduly mercenary.
The business value of profit also spurs some legal activity that is very socially useful. For exam-
ple, contingent fees permit ordinary people to litigate for vindication of their rights, even if they
occasionally lead to profits criticized as windfalls. See also  supra notes 145-46 and accompa-
nying text (describing multi-billion dollar fees awarded Florida’s outside counsel in tobacco liti-
gation).
175. See, e.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977) (establishing a First
Amendment right for a legal clinic to advertise prices for particular legal services despite state’s
ban on such advertisements); see also FLORIDA RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 4-
7.3 (forbidding communication with injured party or relative until 30 days after the event
causing injury). This post-Bates advertising restriction was upheld against constitutional chal-
lenge in Florida Bar v. Went for It, Inc. , 515 U.S. 618 (1995).
176. See  Geoffrey C. Hazard Jr. et al., Why Lawyers Should Be Allowed to Advertise: A
Market Analysis of Legal Services , 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983).
177. See  JOHN MONAHAN & LAURENS WALKER, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN LAW (3d ed. 1995) (dis-
cussing methodological problems in gathering and measuring information and pointing out
that a decrease in issuance of speeding tickets may be due to a reduction in the number of en -
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Although Watergate is a modern black mark on the profession, it in-
volved lawyers educated, admitted, trained, and regulated prior to 1972.
Thirty years later, the profession arguably does a better job than it did in
preventing and punishing lawyer misbehavior. Recent impeachment-
related events in Washington, and the roles of lawyers in the drama, are
hardly cause for celebration, but at least these lawyers appear not to be
involved in political espionage and cover-up, as was the case during
Watergate. It is doubtful that a business-based construct of lawyering
would do any better. Some of the doubt is based upon the reasons noted
above regarding the lack of a fully formed system of business ethical re-
sponsibility. There simply is no effective yardstick for determining when
a businessperson has crossed the line of ethical behavior. The best yard-
stick business has is the one provided by the legal profession through
statutory and common-law constraint.
Undoubtedly, in law there has been protectionism in the guise of
ethics regulation—and favoritism. Rhetorically, one might ask whether
we see fewer disciplinary actions involving attorneys from prominent
large firms because those attorneys are less ethically challenged or be-
cause those firms are less likely to be fully prosecuted. Even admitting a
significant degree of imperfection, however, there is much to appreciate
in the current system of lawyer regulation under the professionalism
paradigm.
Under the status quo, even the powerful frequently answer for ethical
improprieties and pay a significant penalty. For example, a Minnesota
Supreme Court Justice quit after being accused of cheating while taking
the Florida Bar Examination.178 The Chief Judge of the New York Court
of Appeals was convicted of stalking, removed from the Court, and dis-
barred.179 A United States Supreme Court Justice was denied ascension
to the Chief Justice post and resigned in disgrace upon disclosure of his
alleged ethical improprieties.180 A Florida lawyer was suspended from
                                                                                                                                                
forcement officers rather than to a reduction in the incidence of speeding). I am of course
speaking in proportional terms. There may be a net increase in lawyer misconduct today simply
because there are now twice as many lawyers as in 1970. Presumably, there is more net social
utility provided by this larger group of lawyers as well. Regarding whether the ethical conduct
of lawyers is better or worse than in the past, the relevant comparison is whether a higher per-
centage of legal activity results in a higher percentage of discipline.
178. See  Amy Tarr, Removal Urged of Justice Who Cheated on Exam, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 4,
1985, at 6; Austin C. Wehrwein, Minnesota Justice Quits over Probe, NAT’L L.J. , Mar. 25, 1985,
at 10. Minnesota Supreme Court Associate Justice John J. Todd wanted to gain admission to
the Florida Bar. Todd, because of his prominent position, succeeded in convincing Bar author i-
ties to allow him to take the exam at his chambers in St. Paul, Minnesota. This alone was an ob-
viously unusual and, perhaps, improper accommodation. Based on his law clerks’ testimony,
Justice Todd was accused of cheating on the exam by making use of written materials, and even
using the law clerks to bring him material. The story broke, Justice Todd resigned from the
Court in disgrace, and his Florida Bar exam was invalidated.
179. See  SOL WACHTLER, AFTER THE MADNESS: A JUDGE’S OWN PRISON MEMOIR 5 (1997).
Sol Wachtler, Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, highest New York court, was ar-
rested and convicted for stalking his former paramour and threatening her daughter’s safety in
a bizarre effort to drive her back into terminated illicit relationship. Judge Wachtler was subse-
quently imprisoned, removed from the Court, disbarred, and later released from prison.
180. See  LAURA KALMAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 372-76 (1990); BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY ,
FORTAS: THE R ISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME COURT J USTICE  570-575 (1988). Justice Fortas had
engaged in improper business dealings with a financier who had pending business before the
Court. In addition, Fortas had engaged in arguably improper conduct by continuing to serve as
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practice for a year because he had an undisclosed conflict of interest
while representing the seller in a land deal.181 Would business leaders,
particularly prominent or politically powerful business leaders, who
committed similar wrongs be as frequently, readily, and effectively ex-
amined and sanctioned?
There have, however, been some unwise developments in lawyer
regulation. Conflicts, for example, are more readily tolerated today.
Firms may employ screening mechanisms as a means of sterilizing law-
yers “infected” with a conflict, who change firms.182 Lawyers divide as to
whether screening should be permitted.183 If the pro-screening forces are
correct, then our commitment to professionalism has not softened. If,
however, the anti-screening view is correct, then there has been ethical
slippage. This has come about not because of fidelity to the profession-
                                                                                                                                                
a White House advisor during his time on the Court, including apparent communication with
then-President Lyndon Johnson regarding pending Court matters. Fortas was not disbarred,
however, and regained some measure of stature in private practice. See Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), the well-known “snail darter” case, in which Fortas suc-
cessfully argued before the Supreme Court to suspend construction of the planned Tellico Dam
on the grounds that the project would destroy the last known habitat of an endangered species.
However, Fortas’ former colleagues at the prestigious Washington law firm of Arnold & Porter
(named Arnold, Fortas & Porter prior to the appointment of Fortas to the Court) would not ac-
cept him back into the partnership. See  Kalman, supra, at 380-85.
181. See  Chris Poynter, Attorney Punished over Business Deal: George Harold Carswell
Jr. Received a One-Year Suspension but Can Petition Immediately to Be Reinstated, TALL.
DEM., May 10, 1996, at 2B (describing how an attorney was suspended from practice for one
year due to representation tinged with conflict of interest). The attorney represented a seller of
real property in connection with the sale while at the same time having an undisclosed agree-
ment with the prospective buyer under which the attorney would manage the property for a fee.
See id.
182. See  RULE 1.9. The Rule would prohibit a lawyer from representing a current client if
the matter for the current client is “substantially related” to a matter on which the lawyer
worked for a former client. However, despite the Rule provisions on imputed conflicts, when
such a tainted lawyer changes firms, a court may not necessarily disqualify his new firm if the
“infected” lawyer is adequately “screened” from the current legal activity on the matter. This
has even been permitted in situations where any imputed conflict would be a concurrent con -
flict within the meaning of Rule 1.7. See, e.g., Cromley v. Board of Education, 17 F.3d 1059 (7th
Cir. 1994). The Cromley  court permitted screening, despite an arguably current conflict of in -
terest. There, the plaintiff’s attorney in a discrimination case against a school board had ac-
cepted a partnership in the firm representing the defendant school board and then withdrew as
counsel for plaintiff. The court refused to disqualify the school board’s firm, finding that former
plaintiff’s counsel was adequately screened from contact with his new firm’s ongoing defense
against his now former client.
The Cromley case seems wrongly decided. Not only does it tolerate a current conflict situa-
tion of high adversariness, but it also utterly ignores the plaintiff’s attorney’s blatant breach of
his duty of loyalty. See  GILLERS , supra note 131, at 322 (implicitly criticizing the Cromley dec i-
sion for failing to inquire into this breach). Compare the Cromley court’s att itude to the resis-
tance to screening found in pre-Model Rules cases such as Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur An-
dersen & Co., 567 F.2d 225, 229-31 (2d Cir. 1977), which imputed the conflict of a mere affili-
ated counsel to a firm in a case involving civil litigation, despite a ttempts to screen out the con -
flicts.
Cromley reflects the professionalism paradigm quite heavily compromised, perhaps even
trumped, by the business paradigm and provides a consequently disturbing example of what
may take place should the business ethos become dominant in law.
183. See  AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, R ESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS §§
204(2), 213 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1996) (permitting screening). But see  Neil W. Hamil-
ton & Kevin R. Coan, Are We a Profession or Merely a Business? The Erosion of the Conflicts
Rules Through the Increased Use of Ethical Walls , 27 H OFSTRA L. REV. 57 (1998) (opposing the
use of screening).
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alism paradigm, but because lawyers have succumbed, to some degree,
to the business paradigm and to a desire to acquire or retain paying cli-
ents rather than turn them away.
Similarly, the 1980s and 1990s saw the rise of law firms “firing” cli-
ents, or lawyers who would take with them unwanted clients, in order to
free the firm to accept newer, more lucrative clients, without running
afoul of the conflict of interest prohibitions of Model Rule 1.7. 184 One
court referred to this as the law firm dropping the client “like a hot po-
tato.”185 Despite trying hard not to be unfair to Pearce’s high hopes for
market regulation of lawyers, I cannot help but see the “hot potato” cases
as further examples of lawyers attempting to operate under a business
paradigm but (usually) being thwarted by the ethical constraints of the
professionalism paradigm.186 Further, I am relieved that the profession-
alism paradigm provides this bulwark, and I find this a substantial ar-
gument in favor of retaining it.
With tolerance for lawyer screening and the “hot potato” phenome-
non as examples, I am fortified in my skepticism about a business-based
regulatory construct. No matter how much Pearce or others buff the
business paradigm, it is likely to lead to less ethical conduct rather than
more, because it increases the likelihood that lawyers will do what is
most monetarily advantageous for them, irrespective of other concerns.
B.   The Importance of Group Norms and Environment
Lawyers, like anyone else, react rationally to their environments.187 If
their environment is one that rewards ethical behavior and punishes
breaches of professional responsibility, most lawyers will conform their
conduct to the set, scrutinized, and enforced professional standards.188
                                                                                                                                                
184. See, e.g. , Unified Sewerage Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 (9th Cir. 1981);
Strategem Dev. Corp. v. Heron Int’l, 756 F. Supp. 789, 793 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Teradyne, Inc. v.
Hewlett-Packard Co., 1991 WL 239940 (N.D. Cal. 1991); Hartford Acc ident & Indem. Co. v.
R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp. 534, 540 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (involving firing the lawyer in order
to indirectly fire the client).
185. Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365; see also GILLERS , su -
pra note 131, at 308-11 (discussing the “hot potato” problem and its variants).
186. An exception is Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 721 F. Supp.
534, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), in which the firm was permitted to fire the lawyer in order to indi-
rectly fire the client and then represent a new client, adverse to the client whose firing was en -
gineered. See  GILLERS , supra note 131, at 327-28; see also  Borges v. Our Lady of the Sea Corp.,
935 F.2d 436, 440 (1st Cir. 1991) (declining to disqualify firm from representing litigant against
client under somewhat different circumstances where complaining party could be characterized
as former client in unrelated matter).
187. See  WOLGAST, supra note 169, chs. 2-4, 8; see also ROSS & NISBETT , supra note 169,
ch. 2 (1991); PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A COMPARATIVE
APPROACH ch. 4 (1962); FREIDSON, supra note 7 at 85 (noting that although group norms are
important in shaping behavior in any setting, shaping of member norms is stronger where the
profession itself is stronger and more developed).
188. Professional or group norms are:
 . . . a code of rules that lays down for the individual what he should do so as not to
damage collective interests and so as not to disorganize the society of which he
forms a part. If he allowed himself to follow his bent, there would be no reason why
he should not make his way or, at very least, try to make his way, regardless of eve-
ryone in his path and without concern for any disturbance he might be causing
about him. It is this discipline that curbs him, that marks the boundaries, that tells
him what his relations with his associates should be, where illicit encroachments
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Even the informal atmosphere of a work setting can have dramatic
impact upon esprit de corps and productivity,189 and informal organiza-
tion can be as important to work performance as any formal system.190
Thus, group norms are critical in determining people’s behavior at
work.191 Further, these norms are affected by group structure in impor-
tant ways. 192 For example, one well-regarded study found better work
performance to be associated with such factors as increased worker
control, better job security, and reduced competitive conflicts within the
group.193
While much of the past occupational research related to “blue collar”
workers, a number of studies investigated the impact of bureaucratic or
informal norms upon workers involved in more nuanced activity. For
example, one study of welfare caseworkers found that the establishment
of a “pro-client atmosphere” had significant impact upon workers’ atti-
tudes toward clients and work on behalf of cl ients.194 According to the
author of the study, the observations:
                                                                                                                                                
begin, and what he must pay in current dues towards the maintenance of the com-
munity.
DURKHEIM, supra note 79 , at 14-15 (1958); see also id.  at 31-35, 171-175; TALCOTT PARSONS,
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY 34-49, 370-85 (1954). Particularly, Parsons notes that group
rules and norms tend to discourage “deviant” or unethical behavior that may result in “yielding
to expediency, above all through financial temptations and pressures from clients.” Id. at 377.
189. See  MERTON, S OCIAL THEORY, supra note 79 , at 230-59 (1968); see also BLAU & SCOTT,
supra note 187, at 90-91 (discussing workplace studies demonstrating that “increased produc-
tivity was a function of improved human relations” and that changes in social situations at work
often were associated with productivity); HARRISON M. TRICE, OCCUPATIONAL SUBCULTURES IN
THE WORKPLACE 20-45, 48-51 (1993).
A classic example is the so-called “Hawthorne effect,” named after an industrial experiment
at the General Electric plant, located in Hawthorne, New York. The experiment was designed to
test the effect of lighting on industrial production.
When illumination was regularly increased, productivity increased in two of the
three departments, but the increases were not parallel to the changes in illumina-
tion. A second study divided workers in one department into an exper imental and a
control group, with illumination being increased in the former and held constant in
the latter; production increased in both of the two groups. A third study decreased
illumination in the experimental group; again, productivity of workers increased
until the illumination had been reduced to a point where operators could no longer
see their work. The conclusion seemed inescapable that the improved productivity
noted was not due to increased illumination. The experimenters pointed out that
many relevant conditions—includ ing social ones—had not been controlled. Appar-
ently what was involved in these striking changes was that groups of workers rou -
tinely engaged in monotonous tasks were singled out for attention by management
and by the researchers. This attention gave them a feeling of importance and made
their jobs more interesting, and their consequent greater work satisfaction led them
inadvertently to work faster.
BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187 at 89-90.
190. See  TRICE, supra note 189 , at 20-45; BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187, at 91.
191. See  BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187, at 92-93 (summarizing research on industrial
workers as evidence of this point).
192. See  id.  at 100-104.
193. See  FRITZ JULES ROETHLISBERGER & WILLIAM DICKSON , MANAGEMENT AND THE
WORKER (Harvard University Press 1966), discussed approvingly and summarized in BLAU &
SCOTT, supra note 187, at 91-94.
194. See  Peter M. Blau, Structural Effects, 25 AM . SOC. R EV. 178, 180-83 (1960). This effect
occurred notwithstanding the individual worker’s pre-existing attitudes. See id.
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suggest that a worker’s orientation influences not only his own per-
formance but also his reaction to the performance of other workers in
his group. If a pro-client orientation prevails in a group, then the indi-
vidual who merely checks client eligibility without providing casework
services experiences disapproval, whereas the individual who provides
services to clients earns the approval of his colleagues. The desire for
social approval thus constrains workers in pro-client groups to pro-
vide casework services to clients regardless of their own orientations
to clients. In groups where the prevailing social climate is anticlient,
social pressure works in the opposite direction, and the individual is
socially rewarded for carefully checking eligibility but not for fur-
nishing casework services. It is in this way that social processes—the
distribution and direction of sanctions in interaction—exert an influ-
ence on a worker’s approach that is independent of his own orienta-
tion to clients.195
In short, “prevalence of pro-client values in a group probably gives
rise to norms protecting the interests of clients.”196
It is important that core values be emphasized. Group norms create
formal and informal pressure for conformity, but that pressure is re-
sisted in significant degree when the worker is secure in status, either
formally, as is, for example, the boss or partner, or informally, as is, for
example, the popular or valuable worker.197 Nonetheless, norms “that
pertain to basic values of a group” are “too significant to permit any
member to violate them.”198 Thus, people will conform their behavior to
fundamental norms, regardless of their status.
The degree of group cohesion may also make client relations less im-
portant to the worker’s performance or success.199 On a more macrocos-
mic level, “the position of the work group in the larger organization’s di-
vision of labor influences its social solidarity.”200 What this suggests is
that how strongly members identify with a group will determine how
much influence the group’s norms will have over their behaviors.
While many of these studies date from the 1930s to the 1950s,201
nothing in the recent literature casts doubt upon the earlier findings.
Furthermore, a more recent study conducted by Patricia Martin and
Marlene Powell 202 has produced findings consistent with the earlier
                                                                                                                                                
195. BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187, at 102.
196. Id. at 103.
197. See  BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187, at 104-06; see also CHRIS ARGYRIS, P ERSONALITY
AND ORGANIZATION  (1957); J.K. CHADWICK-JONES, SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY: ITS STRUCTURE
AND INFLUENCE IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (1976); GEORGE C. H OMANS, THE HUMAN GROUP  (1950);
GEORGE C. H OMANS, THE NATURE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1967); GEORGE C. HOMANS, S OCIAL
BEHAVIOR: I TS ELEMENTARY FORMS  140-44 (1974); WILLIAM L. SKIDMORE, SOCIOLOGY’S MODELS
OF MAN (1975); George C. Homans, Social Behavior as Exchange, 63 AM . J. SOC. 597 (1958);
Harold H. Kelley and Martin M. Shapiro, An Experiment on Conformity to Group Norms
Where Conformity Is Detrimental to Group Achievement, 19 AM . SOC. REV. 667, 667-77 (1954).
198.  BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187, at 106.
199. See  id.  at 108.
200. Id. at 110.
201. See  BLAU & SCOTT, supra note 187, at ch. 4 (surveying the literature of the field and
making considerable reference to older studies, giving impression that work in the area may be
subsiding).
202. See  Patricia Yancey Martin and R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the “Second As-
sault”: Legal Organizations’ Framing of Rape Victims, 19 L. & SOC. INQUIRY  853, 872-79
1999]                         E M B R AC I N G  D E SC E N T  71
studies, including Blau’s examination of informal norms among welfare
caseworkers.203 The study examined the attitudes and expectations of
law enforcement officers, prosecutors, and judges, the structure of the
organizations in which they worked, and the effects of these attitudes
and structures on how they responded to rape crimes.
Using data from 130 Florida organizations that process rape cases,
Martin and Powell found that even “well-meaning” police officers were,
because of organizational structure and attitudes, “oriented to routinely
treat victims unresponsively.”204 They concluded that the officers’ be-
havior was very much influenced by factors such as self-concept, rules,
expectations, and informal norms, as sociology and social and industrial
psychology have for some time posited. Further, the study found their
behavior was particularly influenced by frameworks and frames of activ-
ity, 205 concepts drawn from the interpretive theory of famed social psy-
chologist Erving Goffman, which provided much of the foundation for
their study.206
Under the framework theory, organizations and individuals working
within organizations are also subject to the “rules and routines” of the
institution. “Rules” include not only routines but also “procedures, con-
ventions, roles, strategies, organizational forms, and technologies
around which . . . activity is constructed.”207 The term also includes the
organization member’s “beliefs, paradigms, codes, cultures, and knowl-
edge that surround, support, elaborate, and contradict those roles and
routines.”208
Applying this theory, Martin and Powell confirmed the influence of a
community’s norms over its members. Individuals make decisions about
their actions according to “‘appropriateness within a conception of iden-
tity.’”209 They “assess their options against standards of what is consid-
ered appropriate  for them and the situation, rather than against a stan-
dard of all possible outcomes based on rational choice assumptions.”210
                                                                                                                                                
(1994) (describing specific norms, frames of activity and frameworks correlated with less re-
sponsive behavior toward victims).
203. See  Blau, Patterns of Deviation, in  FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS, supra note 187.
204. Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at 853.
205. “Frameworks are cognitive schemata through which individuals interpret and give
meaning to concrete events; frames of activity are behavioral responses or actions that are ap -
propriate in given situations.” Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at 859 (citing ERVING
GOFFMAN , AN ESSAY ON THE ORGANIZATION OF EXPERIENCE: FRAME ANALYSIS (1974) [hereinafter
GOFFMAN , FRAME ANALYSIS]; JAMES G. MARCH & J OHAN P. OLSEN , R EDISCOVERING
INSTITUTIONS: THE ORGANIZATIONAL BASIS OF POLITICS (1989); David A. Snow et al., Frame
Alignment Processes, Micromobilization, and Movement Participation, 51 AM . SOC. REV. 464
(1986)).
206. See  GOFFMAN , FRAME ANALYSIS, supra note 205; ERVING GOFFMAN , ASYLUMS (1961)
[hereinafter GOFFMAN , ASYLUMS]. Martin and Powell also relied on more recent institu tional
theory. See  MARCH & OLSEN , supra note 205.
207. MARCH & OLSEN , supra note 205 , at 22. See also Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at
860 (“Rules specify routines that organizational members are expected to and, indeed, try to
follow.”).
208. MARCH & OLSEN , supra note 205, at 22 (emphasis added), quoted in Martin & Powell,
supra note 202, at 860 .
209. Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at 860 (emphasis removed) (quoting MARCH &
OLSEN , supra note 205 , at 38).
210. Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at 860.
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Such rules, routines, and conventions shape behavior even “when it is
not obviously in the narrow self interest [sic] of the person responsible
to do so.”211
Consequently, for legal organizations as for other organizations, work
is shaped by the community. To use Martin and Powell’s painful but
powerful illustration: “Bull Connor could not have hosed black citizens
in Birmingham, Alabama, during the civil rights movement without
community tolerance of his behavior.”212 Martin and Powell found that
prosecutors, judges, defense attorneys, police, and hospitals are shaped
by the community and society in their attitudes and conduct toward rape
victims.213 This study suggests that improved conduct can result from
consciousness-raising and other efforts aimed at affecting organizational
and community attitudes.214
C.   Promoting Group Norms Under a Regulatory Regime
One might question the relevance of some of these studies to the cur-
rent debate about lawyers: Much of the past research was performed on
“blue collar” workers rather than professional or managerial workers,
and much of it focused on improved productivity rather than improved
judgment, independence, loyalty, and other traits more directly germane
to the practice of law. However, particular studies have focused on law-
yers and have tended to confirm the prevailing sociological literature de-
rived from studies of other work groups.215 Even mass-market books on
lawyers that are not designed as scholarly inquiries tend to reflect the
manner in which lawyers conform to these contextual and regulatory
factors.216 Furthermore, the fact is that lawyers, despite their profes-
sional status, are unlikely to behave differently from other human be-
ings.
Brought home to the issue of lawyer regulation, then, the teachings of
sociology buttress what our common sense innately tells us: Behavior is
a result of structures and norms. Consequently, the structure and norms
that society chooses will have a powerful effect on the manner in which
lawyers conduct themselves. Whether it is a professionalism paradigm or
a business paradigm, the chosen framework will set the “frames of activ-
ity” within which lawyering takes place. It is therefore important that the
structure be one that fosters close identification with the legal commu-
nity as a whole and emphasizes important core values. Because the pro-
                                                                                                                                                
211. MARCH & OLSEN , supra note 205 , at 22, quoted in Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at
861.
212. Martin & Powell, supra note 202, at 872.
213. See id. at 872-73.
214. See  id.  at 888-90.
215. See generally JEROME E. CARLIN , LAWYERS’ ETHICS (1966); CARLIN , supra note 19;
GALANTER AND PALAY, supra note 32 ; J OHN P. HEINZ & EDWARD O. LAUMANN, CHICAGO
LAWYERS: THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR (rev. ed. 1994); ROBERT L. NELSON , P ARTNERS
WITH POWER (1988); THE NEW HIGH PRIESTS : LAWYERS IN POST-CIVIL WAR AMERICA  (Gerard W.
Gawalt ed., 1984); WILLIAM H. S IMON, THE PRACTICE OF J USTICE  (1998); SMIGEL, supra note 19.
216. See  J OSEPH C. GOULDEN , THE BENCHWARMERS: THE PRIVATE WORLD OF THE POWERFUL
FEDERAL J UDGES  (1974); GOULDEN , supra note 19; HOFFMAN , supra note 19; GERALD R. STERN,
THE BUFFALO CREEK DISASTER  (1976); JAMES B. STEWART, THE PARTNERS: I NSIDE AMERICA’S
MOST POWERFUL LAW FIRMS (1983).
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fessionalism paradigm holds greater promise for protecting the inde-
pendent judgment, loyalty to clients, and duty to the system required of
lawyers, it retains clear advantages over the business paradigm.
Undoubtedly, some lawyers cheat on the current professional system
and would do so under any future system. Some will err because of ad-
versarial, financial or social pressure or because of a dysfunctional orga-
nizational culture where they practice.217 Some will be insensitive to con-
flicts due to the lure of profit or out of a belief that they are too promi-
nent to be questioned.218 Others will violate the rules inadvertently, par-
ticularly in close cases where a decision that seemed reasonable at the
time it was made is, in hindsight, deemed a violation.219 There will be ar-
                                                                                                                                                
217. See, e.g., Matter of Jordan Schiff, No. HP 22/92 (Feb. 2, 1993), Departmental Disci-
plinary Committee, First Judicial Department, N.Y. Sup. Ct., reprinted in GILLERS , supra note
131, at 775 (illustrating a young lawyer’s display of outrageously rude and sexist behavior to-
ward opposing counsel who may have practiced in firm where senior partner set tone of rude-
ness, sexism, and unprofessional behavior); Bob Van Voris, Client Memo Embarrasses Dallas
Firm, NAT’L L.J. , Oct. 13, 1997, at A1 (describing how prominent plain tiff’s firm was accused of
ethical impropriety in content and tone of memorandum given to witnesses in preparation for
depositions, which defense lawyer characterized as a document that “tells how to lie,” after
which plaintiff’s firm did not address the propriety of the apparent coaching but instead coun-
terattacked by arguing that memorandum was improperly taken and retained).
218. See, e.g., Paul M. Barrett, How Ex-Milbank Partner Gellene Ended up on Trial over a
Conflict, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1998, at B6 (describing how in Milbank, Tweed bankruptcy case,
John Gellene, the partner appearing in the matter, was prosecuted and convicted for fraud for
failing to disclose a conflict of interest); Paul M. Barrett, Inside a White-Shoe Law Firm’s Con-
flict Case, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 1998, at B1 (describing how prominent New York firm Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy agreed to repay $1.9 million in bankruptcy fees in face of allegations
of improper conflict of interest representing both debtor and investor that was potential target
of fraud claims by debtor); Paul M. Barrett, Milbank Tweed Ex-Partner Convicted, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 4, 1998, at B13; Harvey Berkman, Counsel Conflicts Decried: Critics Say Ken Starr’s
Caseload Makes Him Too Partisan for Whitewater Probe , NAT’L L.J., Mar. 25, 1996, at A6 (de-
scribing critics’ argument that Ken Starr’s investigating President Clinton was a violation of
professional responsibility rules on conflict of interest); Anthony Lewis, Lord High Execu -
tioner, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 26, 1998, at A19 (accusing Starr of inappropriately meddling in Clinton
impeachment process out of partisanship); Melody Petersen, A Client Asks: ‘Weren’t You My
Lawyer?’, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1998, at B1 (stating that businessman had accused prominent
firm Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom of wrongfully dropping him as client in favor of co-
venturer seen as more lucrative future client for firm, and that plaintiff had alleged that in this
matter and two others “Skadden, Arps turned against one client, or that client’s best interests,
so that another client could profit”); Dean Starkman, Willkie Farr Is Criticized for Role in Case ,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 27, 1998, at B8 (stating that U.S. Bankruptcy Trustee had criticized prominent
New York firm for failing to disclose conflict of interest and recommended firm’s forfeiture of
$4.6 million in fees).
219. See  Juliet Eilperin, Female Lawyer Fined for Not Accepting Male Client: Ruling that
Law Firm Office Is Public Accommodation Sparks a Feminist Debate, NAT’L L.J. , May 12, 1997,
at A7. The decision of the Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination was that attorney
Judith Nathanson could not limit her family law practice to female clients in cases of divorce.
The Commission’s decision sparked considerable protest and has divided commentators in the
bar and the academy. See  Symposium, A Duty to Represent? Critical Reflections on Stopnicky
v. Nathanson, 20 W. NEW . ENG. L. REV. 5 (1998). I have previously described the issue as a
“simply hard” one and “a difficult question,” and it remains so to me. See  Jeffrey W. Stempel, A
More Complete Look at Complexity, 40 ARIZ. L. R EV. 781, 791 (1998). Cf. Debra Burke et al.,
Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications, 26 LOY. U. CHI . L.J. 61 (1994) (“Although attorneys
may owe duties to perform pro bono se rvice for indigent litigants which are historically, con -
stitutionally, practically, and ethically based, as well as need-based, mandating that such serv-
ice be made available to indigent civil litigants may raise legitimate concerns.”); Deborah L.
Rhode, Can a Lawyer Insist on Clients of One Gender?, NAT’L L.J. , Dec. 1, 1997, at A21. When
attorneys “err” in situations like this, it can hardly be said that the fault lies with the profession -
alism paradigm.
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eas of unavoidable difference of opinion among reasonable people.220 A
few—hopefully very few—will cheat simply because they are “cheats”
who have passed undetected through college and law school. On the
whole, however, lawyers will respond to a system that elicits good con-
duct.
This simple truth seems to have been overlooked or at least unde r-
emphasized by Pearce and others who advocate more emphasis on busi-
ness in the practice of law. Much of the discussion draws upon real world
events or makes assumptions while saying almost nothing about the lit-
erature of human behavior. Scholarship in psychology gives us insight
into the behavioral influences affecting the individual. Sociology and
group psychological study provide windows on the manner in which per-
sons think and behave in social settings. As noted above, inquiry of this
sort seems to have fallen out of fashion in legal literature. Prior to the re-
cent focus on the perceived decline of lawyers and law practice, there
was a good deal of examination of individual and group behavior and its
influences. Prior to 1980, Talcott Parsons and others conducted signifi-
cant studies and articulated theories of worker behavior, including that
of professionals.221 Robert K. Merton’s work stood out; indeed, he coined
the term “self-fulfilling prophecy.” 222 In the 1980s and 1990s, however,
these sources are seldom found in legal scholarship. Although I accuse
him of paying it insufficient attention, Pearce is among the few to note in
any way this body of work in legal writings.
Some of the inattention to the literature on workers in groups and so-
ciety is a function of its very success. The observations made fifty years
ago seem obvious and trite. There seems to be no need to dissect it with
the zeal reserved for a new work in cognitive theory by Tversky and Kah-
neman.223 Nonetheless, it is odd that despite the proliferation of “law and
                                                                                                                                                
220. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Compulsory Bar Dues and Politics Don’t Mix , NAT’L L.J.,
Jan. 19, 1998, at A26, in which an ethics expert takes the position in his regular column that bar
associations with compulsory dues should not take positions on political issues unrelated to law
practice and the courts, suggesting that affirmative action, punishment for child molesters,
same-sex marriage, and caps on medical malpractice damages are such nonrelevant political
matters. The California Bar and other state bars have at least implicitly disagreed by taking po-
sitions on such issues.
221. See, e.g., TALCOTT PARSONS, THE PROFESSIONS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (1939); TALCOTT
PARSONS, THE SOCIAL SYSTEM (1951); PETER M. BLAU, THE DYNAMICS OF BUREAUCRACY (1955);
B.J. BLEDSTEIN, THE CULTURE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1976); EMILE DURKHEIM, MORAL
EDUCATION (1961); EMILE DURKHEIM, PRAGMATISM AND SOCIOLOGY (John B. Allock ed., J.C.
Whitehouse trans., 1983); DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL ETHICS , supra note 79 ; ELIOT FREIDSON,
DOCTORING TOGETHER: A STUDY OF PROFESSIONAL SOCIAL CONTROL  (1975); ELIOT FREIDSON,
PROFESSIONAL DOMINANCE (1970); C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR (1951); D. R UESCHEMEYER,
LAWYERS AND THEIR SOCIETY (1973); R. Bucher & J. Stelling, Characteristics of Professional
Organizations 10 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 3 (1969); H.L. Wilensky, The Professionalization of
Everyone?, 70 AM . J. SOC. 137 (1964).
222. See, e.g. , MERTON, ON THEORETICAL SOCIOLOGY, supra note 79 ; M ERTON, SOCIAL
THEORY, supra note 79 ; ROBERT K. MERTON, S OCIOLOGICAL AMBIVALENCE AND OTHER ESSAYS
(1976).
223. See  Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision
Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Availability: A
Heuristic for Judging Frequency and Probability, 5 COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 207 (1973) (discuss-
ing heuristics by which persons assess issues, sometimes rationally and sometimes errone-
ously). Spurred by the work of Tversky and Kahneman, cognitive theory has been prominently
discussed in the legal literature of the 1990s and utilized to justify or oppose various legal rules,
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[fill in your favorite discipline]” inquiry during the past three decades,
relatively little has been done by bar critics or supporters to examine
lawyers in light of research on occupational and group behavior. This
body of work, primarily sociological rather than psychological, power-
fully reveals the influence of social structure and expectation upon be-
havior.
In a nutshell, research in this area demonstrates that institutions and
their ground rules and norms matter a great deal. Thus, it would be a
mistake to overlook this “lost learning”224 as Pearce and others have done
in determining to ditch professionalism in favor of the business para-
digm. The conduct of lawyers in the twenty-first century will be shaped
by their regulatory environment, which includes not only rules, en-
forcement, reward, and sanction, but informal norms as well.
Even if Pearce is right about the current malaise affecting lawyers, the
growing violation of historical taboos, and the acuteness of the paradig-
matic anomaly he perceives, his analysis suffers from a significant, ar-
guably fatal, flaw. Faced with occurrences creating tension in the system
of lawyer regulation, he assumes that the only means of resolving the
anomaly is through a change in the system. Pearce overlooks the degree
to which the regulatory system can change the behavior of its subject. So
viewed, the professionalism paradigm is both a cause and a casualty of
lawyer behavior. Even if the profession is in crisis, a reinvigorated and
heightened professionalism paradigm may resolve the crisis, at least as
well as any proposed paradigm shift to a business paradigm.
IV.   THE SUPERIORITY OF THE PROFESSIONALISM PARADIGM ’S FRAMEWORK
Viewed from the sociological perspective, the question then becomes:
Are we more likely to foster good behavior by lawyers, or at least mini-
mize bad behavior, under a professionalism paradigm or a business
paradigm? I prefer to place my bets on professionalism for the following
reasons: (1) The proffered business paradigm lacks sufficient ethical
content; by contrast, professionalism is accompanied by a comprehen-
sive set of rules outlining the bounds of permissible lawyer conduct. (2)
The professionalism paradigm provides more means for detection, su-
pervision, and enforcement, and, unlike the business paradigm, profes-
sionalism is supplemented by a system of informal norms. (3) The pro-
fessionalism paradigm requires lawyer loyalty to clients even when out-
side pressures or pecuniary interests would otherwise draw lawyers in
directions adverse to the client, as well as certain duties to the system
and third parties. By contrast, even modern business ethics impose no
                                                                                                                                                
doctrines, and norms. See, e.g., Neil B. Cohen & Aaron D. Twerski, In formed DecisionMaking
and the Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation , 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607; Cass R.
Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI . L. REV. 1129 (1986).
224. See  Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal Rea l-
ism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. R EV. 325, 390 (1995) (assessing
the development of commercial law under the UCC and suggesting that modern debates about
revision tend to retread old ground well-analyzed by scholars and practitioners of the 1930s, or
to be oblivious to this “lost learning”).
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similar duties. Instead, business theory urges them to look out for them-
selves, no matter what the consequences.
A.   The Professionalism Paradigm: Comprehensive Rules and
Precedential Interpretation
It is difficult to determine exactly what would constitute rules of law-
yer responsibility under a business paradigm. 225 Further, even if one
could zero in on the elusive target, any set of regulations developed un-
der the business paradigm probably would not be particularly apt or at-
tractive. The primary objective of business activity is profit.226 Thus,
most business theories urge commercial actors to look out for them-
selves no matter what the consequences, so long as the conduct stops
short of outright illegality.
What ethical guidelines may be found in business are for the most
part relatively straightforward aspects of common decency: make a
product of acceptable quality, give a day’s work for a day’s pay, do not
defraud, and try to keep the customer happy.227 Many of these business
bromides, however, can be seen as tips for success more than ethical as-
pirations or restrictions. Business ethics have not been very concerned
with matters such as conflicts of interest, independent judgment, loyalty,
and confidentiality, matters central to the effective discharge of the law-
yering function.228 Turning the practice of law over to an organizing con-
struct that does not deal with these factors is folly.
These factors, of course, lie at the center of lawyer professional re-
sponsibility. The professionalism paradigm, moreover, has developed a
comprehensive set of rules and regulations outlining the bounds of per-
missible lawyer conduct in these critical areas. Although imperfect, the
                                                                                                                                                
225. See  Kemba Dunham, Right and Wrong: What’s Ethical in Business? It Depends on
When You Ask., WALL ST. J., Jan. 11, 1999, at R48 (noting lack of widespread agreement on
core code of business ethics and stating: “While there may be fewer outrageous abuses than in
the past, many business ethicists say there remains a long way to go”); see also  Tina Kelley,
Charting a Course to Ethical Profits, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1998, § 3, p. 1 (noting Boeing’s use of
an ethics director but not describing functional set of ethics rules).
226. At least, this is the black-letter law of business purpose. See  A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v.
Barlow, 98 A.2d 581, 583-84 (N.J. 1953); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919) (“A business corporation is organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stock-
holders.”). For a broader examination of corporate purpose that goes beyond money-making
but finds business ethics problematic, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, Coopera tion and Constraint in
the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 TEX. L. REV.
477 (1995).
227. See  R. E DWARD FREEMAN , BUSINESS ETHICS: THE STATE OF THE ART (1991). Perhaps I
am unfair to Freeman and other business ethicists, but after reading this book and others in the
genre, I am still asking Gertrude Stein’s question about whether there is a “there there” in the
case of business ethics that goes beyond the limits of the Golden Rule. Although “do unto others
as you would have them do unto you” is a pretty good maxim for living, it hardly provides the
sort of developed rules for regulating lawyer activity already in place under the professionalism
paradigm. See  Mitchell, supra note 226 , at 528-29, 536 (arguing that corporate actors are not
held to sufficient moral accountability; corporate managers “are constrained by current law to
act more as children than as rational adults who recognize their own moral agency”); Aspen In -
stitute, 1999 Seminar Schedule, The Corporate Conscience: Ethics for Leaders (Jan. 1999 pro-
gram brochure) (suggesting business ethics derive from classical ethical theory and are implic-
itly not designed for the practice of law).
228. See supra notes 127-38, 225-27 and accompanying text.
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framework provides “black letter” guidance to lawyers and has been
augmented through years of precedential interpretation.
Thus, unlike the mythical and amorphous “Model Rules of Business
Responsibility” Pearce hopes to see by the year 2050, there already exist
real ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct  that speak to important
ethical concerns that might be overlooked, ignored, or knowingly vio-
lated if attorneys were to unilaterally consider their own best economic
interests. The Model Rules prohibit conflicts of interest229 or affiliations
that might impair the lawyer’s detached, neutral, sound judgment to
which the client is entitled.230 Confidentiality is required, 231 as is compe-
tence232 and some minimum level of client control, including control of
the objective of the representation.233
In addition, lawyers are required to safeguard client property,234 have
some restriction on fee charges, 235 and have limitations on their with-
drawal from representation.236 Lawyers must also act as officers of the
court and the legal system generally. 237 Lawyers are further obliged to
serve the profession through quality-control responsibil ities, such as su-
pervising subordinate attorneys238 and reporting serious ethical miscon-
duct.239
B.   Promoting Adherence to Standards of Conduct
The professionalism paradigm provides more means for detection,
supervision, and enforcement. Lawyers operate in the presence of cli-
ents, third parties, and other counsel. Because the non-clients with
whom the lawyer deals are often adverse, a natural private police force
shadows the working attorney. If any one of these parties feels dissatis-
fied or wronged by the lawyer’s behavior, they may take action to expose
the allegedly wrongful conduct and to obtain relief. this also exists in
business to some degree. For example, competitors are often the insti-
gators of antitrust or trade and tariff violations. However, the corps of
self-interested, private attorneys general in the business world enjoy a
considerably more distant vantage point from which to pursue their
claims than do those who work in proximity to lawyers and have other-
wise strong incentives to take action against misbehaving lawyers.
                                                                                                                                                
229. See  RULES 1.7, 1.9, 1.10, 1.11, 1.12.
230. See  RULES 1.8, 5.4.
231. See  RULE 1.6.
232. See  RULE 1.1.
233. See  RULE 1.2.
234. See  RULE 1.15.
235. See  RULE 1.5.
236. See  RULE 1.16.
237. See  RULES 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., 4.1.
238. See  RULES 5.1, 5.2, 5.3.
239. See  RULE 8.3. The duty is not a paper tiger. See  In re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790, 796
(Ill. 1988) (suspending attorney’s license to practice law for failure to report that another law-
yer had stolen from a client). In an effort to recover the money, the victim hired Himmel, who
agreed in a settlement with the other attorney to keep mum about the eth ical breach. See id.  at
795. Since the decision, lawyer complaints about other lawyers have greatly increased, num-
bering in the hundreds each year in Illinois alone. See  The Himmel Effect: ‘Snitch Rule’ Re-
mains Controversial but Effective, Especially in Illinois, A.B.A. J. , Apr. 1997, at 24.
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Those dissatisfied with lawyer actions have available to them a wider
array of remedies than commonly exists for businesspersons. A more ex-
pansive variety of meaningful sanctions is available against the trans-
gressing attorney. In the business world, the wronged party can demand
informal satisfaction, file suit or, depending on the infraction, complain
to a prosecutor. Bad business conduct is usually punished only by civil
liability, with only occasional criminal prosecution. By contrast, bad
conduct by the lawyer subjects him or her to criminal prosecution and
civil liability, as well as discipline by the profession and, perhaps, con-
tempt of court. The organized bar and the state’s high court have the
ability to find that a lawyer has sinned and to deliver a death penalty of
sorts—disbarment—that would not be a realistic threat in the business
world. Further, wrongdoing that results only in civil liability can be
spread and shifted through insurance. Thus, the professionalism para-
digm creates a heightened threat encouraging greater lawyer adherence
to professional norms than would the business paradigm.
The professionalism paradigm—simply because it defines lawyers as
professionals rather than ordinary market participants—creates a system
of informal norms encouraging better behavior by lawyers. Business has
no comparable analogue. Although many ethical businesspersons serve
as role models to others in the community, there is no sanctioning
mechanism for the “bad” businessperson similar to that which currently
exists for the “bad” lawyer. The sanctioned businessperson is likely to
enjoy continued acceptance in the business community or, if shunned,
will lose only commerce for some modest time interval.
Lawyers, of course, are not always formally disciplined or held liable
because of improper behavior.240 Nonetheless, lawyers who have
breached a confidence, performed poorly, bilked a client, gouged on fees,
or concealed relevant information are more likely than businesspersons
to face immediate or informal sanctions. Offending lawyers are more
likely than offending businesspersons to lose future referrals or suffer
adverse judicial rulings because of the court’s lingering doubts. Busi-
nesspersons can more often simply sell another widget to the next pass-
ing customer.
C.   Promoting Important Values Above Quest for Profit
In addition, the very nature of lawyering makes a professionalism
paradigm more appropriate for the lawyer regulation. The multifaceted
nature of legal service is a significant part of the reason why Pearce’s
proposed business paradigm should be rejected. Businesspersons have
one primary goal: commercial success.241 The objective of business is to
benefit the owners or managers of the entity, usually through relatively
                                                                                                                                                
240. See  supra notes 197-221 and accompanying text (regarding influence of group struc-
ture and norms on individual behavior).
241. I use the term “commercial success” to encompass profit maximization, growth or any
other reasonable goal sought by company management to avoid entering the debate about
whether business really seeks profit maximization or instead pursues other goals. Still, any
commercial goal I have seen adopted or urged has always been one designed to benefit the
owners or managers of the entity.
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swift monetary reward. Although the diffuseness of business-ethics
writings makes it possible that I am underinformed, it does not appear
that mainstream business ethicists suggest that a businessperson has
any superior duty.
By contrast, the regime of legal ethics developed under the profes-
sionalism paradigm has clearly established two duties of counsel that
under certain circumstances are superior to pecuniary success: The duty
of loyalty to the client and the duty to the system are decreed in many
black-letter rules of lawyering and implicitly supported in judicial con-
tempt power and in the very structure of the system’s admission and dis-
ciplinary architecture.
Although external conduct standards are applied to the business
community through the positive law of the governing jurisdiction, the
business ethos calls for avoiding legal regulation if possible, and mini-
mizing it to the degree permitted. Ironically, of course, business fre-
quently does this with the help of lawyers acting pursuant to their duty
of client loyalty. Although Pearce acknowledges the troubling specter of
a lawyer who is but a “business servant,”242 his thesis fails to fully appre-
ciate the implication. Rather than attempt to rein in the business servant
under the regulatory regime of the professionalism paradigm, Pearce in-
stead suggests codifying a paradigm of business servitude.
Certainly, many businesses display social conscience. Illustrations
abound of businesses contributing to charity, working for community
improvement, and so on. Nevertheless, the bulk of this effort is moti-
vated by the self-interest of the business in public relations and the indi-
rect and deferred profits likely to come from a more stable commu-
nity—better schools, and the like. While this is all very admirable, it is
not the equivalent of a duty to the system enforced against the business
by the system. Rather, business engages in good works when it accrues
to its benefit; there is no canon of any business code of ethics requiring
business to act against its pecuniary self-interest. Lawyers, however,
must do so because of their duties to the system. It is at least question-
able whether similar obligations would be imposed upon lawyers work-
ing under regulations propounded under a business paradigm.
Although a question may be posed whether a business paradigm is
more pro-client than the professionalism paradigm, it is a question that
need not long detain the inquiry. It is true that entrepreneurial zeal may
make lawyers bulldogs for clients, but this presents another set of prob-
lems. Ultimately, the net impact is anti-client, because the dog’s affec-
tions can prove to be fickle in the face of business opportunity. More sig-
nificantly, any version of a business paradigm that I can discern serves
the client only to the degree that financial benefit accrues to the busi-
nessperson. Business ethos requires no residual loyalty to a customer
who has outlived its usefulness.
Businesses treat customers or prospective customers well because it
is in their pecuniary interest to do so. When it is not, business owes
nothing to the current, former, or prospective customer. If a business
                                                                                                                                                
242. See  Pearce, Paradigm Shift, supra note 31, at 1231-53 (discussing the concept of a
lawyer as a potentially slavish “business servant”).
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has an opportunity to acquire a better customer, it may terminate rela-
tions with an existing customer, even one that has relied upon the busi-
ness. Although the business may be required to pay contract damages,
the compensation will often be assessed according to a theory of “eff i-
cient breach.” The business pays only what the spurned customer would
have realized had the contract been kept. There is almost never an addi-
tional penalty for even cold-blooded breach, and courts resist character-
izing events surrounding such a breach as a tort justifying exemplary
damages. In other words, the business paradigm provides only the mild-
est penalty for disloyalty or abandonment.
By contrast, the legal ethics launched under the professionalism
paradigm make client loyalty perhaps the highest duty of the attorney.
Even when the relationship is over or the client is dead, substantial du-
ties of loyalty continue to weigh upon counsel.243 Lawyers may not reveal
the past confidential communications of clients.244 They may not pro-
duce trial preparation materials absent court order.245 They may not take
in new clients if the new client’s matter is substantially related to the
matter involving the former client.246 Lawyers, of course, cannot simul-
taneously represent two clients with directly conflicting interests.247 Nor
can they represent a client where the lawyer’s faithfulness to the client
may be compromised by the lawyer’s other business or personal ties.248
There is nothing resembling a widely accepted business code that pro-
hibits such behavior by commercial actors.
Lawyers function quite differently from businesspersons, and under
the professionalism paradigm, lawyers enjoy ethics regulation reflecting
the inherent tension in the their multiple rules and duties. Consequently,
lawyers operating under the professionalism paradigm frequently have
duties imposed upon them that transcend their ability to maximize prof-
its at the expense of current or former clients. There appears to be no ba-
sis for thinking that this praiseworthy aspect of American law would im-
prove under a business paradigm of regulation.249 There is substantial
ground for fearing that this aspect of lawyer regulation would deteriorate
if a business paradigm replaced the professionalism paradigm.250
The duties to the client and the system are part and parcel of one’s
identity as a lawyer, not out of any misplaced sense of altruism or char-
ity, but because they are essential attributes of the lawyer’s work. With-
out loyalty to the client, law itself cannot be practiced. Without a corre-
                                                                                                                                                
243. See  Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399, 410 (1998) (holding that attorney-
client privilege survives death of the client).
244. See  RULE 1.6.
245. See  FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
246. See  RULE 1.8.
247. See  RULE 1.7.
248. See  RULE 1.8.
249. See  supra text accompanying notes 178-82 (describing cases of effective discipline of
lawyers).
250. See  supra notes 141, 226-28 and accompanying text (noting the absence of well-
established business ethics and that the primary goal of business, profit, would impede ade-
quate protection for client, confidentiality, independent judgment, and client loyalty). See  Part
V infra for examples of questionable business conduct that did not appear to cause lasting harm
to the perpetrators.
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sponding duty to the system, law can be an instrument of social destruc-
tion rather than social cohesion; therefore, there are exceptions to the
general duties of client loyalty. For example, client confidences may be
revealed if they involve an intent to commit a future crime or if the law-
yer’s services have been enlisted to perpetrate fraud.251 Where a lawyer
knows of adverse controlling legal authority that an opponent has failed
to invoke in a contested matter, the lawyer must inform the court even
though this works against the immediate interests of the client.252
Because the lawyer’s roles and duties are varied, nuanced, and often
in conflict, lawyer regulation requires a sophistication and sensitivity
that one is hard-pressed to see in theories of business behavior. Al-
though business thinking has developed sophisticated approaches to the
means by which business accomplishes its goals, the basic business the-
ory about goals remains a simple one: make money. Because the practice
of law has a considerably wider array of goals, it is unlikely that a system
of legal regulation run through a business paradigm would successfully
shoulder the burden of addressing varied aspects of law practice as well
as the professionalism paradigm.
V.   THE DANGERS OF REJECTING PROFESSIONALISM
Adding further fuel to this concern is the occasionally abysmal track
record of business on ethical matters. In particular, we often see in-
stances of businesses attempting to control or constrain professional
judgment by lawyers. If this is what business does when dealing with
professionals regulated under a professionalism paradigm, one shudders
to think what may take place in the future under a business paradigm,
when lawyers lack even the ideological protection of their own paradigm.
If lawyers are governed under a business paradigm, this may reduce the
tension between lawyers and certain clients such as liability insurers, but
the absence of tension would simply reflect the profession’s surrender to
the dark aspects of the business world.
Merely reading the newspaper and case reports makes one aware of
the danger which awaits if lawyers are subject to regulation by business
ideology.253 Too often, business ethics consist of not merely the disturb-
                                                                                                                                                
251. See  RULE 1.6(b)(1).
252. See  RULE 3.3.
253. Ev e n  w h  e re comme rc ial ac tors are sup  p  ose d  to be prof e ssion  als, one fin  d  s trou  ble some 
in  st  an  c e s of susp  e c t  con  du  c t  . Se e , e.g  ., MIC H AEL H . TROT T ER, PROF IT AN D T H E P RAC T IC E OF L AW :  
W H AT ’ S H AP P E NE D T O T H E L E GAL P ROF E SSION (19  97). A reviewer characterized Trotter’s analysis
as one that “sees attorneys as usually well-meaning individuals trapped in a system that ignores
ethics and invites abuse.” Kevin M. Quinley, Look at Law Firms a Helpful Service for Readers,
BUS. INS., Nov. 16, 1998, at 20; see also  Paul Beckett, SEC Has New Standards for Account-
ants, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1998, at B10 (documenting how government regulators impose
professional conduct rules on accountants, members of a profession); Monica Langley, Colum-
bia Tells Doctors at a Hospital to End Their Outside Practices: Showdown Nears as Physician
in Forth Worth Refuses Administrator’s Demands, WALL ST. J., May 2, 1997, at A1 (noting
conflict between doctors and a hospital company regarding the appropriateness of outside
practice and hospital control over doctors); Elizabeth MacDonald & Joann S. Lublin, In the De-
bris of a Failed Merger: Trade Secrets, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1998, at B1 (noting that former
clients were concerned about leakage of sensitive information due to the involvement of two of
the “Big Six” accounting firms, Ernst & Young and KPMG Peat Marwick, despite the profes-
sional stature of accountants, due to confidentiality rules which are less stringent and estab-
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ing “caveat emptor” ideal, but also the distasteful “survival of the fittest”
or “devil take the hindmost” ideals. A few recent or current examples of
note illustrate.254
A.   Testing the Constraints of the Business Paradigm: The Behavior of
Financial Institutions During and Following World War II
It may seem unduly melodramatic to invoke the banking and insur-
ance nonpayment, stonewalling scandals as examples of business mis-
behavior. Unfortunately, it is also apt. The undeniable factual evidence
indicates that in the wake of World War II and the Nazi Holocaust,
European banks simply escheated to themselves the unclaimed accounts
of murdered or dislocated Jewish depositors.255 European life insurers
did the same regarding life insurance policies unclaimed by beneficiaries
                                                                                                                                                
lished than those applicable to lawyers); Melody Petersen, When an Auditor’s Hats Clash:
KPMG Case Shows Varied Duties Can Create Conflicts, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 7, 1998, at D1 (noting
concern that KPMG Peat Marwick may have been shouldering “too many” roles for Teachers
Management and Investment Corp., including: “client,” “self-regulator,” “bill collector,” “audi-
tor,” and “consultant”); Hope Viner Samborn, Shutting Out Former Partners: Courts Are Now
Umpiring the Growing ‘Free-Agency’ Among Lawyers, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1999, at 32 (r eflecting
concerns about ethical breaches and disloyalty occasioned by lawyers changing firms, an in -
creasing practice).
254. The scope of this article obviously prevents sustained examination of purported ethi-
cal lapses by business. However, there seems to be no shortage of topics for further investiga-
tion. See, e.g., Lee Ann Gjertsen, N.Y. Recommends Brokers Disclose Fees, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER (Prop. & Casualty/Risk & Benefits Mgmt. ed.), Sept. 28, 1998, at 9 (regulators
require disclosure to correct possible misleading of clients and self-dealing by insurance place-
ment brokers); Sally Roberts, Greenberg Designated to Take Helm of M & M, BUS. INS., Jan.
25, 1999, at 1 (large insurance broker Marsh & McLennan selects Jeffrey W. Greenberg as CEO,
notwithstanding the fact that Greenberg’s father, Maurice Greenberg, is CEO of American In -
ternational Group, world’s largest insurance company and a party frequently adversarial to
Marsh & McLennan and its clients); Eben Shapiro, Manager’s Dual Roles Anger Star Client,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 1998, at B1 (comedian Gary Shandling files suit alleging that former man-
ager “was mired in conflicts of interest and cut deals to benefit himself at Mr. Shandling’s ex-
pense”); Michael Siconolfi, Merrill Broker Protests Policies, Is Fired, Finds His Clients Divvied
up: He Says Trumped-up Charge Was Used to Oust Him and Grab His Customers, WALL ST.
J. , Feb. 27, 1998, at A1; State Farm Settles Policyholder Lawsuit for over 100 Million, WALL ST.
J. , June 12, 1998, at A6, (“State Farm Insurance Cos. [sic] has paid more than $100 million to
settle a lawsuit by 117 victims of the Northridge, Calif., earthquake, who alleged that the com-
pany wrongly restricted their insurance coverage prior to the 1994 disaster . . .”).
255. See  Tom Bower, The Genocide Bank , DAILY MAIL, Feb. 6, 1999, at 17 (referring to the
role of Deutche Bank in financing the Auschwitz concentration camp and other cooperation
with the Nazi regime); see also Alex Brummer, A Hook for Holocaust Justice; American Law-
yers and Finance Regulators Are Giving Jewish Groups a Powerful Tool to Crack Open the
Vaults of Banks, Art Collections and Firms Tainted by the Nazis, GUARDIAN, Dec. 17, 1998, at
19, available in  LEXIS, News Library, Guardn File; Desson Howe, A Wealth of New Informa-
tion on Holocaust; Declassified Wartime Documents at Archives Are Generating Lots of Inter-
est, WASH. POST , Nov. 18, 1998, at B1 (recording that documents regarding the Nazi financing
efforts show looting of Jewish bank accounts, in surance policies, and other assets, often with
open cooperation or at least no significant resistance from both German and other European fi-
nancial institutions); Henry Weinstein, Holocaust Survivors, Swiss Banks OK Settlement, L.A.
TIMES , Jan. 23, 1999, at A13. European businesses also employed slave labor provided by the
Nazi captors. See  Edmund L. Andrews & Barry Meier, Germans Seek Plan to Avoid Suits over
Nazi-Era Labor, N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 14, 1998, at A12 (noting that according to one source, Ger-
man companies used 750,000 slave laborers from concentration camps, half of whom were
Jewish).
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in the wake of the War.256 In both cases, it appears that banks and insur-
ers conducted “business as usual” and pretended that what must have
been an inordinate spike in orphaned accounts and policies was merely
an unusual upsurge in abandonment by depositors and policyholders
and their families.
This complicit attitude on the part of some segments of the financial
business community was not confined to European institutions. While
there is no suggestion that any American institutions inappropriately
handled specific accounts, several have come under fire recently for
having put their economic interests ahead of both decency and patriot-
ism.257
I do not want to ride the morality play train more than is warranted,
but these events must surely give pause to anyone concerned about the
legal system and the ethics of businessmen and lawyers. To be fair to the
banks and insurers, the ravages of war undoubtedly left them less orga-
nized for a time. Looking back today, there may be legitimate reasons
why current management cannot be blamed for records discarded long
ago. Yet yesterday’s management was culpable at almost an obscene
level: Even when weighed against the most compelling of moral and
ethical considerations, profit came first.
This is not to suggest that lawyers have a morality genetically supe-
rior to that of bankers and insurers. Indeed, some information has sur-
faced to suggest that some lawyers emulated the financial community in
their relations with Nazis or German interests.258 However, the fact re-
                                                                                                                                                
256. See  Andrew McCathie, Corporate Germany Under Pressure over Nazis Links,
DEUTSCHE PRESSE -AGENTUR , Feb. 5, 1999, available in LEXIS, News Library, Dpa File (report-
ing that, according to one German historian, “the Nazis pursued the wealth held by the Jews
and other victims of Hitler as a way of helping to fund their exploits” and in add ition to anti-
Semitism “were out to steal and were very interested in money”); National Archives Holds
News Conference on the Holocaust Conference, FDCH Political Transcripts, Dec. 3, 1998,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Poltrn File (transcribing the remarks of the Undersecretary
of State Stuart Eizenstadt and others, who described how Nazis and European insurers con -
verted insurance policies held by Jews and noted: “It’s not coincidental that the six [insurance]
companies which are voluntary—voluntarily participating have insurance business in the
United States.”); Sean Somerville, Suing for Reparations; Holocaust: The Success of Lawsuits
Against Swiss Banks Has Given New Impetus to War-Crimes Class Action Suits, BALTIMORE
SUN, Jan. 17, 1999, at 1D, available in LEXIS, News Library, Balsun File.
257. See, for example, Michael Hirsh, The Hunt Hits Home: Did U.S. Companies Cozy up
to the Nazis?, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 14, 1998, at 48, describing a letter, dated only five months after
Pearl Harbor, from the Paris branch chief of Chase National Bank, a “pillar of Wall Street,” to
then-vice president Siegfried Stern, in which the chief boasted of the “pleasant relations” which
the Paris branch enjoyed with many German organizations and Nazi officers. The article points
out that “[o]nly a few miles from branch office, Jews were being loaded into cattle cars, and
thence to slaughter in Eastern Europe.”
258. The Hirsh article provided the following disturbing account:
In 1940, one of the nation’s most prestigious law firms, Sullivan & Cromwell, joined
together with the Wallenberg family of Sweden—famed for producing Raoul, a
Holocaust martyr who saved Jews in Budapest—to represent Nazi German inter-
ests, says Abe Weissbrodt, a former Treasury Department lawyer who prosecuted
the case in 1946. The scam? Sullivan & Cromwell drafted a voting trust agreement
making the Wallenbergs’ Enskilda Bank a dummy owner of the U.S. subsidiary of
Bosch, a German engine-parts maker, so the Nazis could retain control. The papers
were drawn up by John Foster Dulles, a Germanophile who later became Secretary
of State and whose name today graces Washington’s international airport (the
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mains that, while the business paradigm is at best neutral as to this type
of behavior, the professionalism paradigm, by emphasizing duties to the
client, inherently disapproves and discourages it.
To test the comparative ethical quotient of law and business, one can
hypothetically make a law firm the focal point of this drama. Visualize a
large, prestigious American law firm during World War II with branch
offices throughout Europe. During and after the War, contact ceases
from many of the clients who had paid sizeable retainers to the firm.
What might happen if one of the firm’s managing partners decided that
the funds were abandoned and now belonged to the firm?
It seems unlikely that a significant subset of lawyers could engage in
the thievery that apparently gripped some European banks and insur-
ers.259 Even if an unscrupulous managing partner suggested such tactics,
under the current paradigm he or she would likely be stopped by others
in the firm, reported for ethical violations, removed from the firm, or
otherwise thwarted.
Lawyers are trained to give great loyalty to clients. Some may occa-
sionally stop short of the fiduciary goal of putting client interests above
their own in little ways, as, for example, billing for the hour that was not
optimally productive or suing to collect an unpaid bill, but client aban-
donment is, if not altogether forbidden, strongly frowned upon.260 Even
commingling of client and personal funds is forbidden,261 and it is so rig-
orously enforced in some states that it can lead to disbarment, even
when no client loses money.262
Loyalty rules are not aspirational or left to individual conscience;
violations can lead to professional discipline. In fact, in many instances
lawyers are even required to report the violations of others. 263 Civil li-
ability to the injured party is a distinct possibility, or even a likelihood,
and there are few barriers to such a suit by clients or third parties.264 In a
case such as the conversion of assets of deceased clients, plaintiffs would
                                                                                                                                                
scheme worked during the war, but in 1948 Bosch was finally auctioned to a U.S.
buyer).
Id. at 48.
259. This is different from having an isolated lawyer or even a small firm engage in unethi-
cal conduct. See  Dunham, supra note 225 .
Throughout history there have been those who considered it a matter of personal
honor to deal fairly and also those who thought that anything one could do without
penalty was acceptable. The question is, at base, whether human nature has
changed. To that, I find, the answer is, “It has not.”
Id.
260. Still, lawyers are legally permitted a wider zone of client abandonment than is, per-
haps, desirable. See  RULE 1.16(b) (setting forth the circumstances under which a lawyer may
withdraw from representation); see also  supra text accompanying notes 241-49 (regarding a
lawyer’s discretion to discharge clients).
261. See  RULE 1.15.
262. See, e.g. , In re Warhaftig, 524 A.2d 398, 402 (N.J. 1987) (disbarring an attorney who
had “borrowed” money from client funds, although he only took an amount less than he was
confident his fees would be, the fees were to fund cancer treatment for his wife, no client was
ever injured, and he replaced the funds).
263. See  RULE 8.3.
264. See generally RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH , LEGAL MALPRACTICE (4th ed.
1996) (surveying doctrinal and practical aspects of malpractice exposure and litigation); see
also GILLERS , supra note 131, at 733-52.
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probably not even need to proffer an expert witness on professional re-
sponsibility to prevail.265 Case law further suggests that on questions of
credibility and evidentiary inference, ties go to the client-plaintiff rather
than the attorney-defendant.266
Under the professionalism paradigm, the norm of client loyalty
means that the law firm in the above hypothetical would be roundly
criticized and ostracized by its peers. No similar reaction seems to have
taken place with regard to the financial institutions’ behavior during
World War II. Those highly respected banks and insurers remain re-
spected banks and insurers. Sadly, they may suffer no loss of business
because of their reprehensible conduct. This is hardly a persuasive brief
for institutionalizing a business paradigm for the law.
B.   Loyalty and Duties to Third Parties
American business may lack examples of anti-client action as dra-
matic as that of the European abandonment of Jewish depositors and
policyholders.267 Nonetheless, American businesses, operating under the
business paradigm, do not have the same kind of loyalty to their clients
and customers as lawyers operating under the professionalism para-
digm. It is true that the business ethic, particularly in the wake of the
total quality management preached by W. Edwards Deming initially and
by Tom Peters to this day,268 advocates treating customers well as part of
a long-term relationship.269 But an underlying premise of this post-
                                                                                                                                                
265. See  Olfe v. Gordon, 286 N.W.2d 573, 578 (Wis. 1980) (finding that expert testimony is
not required to sustain a malpractice action against a lawyer where malpractice consists of
breach of contract, deception, and failure to follow client instructions, rather than a lleged poor
judgment or inadequate performance of services).
266. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 693-94 (Minn.
1980) (affirming client’s judgment in malpractice action in the face of attorney testimony that
there had been no retention).
267. There are, however, widespread accounts of anti-social behavior by business, much of
it uncovered by and prosecuted by lawyers: asbestos, the Ford Pinto gas tank, the Dalkon
Shield, and tobacco, to name a few. Se e , e.g  ., Bore l v. Fibre board  Pape r Prod  s. Corp  ., 49  3 F.2d  
10  76  (5t  h  Circ . 19  73) (affirming jury verdict in asbestos case); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 119
Cal. App. 3d 757, 771 (1981) (affirming jury verdict in Ford Pinto case); Sheldon Engelmayer &
Robert Wagman, Note, Lord's Justice: One Judge's Battle to Expose the Deadly Dalkon Shield
I.U.D., 99 HARV. L. REV. 875 (1986) (book review) (discussing one trial judge’s determined ef-
forts to “see justice done” in famous Dalkon Shield case—and arguing he went too far beyond
his appropriate neutral role); Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Liti-
gation, 44 STAN. L. REV. 853, 857 (1992) (discussing the “first wave of cigarette litigation,”
which began in the mid-1950s).
A discussion of this interaction of business and law is too much of a detour into the realm of
torts and compensation for this paper. Nonetheless, a word on the point is in order: One is
hard-pressed to find similar instances of injury inflicted by lawyers in the ordinary course of
business. Much of the reason for this is simply the limited scope of legal work. A bad brief does
not have the ripple effect of a dangerous product. Even so, it may also be that lawyers rarely be-
get massive tort liability because the professional rules and norms governing lawyers discour-
age harmful antisocial behavior.
268. See  W. EDWARDS DEMING, OUT OF CRISIS (1986); TOM PETERS AND ROBERT WATERMAN,
IN SEARCH OF EXCELLENCE : LESSONS FROM AMERICA’S BEST RUN COMPANIES (1982); PHILIP
CROSBY, QUALITY IS FREE  (1979) (discussing TQM and related modern theories of management
and company performance).
269. See  Pamela H. Bucy, Corporate Ethos: A Standard for Imposing Corporate Criminal
Liability, 75 MINN. L. REV. 1095, 1121-27 (1991) (noting that corporate culture affects behavior
of individual corporate constituent actors); see also Richard B. Hoffman & William M. Luciano-
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caveat emptor enlightened business theology is that this applies only to
the customers you want. Indeed, there is a good deal of business litera-
ture about avoiding or jettisoning unprofitable clients,270 although law
has this as well. Certainly, good businesses treat good customers
well—and try not to gratuitously harm less favored or unwanted custom-
ers. Nevertheless, when there is profit to be made by turning on a cus-
tomer, distributor, or joint venture partner, the business ethic appears to
permit this freely, even if such behavior is not encouraged.
Two recent examples from the soft drink industry demonstrate the
business paradigm’s lowered standard of loyalty. Although this may be a
mundane source of case study, it is nonetheless illustrative of my point.
Prior to its 1980s resurgence, Coca-Cola was considered an only
modestly well-performing company, in large part because of its relations
with its bottling subsidiaries or contract bottlers.271 Coke’s solution was
to change the corporate and contractual relationships to make them less
advantageous for the bottlers and more advantageous for Coca-Cola.272
The then-CEO Roberto Goizueta was generally praised for this new,
more aggressive strategy.273
While Coke’s actions may be good, even excellent, business, they are
hardly shining examples of loyalty. I do not mean to suggest this is
blameworthy conduct in the business arena. In fact, that is my point: the
business paradigm approves of and even praises conduct that would be
impermissible or at least questionable under the lawyer’s professional-
ism paradigm. To me, this makes the professionalism paradigm, in its
ability to protect clients, substantially superior to any business paradigm
for use in law.
More recently, Coca-Cola and other major soft-drink brands have be-
gun moving into lucrative vending machine markets that were previously
served by their own distributors. Coke is able to undersell its former al-
lies by selling soda from its own vending machines at a lower price.274
                                                                                                                                                
vic, Long Range Planning: A Reality in the Judicial Branch, 44 AM . U. L. REV. 1599, 1600 n.1
(1999) (“Total Quality Management (TQM) has become a general rubric for initiatives for in -
creased quality and customer awareness in public and private organizations.”). But see  David G.
Oedel, Deming, TQM and the Emerging Managerial Cr itique of Law Practice, 37 ARIZ. L. R EV.
1209, 1215 n.34 (1995) (attributing to American Lawyer publisher Steven Brill the aphorism
that TQM is “[b]ullshit” without substance at its core).
270. See  Rich Brooks, Alienating Customers Isn’t Always a Bad Idea, Many Firms Dis-
cover: Banks, Others Base Service on Whether an Account Is Profitable or a Drain, WALL ST.
J. , Jan. 7, 1999, at A1 (finding that banks seek to provide minimalist, even halting, service to
smaller, less favored customers and tacitly encourage less profitable customers to take business
elsewhere).
271. See  Thomas E. Ricks, Coca-Cola Celebrates New Success After Restructuring Its Bot-
tlers, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1984, available in 1984 WL-WSJ 215184 (noting that before the ad -
vent of its “new killer instinct” Coke had been trailing Pepsi in both grocery-store and diet soft-
drink sales).
272. See id. (describing how Coke “bought out, eased out or [shook] up” over one half of its
bottling business in the United States).
273. See, e.g. , Peter W. Bernstein, Coke Strikes Back: A Cuban-Born Chief Executive Is
Marshaling the All-American Company's Bottlers to Counter the Pepsi Challenge, FORTUNE ,
June 1, 1981, at 30 (describing the new strategy and declaring that “to an organization that had
grown complacent, [Goizueta] has already added life”).
274. See  Constance L. Hays, When Your Bottler Is Your Rival: Vending-Machine Owners
Ask Whose Side Coke Is on, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 21, 1999, at C1.
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While there has been some criticism, it is not clear that it violates any
law. Presumably, Coke did not launch this business operation without
the advice of talented legal counsel, and its activities will likely avoid any
legal liability.
Still, apart from the legal or public-relations ramifications emerging
from this business strategy, the episode illustrates the difference be-
tween legal practice and business. The business community by and large
supports such aggressive tactics by business, even when it redounds to
the detriment of current and former business “allies.” By contrast, law-
yers are prohibited from similar conduct by conflict of interest prohibi-
tions and similar rules and norms forbidding or discouraging a lawyer
from changing tactics or loyalties to the detriment of a client or a third
party who has relied upon the lawyer.275 Furthermore, legal precedent
places some limits on the degree to which a lawyer may drop a client
“like a hot potato.”276 In this way, the professionalism paradigm has a
clear advantage over the business paradigm.
C.   The HMO Example
When professionalism bends too far to the will of business, the re-
sults may be discouraging and, at times, frightening and revolting. Dur-
ing the 1990s, managed health care provided a laboratory for gauging
these unsettling results. The rise of managed care in health insurance,
typically associated with Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs),
has changed the relationship of doctors to insurers and, more omi-
nously, toward patients. HMOs and other managed care health insur-
ance plans have, to a large degree, established systems where plan ad-
ministrators displace physicians in making health care determina-
tions.277 Many adopt compensation systems that create a financial incen-
tive for doctors not to recommend further care for their patients, thus
exposing patients to injury and even death, so that the doctor tied to
such a plan can enjoy greater profits.278
                                                                                                                                                
275. See generally GILLERS , supra note 131, at chs. III, V, & VI.
276. See, e.g. , Picker Int’l, Inc. v. Varian Assocs., Inc., 670 F. Supp. 1363, 1365 (N.D. Ohio
1987) (using the “hot potato” metaphor), aff’d , 869 F.2d 578 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Unified Sewerage
Agency v. Jelco, Inc., 646 F.2d 1339, 1345 n.4 (9th Cir. 1981) (prohibiting lawyer withdrawal
from representation as a means of curing conflict of interest by jettisoning an earlier acquired,
but less financially desirable, client). See also GILLERS , supra note 131, at 308-11 (discussing the
“hot potato” issue).
277. See  George Anders & Laurie McGinley, Actuarial Firm Helps Decide Just How Long
You Spend in Hospital, WALL ST. J., June 15, 1998, at A1; see also  Allison Bell, Aetna Institutes
External Review Policy, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Fin. Servs. ed. ), Jan. 18, 1999, at
5; Allison Bell, Jury Hits HMO with $1.4 Million Verdict, NAT’ L UNDERWRITER (Life &
Health/Fin. Servs. ed.), Nov. 10, 1997, at 52 (jury verdict for plaintiff in case where she claimed
“[c]ost-cutting effort by [HMO] led a doctor at one of its clinics to hold back on ordering biop -
sies and other diagnostic tests”); Katherine Eban Finkelstein, The Sick Business: Why For-
Profit Medicine Couldn’t Care Less, NEW REPUBLIC , Dec. 29, 1997, at 23; Susan E. Reed, Miss
Treatment, Is Managed Care Unfair to Women?, NEW REPUBLIC , Dec. 29, 1997, at 20; Thomas
W. Self, One Man’s Battle with the Managed-Care Monster, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1998, at A17.
278. See generally Neal St. Anthony, Hatch Getting Ready to Mix It up as Attorney Gen-
eral, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB., Dec. 1, 1998, at D1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Strib File
(describing incoming Attorney General and former Commerce Commissioner’s e ffort to require
health insurers to provide coverage that insurers opposed on business grounds); Michael
Bradford, Report’s Release Angers Kaiser, BUS. INS., Apr. 28, 1997, at 1 (“Kaiser Foundation
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A particularly vexing feature of the modern health care landscape is
the “capitated” plan, in which a physician is paid according to the num-
ber of patients allotted to his or her practice regardless of the medical
services delivered to the patient populace. In effect, the doctor is paid a
flat rate and makes more money when fewer patients are treated with
fewer services.279 Now you know why it takes months to get a non-
emergency appointment in some health plans and why a sick child
sometimes is not seen by a doctor for days unless the illness is viewed as
life threatening.280 It is hard to imagine a law firm taking a similar ap-
proach to a client’s appointment request, although similar problems may
face prepaid legal services.281
                                                                                                                                                
Health Plan of Texas is crying foul over regulators’ release of a report critical of its operations in
Texas after the HMO agreed to pay the state a $1 million fine and make changes in the way it
provides health care.”) The report criticized Kaiser for, among other things, interfering with the
professional judgment of its member physicians. See id. Ironically, one of Kaiser’s complaints
after release of the report was its purported breach of doctor-patient confidentiality. See id.; see
also Steven Brostoff, Health Care Battle Lines Drawn, NAT’ L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Fin.
Servs. ed.), Jan. 25, 1999, at 1 (describing current efforts in Congress to enact a “Patients’ Bill of
Rights” and opposition from some insurers and employers); Thomas M. Burton, Self-
Examination: An HMO Checks up on Its Doctors’ Care and Is Disturbed Itself; United, in an
Unusual Study, Finds that Drugs, Tests Are Often Underutilized; Some M.D.’s Are Worried,
WALL. S T. J., July 8, 1998, at A1; Martin Gottlieb & Kurt Eichenwald, A Hospital Chain’s Brass
Knuckles, and the Backlash , N.Y. TIMES , May 11, 1997, § 3, at 1 (describing adverse reaction to
business-driven patient care provided in the Columbia/HCA hospital system); Alfred I. Jaffe,
Managed Care Plans Should Be Liable Because They Are Practicing Medicine, NAT’L
UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Fin. Servs. ed.), Sept. 21, 1998, at 49; Lucette Lagnado, Old-Line
Aetna Adopts Managed-Care Tactics and Stirs a Backlash: Some Doctors and Employers Re-
coil as Insurer Copies Tough HMO It Acquired, WALL ST. J., July 29, 1998, at A1 (describing
adverse reaction to Aetna’s expansion of tightly managed care practiced by recently-acquired
U.S. Healthcare); Darryl Van Duch, Employed Physicians Unionizing: But Can HMO-Affiliated
Independents Do the Same?, NAT’L L.J. , July 21, 1997, at A1 (describing conflicts over control
between health insurers and physicians and the arguable tendency toward deprofessionaliza-
tion of medicine fueled by insurers); Ron Winslow, Measure of HMO Membership Falls for
First Time, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 1999, at B7 (attributing the drop in HMO membership to cus-
tomer dissatisfaction).
279. See  Allison Bell, Jury in Aetna HMO Case Awards $120 Million to Widow, NAT’ L
UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Fin. Servs. ed.), Jan. 25, 1999, at 3 (involving a suit over a health
insurer’s refusal to pay for chemotherapy and bone marrow transplant based on a decision
made by plan administrators rather than the treating physician); see also Joseph D’Allegro,
Texas AG Sues 6 HMOs over Doctor Compensation, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Fin.
Servs. ed. ), Dec. 28, 1998, at 1 (describing how a state Attorney General con tended in a lawsuit
that HMOs are providing financial incentives to doctors “who limit medical care to patients”
rather than providing care deemed best according to a physician’s professional judgment);
Denver Doctors May Quit HMO, BUS. INS., Nov. 16, 1998, at 2.
280. Because of adverse public reaction to such perverse financial incentives and coverage
restrictions, some health insurers have either revised their practices or attempted to better
monitor treatment and explain policy to patients. See  Milt Freudenheim, Playing a New Health
Care Tune, N.Y. TIMES , Dec. 27, 1998, at B2; Editorial, Some Good News for HMOs for a
Change, NAT’L UNDERWRITER (Life & Health/Fin. Servs. ed. ), Sept. 21, 1998, at 48; Lagnado,
supra note 278 (describing how Aetna first adopted a tightly managed care under the recently-
acquired U.S. Healthcare but reversed field in light of adverse reaction by customers and ob-
servers).
281. Nonetheless, well-run prepaid plans can be an effective means of increasing the pub-
lic’s access to affordable legal services. See  Russell G. Pearce et al., An Assessment of Alterna -
tive Strategies for Increasing Access to Legal Services, 90 YALE L.J.  122 (1980).
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1.   A Closer Look at the HMO Problem: Shea v. Esensten
A single case capsulizes quite well the problem that arises when the
business paradigm arguably dominates the professionalism paradigm. In
Shea v. Esensten,282 the widow of an HMO patient alleged gross mal-
practice occasioned by the doctor’s impaired professional judgment. The
court’s recitation of the facts of the case provides a startling illustration
of the harms that can result when professionalism takes a back seat to
business considerations:
After being hospitalized for severe chest pains during an overseas
business trip, Patrick Shea made several visits to his long-time family
doctor. During these visits, Mr. Shea discussed his extensive family
history of heart disease, and indicated he was suffering from chest
pains, shortness of breath, muscle tingling, and dizziness. Despite all
the warning signs, Mr. Shea’s doctor said a referral to a cardiologist
was unnecessary. When Mr. Shea’s symptoms did not improve, he of-
fered to pay for the cardiologist himself. At that point, Mr. Shea’s
doctor persuaded Mr. Shea, who was then forty years old, that he was
too young and did not have enough symptoms to justify a visit to a
cardiologist. A few months later, Mr. Shea died of heart failure.
Mr. Shea had been an employee of Seagate . . . [which] provided
health care benefits to its employees by contracting with [an HMO]
known as Medica. . . . Unknown to Mr. Shea, Medica’s contracts with
its preferred doctors [including Shea’s family doctor] created financial
incentives that were designed to minimize referrals. Specifically, the
primary care doctors were rewarded for not making covered referrals
to specialists, and were docked a portion of their fees if they made too
many.283
Shea’s widow brought an ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty
and a state wrongful death action against the doctor and the HMO, con-
tending that had Shea known of the doctor’s conflict of interest, he
would have sought a cardiologist at his own expense and received ap-
propriate, life-saving treatment.284 Reversing the trial court, the Eight
Circuit rejected the HMO’s ERISA-based defense that it need not dis-
                                                                                                                                                
282. 107 F.3d 625 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied , 118 S.Ct. 297 (1997). The scope of this Arti-
cle does not permit an extensive discussion of the nature of the HMO influence on physicians or
a full analysis of the utility and ethics of group insurance for either medicine or law. See gener-
ally John P. Little, Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the Doctor-Patient
Relationship and Endangering Patient Health , 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397 (1997); Sheldon M.
Retchin et al., Outcomes of Stroke Patients in Medicare Fee for Service and Managed Care, J.
AM . M ED. ASS’N , July 9, 1997, at 5 (finding that stroke victims receive better treatment when
not in HMOs); Special Issue, Health Law: Balancing Legal, Economic, and Ethical Concerns,
FLA. B.J., Apr. 1998; John Ware et al., Diffe rences in 4-Year Health Outcomes for Elderly and
Poor, Chronically Ill Patients Treated in HMO and Fee-for-Service Systems, 276 J. AM . M ED.
ASS’N 1039, 1039 (1996) (finding that these patients fare better under traditional health insur-
ance, worse in HMOs). But see  Robert H. Miller & Harold S. Luft, Managed Care Plan Per-
formance Since 1980, 271 J. AM . MED. ASS’N  1512 (1994) (surveying studies and finding more of
them favorable than unfavorable toward HMOs).
283. Shea, 107 F.3d at 626-27.
284. See  id.  at 627. Under the procedures of the Medica HMO, Shea could only see a spe-
cialist and be covered under the HMO with a referral from the primary-care physician. See id.
The Court described the Medica arrangement as permitting the doctor to “earn a bonus for
treating less.” Id.
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close the financial interest compromising the doctor’s judgment because
they were not “material facts affecting a beneficiary’s interest.”285 In-
stead, the court went on to state that
Mr. Shea had the right to know Medica was offering financial incen-
tives that could have colored his doctor’s medical judgment about the
urgency for a cardiac referral. . . . When an HMO’s f inancial incentives
discourage a treating doctor from providing essential health care re-
ferrals for conditions covered under the plan benefit structure, the in-
centives must be disclosed and the failure to do so is a breach of
ERISA’s fiduciary duties.286
Although Shea  may be an example of the dire consequences that in-
frequently flow from the “mass-merchandising” medical treatment de-
livered under many HMO plans, similar complaints are hardly rare.287
The Clinton Administration has proposed a “Patient’s Bill of Rights” that
has substantial congressional support precisely because of the ravages of
such perverse incentives.288 In the furor over HMO and managed care
reform, the implications regarding the practice of medicine itself are of-
ten overlooked. Shea’s untimely death is a shocking human tragedy. It
also represents the tragedy of modern medicine. Doctors are being told
how to practice or being paid to practice in the manner desired by non-
physicians. In short, doctors today have, to an uncomfortably large de-
gree, lost the independent judgment that makes them professionals. In
medicine, we have seen the onslaught of the business paradigm and it is
not a pretty sight. 289 The arguable excesses of law’s professionalism
paradigm may have produced more than a few padded bills and subop-
timally competitive markets, but I doubt it killed any clients.
Not only have doctors succumbed to the economic power of the
health insurers and the insurers’ veneration of financial incentives, but
the legal system has failed to intervene adequately enough to protect
doctors from themselves. Note that the Shea v. Esensten decision did not
                                                                                                                                                
285. Id. at 627. The Appeals Court accepted the view that ERISA preempted the state
wrongful death action but found a claim for relief arising under ERISA because of the HMO’s
failure to disclose its “referral-discouraging approach to health care.” Id. at 628. The duty was
premised on a fiduciary’s common-law duties, arising under the law of trusts, to deal fairly and
honestly with plan members. See id. (relying upon Varity Corp. v. Howe, 116 S. Ct. 1065, 1070-
1075 (1996)).
286. Id. at 629.
287. See  supra notes 227-79.
288. See, e.g., HMO Reform: Lawmakers Play It Again, AM . H EALTH LINE, Jan. 21, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Hltlne File (describing the bill’s introduction in the Senate
and expectations that Republicans would also support some form of “patient protection” legis-
lation); see also Alison Mitchell, Showdown Ahead over Political Agenda in Congress, N.Y.
TIMES , Apr. 13, 1999, at A18.
289. See  supra notes 278-89 and accompanying text. See also Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d
362, 368-76 (7th Cir. 1998), cert. granted , 120 S.Ct. 10 (1999) (No. 98-1949) (providing back-
ground information and a powerful argument against HMO control over medical decision
making). As the Herdrich Court observed, “doctors, not insurance executives, are qualified ex-
perts in determining what is the best course of treatment and therapy for their patients.” Id.  at
377. Of course, the medical profession has its side to the story as well. See, e.g. , Michael Kirsch,
Lawyers, Heal Thyselves , A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 96 (arguing in article by practicing gastroen -
terologist that many medical malpractice suits are frivolous and admonishing lawyers that they
“have allowed [their] profession to be transformed into a trade. Market forces have become
[lawyers’] North Star”).
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forbid the HMO’s use of incentives designed to keep sick people from
specialists. The HMO was required only to disclose that it was essentially
bribing doctors to give more limited care.290 Apparently, the HMO could
bribe away without legal liability after disclosure. Whether Shea v. Ese n-
sten really gives any protection to persons in need of medical care may
hinge on the quality of disclosure. With little difficulty one can imagine
“disclosure” of the arrangement by means of a boilerplate, fine-print
form, which is unlikely to be adequately appreciated by HMO members.
If courts permit this sort of disclosure to insulate HMOs from legal li-
ability, Shea v. Esensten will be a hollow victory for patients and the
medical profession.
As further evidence of the legal profession’s perhaps undue deference
to the dominance of business-thinking, the inarguable correctness of
Shea’s condemnation of the HMO’s policy has not been uniformly en-
dorsed by other courts facing similar issues.291 In Herdrich v. Pegram ,292
a recent decision following the Shea approach, the dissent argued that
the doctor’s undisclosed financial interest alone did not constitute a
breach of fiduciary duty.293 The laissez-faire approach of the dissent is
hard to square with the facts of cases like Shea and Herdrich. In these
cases, the doctors had clear financial incentives militating against zeal-
ous devotion to giving patients adequate care; accordingly, patients suf-
fered harm after demonstrably lackluster treatment.
D.   “Managed Care” in Insurance Defense
Unfortunately, lawyers cannot be smug about the degree to which the
doctors have surrendered to the dark side of the business paradigm’s
force. Law’s turn to test the intestinal fortitude of the profession is com-
ing or may already be upon us. I refer to the increasingly prevalent in-
surance company attempts to control attorney professional judgment in
liability insurance defense assignments. It is almost perfectly congruent
with the managed care evil to which doctors seem to have succumbed.
Beginning in the 1930s, liability insurers began offering to policy-
holders not only indemnity protection if the policyholder was success-
fully sued for negligence but also a “duty to defend” the policyholder
                                                                                                                                                
290. See  Shea, 107 F.3d at 628-29.
291. See, e.g., Herdrich v. Pegram, 154 F.3d 362, 371-72, 383 (7th Cir. 1998) (following
Shea, with dissenting judge opposed); Weiss v. CIGNA Healthcare, Inc., 972 F. Supp. 748, 755
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (criticizing Shea); Lazorko v. Pennsylvania Hospital, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
10062 (E.D.Pa. 1998) (distinguishing Shea); see also Kiefer v. Ceridian Corp., 976 F. Supp. 829,
845 (D. Minn. 1997) (agreeing with Shea that federal pension law preempts related common-
law causes of action and holding that, when suing under the Employee Retirement Security Act
of 1974, plaintiffs may not also sue under other provisions of the act related to a breach or fidu -
ciary duty); Drolet v. Healthsource, Inc., 968 F. Supp. 757, 761 (D. Mass. 1997); D.A.B. v.
Brown, 570 N.W.2d 168, 172 (1997); Andersen v. Lyman-Richey Corp., 253 Neb. 748, 752 (Ne-
braska 1998). All the above cases cite Shea, but still permit substantial business-based control
of HMO care decisions.
292. 154 F.3d 362.
293. See  id.  at 383 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
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when sued.294 This combination product has proved sufficiently popular
that, since World War II, the typical liability policy sold in the United
States includes a duty to defend.295 This is true for automobile insurance
(effectively required as a condition of driving) and for the commercial
general liability insurance sold to businesses as their basic protection
against litigation and other claims.
Under the typical liability policy, a policyholder facing a settlement
demand or lawsuit tenders the claim to its liability insurer. By contract,
the insurer normally has a duty to defend the policyholder but is also
given the right to retain chosen counsel and has absolute authority to
settle the claim as the insurer sees fit.296 Insurers have always driven
relatively hard bargains with defense counsel. For example, insurers are
notorious for negotiating low hourly rates with their lawyers, and they
have long been considered to excessively scrutinize their bills. 297 Re-
cently, however, the insurance industry has entered an entirely new and
disturbing phase of efforts to control counsel. Today, many insurers es-
tablish billing rules for attorneys that attempt to circumscribe counsel’s
professional judgment by setting limits on discovery activity, legal re-
search, consultation, retention of expert witnesses, and time spent on
case preparation.298
This activity appears to be coming to an early fork in the road in
Montana. the Montana Supreme Court has invoked a special provision
permitting it to sit as a trial court in a test case challenging the legality of
these rules.299 The case is dryly but profoundly captioned: In the Matter
of the Rules of Professional Conduct and Insurer Imposed Billing Rules
and Procedures.300 Insurance defense lawyers in Montana filed the suit
to challenge the billing restrictions as impermissible intrusions on their
professional judgment and delivery of legal services. The defense lawyers
seek a declaratory judgment that such guidelines violate the rules of
professional conduct and thus the lawyers need not abide by the guide-
lines.301
The attempts of insurers to manage legal services so closely are made
more complex—and in my view improper—by the “tripartite” relation-
                                                                                                                                                
294. See  ROBERT H. JERRY II, UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 111 (2d ed. 1996); J EFFREY
W. STEMPEL , LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES § 14.01, at 14-3 (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter
STEMPEL, INSU RANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES].
295. See  ROBERT E. KEETON & A LAN I. WIDISS , INSURANCE LAW § 9.1(b), at 989 (practitio-
ner’s ed. 1988); STEMPEL , INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 294, at § 9.03(a).
296. See  STEMPEL, INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 294, § 9.03.
297. See  Nancy J. Moore, The Ethical Duties of Insurance Defense Lawyers: Are Special
Solutions Required?, 4 CONN . INS. L.J. 259, 285-90 (1997); Charles Silver, Flat Fees and Staff
Attorneys: Unnecessary Casualties in the Continuing Battle over the Law Governing Insur-
ance Defense Lawyers, 4 CONN. INS. L.J.  205, 216-17 (1997) [hereinafter Silver, Unnecessary
Casualties].
298. See  Bill Ibelle, The War Between Insurers and Defense Lawyers, LAWS. WKLY. USA,
Oct. 5, 1998, at B1; Hope Viner Samborn, No-Frills Approach Proving Costly: Insurers’ De-
mands to Economize Are Too Much for Some Defense Firms , A.B.A. J. , Mar. 1998, at 30;
Darryl Van Duch, Test Case for Insurers’ Billing Rules, NAT’L L.J. , Jan. 25, 1999, at A1.
299. See  Van Duch, supra note 298.
300. Id. The Case Caption is Civil No. 98-612.
301. See id.
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ship among the policyholder, its insurer and the attorney.302 Tradition-
ally, the liability insurance contract has been considered permissible
even though it permits the insurer to control the defense, including se-
lection of counsel. Importantly, however, the policyholder has usually
been considered “the client,” while the insurer is but a third-party
payor.303 Consequently, even though counsel is selected by and paid by
the insurer, the lawyer’s fiduciary and professional duty is to the policy-
holder. For example, counsel for the policyholder may not reveal confi-
dences of the policyholder to the insurer and the policyholder is owed a
duty of zealous representation.
In effect, the Montana suit and similar complaints by defense lawyers
contend that insurer case management guidelines interfere with the law-
yer’s duty of zealous and competent representation by allowing the busi-
ness judgment of the insurer to override the lawyer’s professional judg-
ment. In short, the Montana litigation and the new practice of insurance
defense cost-control affect lawyers in much the same way HMOs affect
doctors. It may not be too melodramatic to say that the legal profession
is facing several forks in the road. In reaction, the legal establishment
may react in one of several ways.
First, it could simply surrender completely to business forces.304 Some
have argued that this fate has already befallen physicians under the
managed care regime and that the quality of medical care, at least in
particular cases, has fallen.305 Second, it could completely reject any in-
                                                                                                                                                
302. This tripartite relationship is thoroughly discussed in Moore, supra note 297 , at 261-
85.
303. Nevertheless, there is some current debate surrounding this proposition. See  Charles
Silver, Does Insurance Defense Counsel Represent the Company or the Insured?, 72 TEX. L.
REV. 1583 (1994) (arguing that both the policyholder and the insurer are “cl ients” of the lawyer)
[hereinafter Silver, Insurance Defense Counsel ]. But see  Thomas D. Morgan, What Insurance
Scholars Should Know About Professional Responsibility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 6-9 (1997) (sup -
porting the one-client view); see also Pepper, Fundamentals, supra note 93  (1997) (assessing
both views and noting divergence of the tripartite insurer-policyholder-counsel relationship
from the traditional one-client situation but find ing, on the whole, that the policyholder should
be considered the client).
304. Although he does not advocate complete surrender, Pearce has essentially embraced
something akin to this view, by lionizing the predicted development of LMOs (Legal Main te-
nance Organizations). See  Pearce, Law Day 2050, supra note 31, at 12.
305. One of the difficulties of this “professional judgment vs. business” question is that this
issue, to some extent, may place the aggregate good in conflict with the individual good. For ex-
ample, advocates of managed care can make a convincing case that the overall quality of medi-
cal care for the populace has improved as a result of managed care. It serves as a check against
overtreatment, needlessly defensive medicine, inefficiency, and physician fraud (yes, I admit
that professionals on occasion engage in fraud—just as do bus inesspersons). By seemingly re-
stricting price increases in medical care, managed care has arguably made health care more a f-
fordable. Yet, weighed against this arguable macrocosmic benefit are many instances of micro-
cosmic detriment, cases like Shea v. Esensten, where the professional’s judgment is too greatly
warped by financial self-interest or even constrained in a manner that results in a patient re-
ceiving inferior care.
Some, particularly those with a utilitarian philosophy, under which the optimal situation is
one that produces the greatest good for the greatest number, or with a wealth-maximization
perspective, according to which society gains if there is a net increase in wealth, even if some
individuals lose wealth in the process, find it an acceptable situation. See  BAILEY KUKLIN &
J EFFREY W. STEMPEL , FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAW (1994) (analyzing the perspective in chapter 1
(Ethics and Law) and chapter 2 (Economics and Law)). I disagree with each perspective. In the
realm of medicine and law, the greatest good for the greatest number is a more problematic
criterion than in other areas of commerce and po licy. If cost-benefit analysis is to be applied, it
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trusions on lawyers’ professional judgment and resist any legal services
arrangements outside the traditional model of a single client retaining a
particular lawyer in connection with a representation. Third, it could
permit more innovation in the means by which lawyers are employed
and perform services, subject to baseline, bright-line rules protecting
core professional judgment, with courts and the organized bar reviewing
concrete cases for compliance. The establishment could also adopt a hy-
bridized or sliding scale of regulation that encompasses any three of
these paths for particular types of cases.
Although predictions are always dangerous, I suspect the profession
and the judiciary will adopt a moderate path that does not shut the door
to business efforts to subject law to some degree of eff iciency. To a large
degree, this has already taken place. The law permits prepaid legal in-
surance, which essentially operates as a capitated plan. This creates a
danger that the individual plan member will receive substandard legal
care due to the plan’s overall goals of efficient operation and expanded
access to legal assistance for the many. In prepaid plans, however, it is
the lawyer who makes the determinations regarding the rendering of le-
gal services; thus, in these plans, professional judgment and control is
retained.
Similar to prepaid legal insurance is the tripartite relationship al-
ready permitted by the law, in which the insurer by contract has sub-
stantial control over the defense of claims against the policyholder. The
very arrangement could be deemed unethical. It removes from the client
(i.e., the policyholder) control over selection of counsel and the resolu-
tion of the case. It exposes the client to possible self-dealing by the law-
yer and the more powerful insurer, a source of steady repeat business for
the defense lawyer. Courts have tolerated this strain on lawyer profes-
sionalism in order to permit the social benefits of more widely available
liability insurance, cost containment, and commerce. Courts have per-
mitted the liability insurance defense arrangement and elected to protect
the interests of the client by giving policyholders a cause of action
against the insurer for bad faith in cases where the insurer and counsel
work for their own interests rather than those of the policyholder.306
The majority of courts also permit use of staff counsel, which can be
viewed as establishing a regime that undermines the attorneys’ profes-
sional judgment and creates potential conflicts of interest.307 Courts and
                                                                                                                                                
should be done by professionals—not by business or the unguided marketplace. There will
nonetheless be difficult decisions. For example, should the defendant spend an additional
$20,000 on expert witnesses? There will even be heart-wrenching decisions. For instance,
should the hospital spend $500,000 to try to save premature quintuplets, even though survival
is unlikely under any circumstances? These difficult decisions should be made by expert profes-
sionals and not according to the business bottom line. For a view more supportive of managed
care and the net social utility justification for insurer supervision of medical professionals, see
David A. Hyman, Professional Responsibility, Legal Malpractice, and the Eternal Triangle:
Will Lawyers or Insurers Call the Shots?, 4 CONN. INS. L.J.  353, 380-95 (1997).
306. See  STEMPEL, INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 294 , at ch. 10 (explain ing
the bad faith cause of action).
307.  See  Moore, supra note 297 , at 244 (noting a “vast majority of opinions issued by
courts and advisory bodies” permitting the use of staff counsel). But see Gardner v. North
Carolina State Bar, 341 S.E.2d 517 (N.C. 1986) (holding the use of in-house defense counsel
violative of professional responsibility rules).
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regulators have also generally permitted billing arrangements other than
straight fees for legal services or hourly charges. For example, flat-fee
billing is generally permitted.308
At some point, however, the courts and the legal establishment must
not permit any further erosion in lawyer-client loyalty and professional
judgment. In my view, that time is at hand given billing practices and
other situations such as those challenged in the Montana litigation. It is
one thing to permit the insurer to choose counsel, achieve economies of
scale, and drive hard bargains settling claims with third-parties suing the
policyholder. It is quite another for the insurer to micromanage the re-
tained lawyer and to forbid the lawyer from engaging in the tasks coun-
sel would otherwise deem necessary for effective representation of the
policyholder.
In short, insurer billing guidelines represent too great an intrusion
upon the lawyer professional’s judgment and representation of the cl i-
ent.309 In addition, the billing guidelines initiative appears to be part of a
larger insurer initiative to alter the tripartite relationship in ways that
could prove detrimental to the policyholder client. Insurers reacted vig-
orously to oppose a draft of the American Law Institute’s Restatement of
Law Governing Lawyers that, in their view, embraced too narrow a per-
spective of the lawyer-client relationship and failed to appreciate the nu-
ances of the tripartite relationship.310 Scholars funded by the insurance
industry wrote to argue not only to defend the tripartite relationship but
also to argue for a “two-client” characterization of insurance defense.311
For a variety of reasons, the two-client model, like other “moderniza-
                                                                                                                                                
308. See  Silver, Unnecessary Casualties, supra note 297 , at 222 (arguing that there is “no
sound basis in professional responsibility law” to prohibit flat fees). But see  American Ins. As-
soc. v. Kentucky Bar Assoc., 917 S.W. 2d at 572 (holding that flat fee billing by an insurer vio-
lated Rule 1.7 and Rule 1.8(f)).
309. But see Silver, supra note 297  (supporting such insurer activity); STEPHEN GILLERS ,
ETHICAL ISSUES IN MONITORING INSURANCE DEFENSE FEES: CONFIDENTIALITY, PRIVILEGE AND
BILLING GUIDELINES (1998) (monograph done for Law Audit Services, Inc.).
310. See  William T. Barker, Lobbying and the American Law Institute: The Example of In -
surance Defense, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 573 (1998); see also  Jonathan Groner, Insurance Lobby
Aims at Normally Staid ALI, LEGAL TIMES , June 10, 1996, at 1; Charles Silver, The Lost World:
Of Politics and Getting the Law Right , 26 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 773 (1998) [hereinafter Silver, The
Lost World].
311. See  Ronald E. Mallen, Legal Experts’ Proposal Threatens Insurance Defense Agree-
ments, WASH. LEGAL FOUND . LEGAL BACKGROUNDER, Apr. 26, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wlf File; Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The Professional Responsibilities Of In -
surance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J.  255, 275 (1995) (recognizing two-client characteriza-
tion as legitimate in an article based on research funded by the insurance industry); Silver, In -
surance Defense Counsel, supra note 303 ; Charles Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Are Liability
Carriers Second-Class Clients? No, but They May Be Soon—A Call to Arms Against the Re-
statement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, COVERAGE, Mar./Apr. 1996, at 21; Charles
Silver & Michael Sean Quinn, Wrong Turns on the Three Way Street: Dispelling Nonsense
About Insurance Defense Lawyers, COVERAGE, Nov./Dec. 1995, at 1.
The above articles supporting the two-client model have been termed “increasingly shrill” by
one of the ALI Restatement Reporters. See, e.g., Morgan, supra note 303, at 6 (opposing two-
client model); see also Thomas D. Morgan & Charles W. Wolfram, Insurance Defense Lawyers
and the Restatement: A Reply to Professors Silver and Quinn, COVERAGE, Jan./Feb. 1996, at 8
(rejecting two-client model in favor of Restatement approach). See generally Robert E.
O’Malley, Ethics Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal
Triangle Reformed, 66 TUL. L. REV. 511, 520-21 (1991) (outlining the nature of the tripartite
relationship).
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tions” of the now-traditional two-client model is a bad idea. It under-
mines lawyer-client loyalty and professional judgment in a situation
fraught with danger, in light of the disparate strength, sophistication,
and wealth insurers hold over policyholders.
E.   The In-House Counsel Problem
Similarly, in the insurance context, use of in-house counsel poses
substantial ethical difficulties. Insurers have, to a substantial degree,
moved from managing outside counsel in liability insurance defense
matters to forming their own cadre of inside counsel.312 In-house counsel
has been an increasing development throughout the law since the 1970s
but has existed in some form throughout the twentieth century. The
move of legal services in-house has been thought to foster substantial
savings and concentration of expertise. In the insurance defense context,
however, it presents problems. In the ordinary rendering of legal serv-
ices to a business, questions of client identity are clear. The in-house
lawyer works for the company and has the company as a client. But,
when the company is a liability insurer defending a policyholder, the in-
house lawyer works for the company and has another—the policy-
holder—as a client.
According to the rules of professional responsibility, the lawyer must
put the client/policyholder’s interest first, must preserve the attorney-
client privilege, must keep confidences, must zealously represent the cli-
ent, even when it is potentially not in the interest of the third-party
payor insurer, and he or she must exercise the best professional judg-
ment on behalf of the client.313 The in-house insurance defense lawyer,
however, must discharge these already difficult duties while drawing a
paycheck from the insurer. The insurance company may wish the lawyer
to spend less time and money on the client’s cause while also hoping the
lawyer will advise the company if the client makes an admission against
interest that will hold the company in lurking coverage dispute. Even if
the in-house lawyer is not at immediate risk of being discharged for
zealous client advocacy and resistance to any improper insurer influ-
ence, the lawyer probably wants increased compensation and promotion
in the future. Being a good lawyer—to the policyholder-client--may not
be in the in-house attorney’s best job interests.314
                                                                                                                                                
312. See  Debra Baker, A Grab for the Ball, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1999, at 42 (noting that move by
insurance companies to use of staff counsel has fed into concern among many about fu ture of
the profession).
313. See  RULE 1.8(f).
314. Professor Silver takes a diametrically opposed view and defends use of in-house coun-
sel for defense of policyholders absent palpable conflict of interest. See  Silver, Unnecessary
Casualties, supra note 297 , at 243-56. Responding to his extensive defense of the practice is
impossible in the space allotted to this article. Suffice it to say that I disagree with his apparent
view that routine use of in-house counsel cannot. as a structural matter, present ethical prob-
lems for the insurance company lawyers. However, I propose regulating in-house counsel or i n -
stalling guarantees of professional independence rather than leaving staff counsel to company
regulation. See id. at 250-51 (explaining that Professional Responsibility Professor Bruce Green
of Fordham Law School concludes that staff counsel may review case files with insurer-
employer, but only if the policyholder “clients” consent).
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Insurers have also worked to create “captive” outside insurance de-
fense firms. Although these firms are organized as separate professional
and commercial entities, they are not law firms in the traditional sense.
The firm is assembled by an experienced outside insurance defense law-
yer working at the behest of the insurer. Once so assembled, the new
firm’s work exclusively consists of representing policyholders insured
under liability policies issued by the founding insurer or its affiliates.315
Although I do not want to denigrate the professionalism or independ-
ence of captive firms, a good case exists for treating such firms as in-
house counsel for the insurer, at least for regulatory purposes, rather
than as traditional outside counsel.
My point is not to conduct a searching analysis of the role of lawyers
and liability insurance defense. The issue is complex, evolving, and re-
quires extensive analysis. Much excellent scholarship on all sides of the
issue is already in print.316 Whatever the ultimate resolution of this diffi-
cult and important matter in the delivery of legal services, however, it is
vital that the analysis and decision be made according to professional
norms rather than business norms. Under a business paradigm applying
business norms in the interest of business, the important and difficult
questions appear not to be raised, are given short shrift, or are readily
resolved in favor of the greatest business benefit—to the business with
the most economic power.317
Concerns of the individual client are left in the dust without much re-
flection or remorse. Business thinking by insurers led to the rapid prolif-
eration of inside counsel, captive law firms, and managed care for law-
yers. Some insurers have even gone so far as to actively discourage the
                                                                                                                                                
315. See  Silver, Unnecessary Casualties, supra note 297 , at 237-38.
316. See generally Symposium, Liability Insurance Conflicts and Professional Responsi-
bility, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 1 (1997) (containing a collection of articles addressing the issue of pro-
fessional responsibility in liability insurance by Thomas D. Morgan, Kent D. Syverud, Stephen
L. Pepper, William T. Barker, Tom Baker, Robert H. Jerry II, Charles Silver, Nancy J. Moore,
George M. Cohen, David A. Hyman, and Robert E. Keeton); Charles Silver & Kent Syverud, The
Professional Responsibilities of Insurance Defense Lawyers, 45 DUKE L.J.  255 (1995); Eric
Mills Holmes, A Conflicts-of-Interest Roadmap for Insurance Defense Counsel: Walking an
Ethical Tightrope Without a Net, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1 (1989); Robert E. O’Malley, Ethics
Principles for the Insurer, the Insured, and Defense Counsel: The Eternal Triangle Reformed,
66 TUL. L. REV. 511 (1991).
317. Like Prof. Pearce, Prof. Silver seems to suggest that lawyers should simply learn to
“lump” the consequences of economic force rather than attempting to constrain it under a pro-
fessionalism paradigm.
[A]lternative fee structures will revolutionize the way many lawyers practice, just as
managed care regimes have radically altered the practice of medicine over the past
ten years. When significant economic actors press for change, change will come,
even if the solons of the legal profession do not want it. Creative clients and creative
lawyers seeking to win their business will find ways to come to terms.
Silver, Unnecessary Casualties, supra note 297 , at 216.
Unintentionally, Silver makes my case, right down to the use of managed care as a basis of
comparison. To some extent, the entire point of a professionalism paradigm is the appropriate
constraint of economic power and resistance to it as may be necessary to effect other vital pro-
fessional goals such as client loyalty, client protection, the integrity of the system, and so on. At
some point, a healthy system of law prevents or at least discourages the “creative” efforts of
avarice made by its membership. Rather than resisting or taming the potentially corrupting in -
fluence of wealth, the business paradigm seems premised on celebrating wealth.
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use of counsel by third-party claimants.318 All of this was done to benefit
the insurers’ bottom line. Under the business paradigm, that is enough
reason to forge ahead. Under the more sophisticated client protection
regime of the professionalism paradigm, serious questions are asked and
limits are likely to be placed on insurer tactics that hurt clients or un-
dermine lawyers’ professional judgment.
F.   The “Megafirm”
The proliferation of law firms “acquired” by other companies presents
similar issues. Consulting and accounting firms have added legal serv-
ices to their repertoire of business operations. In Europe, the trend has
been particularly pronounced. Today, the largest provider of legal serv-
ices on the Continent is Arthur Andersen, known to most of the world as
an accounting firm rather than a law firm.319 This phenomenon has not
yet engulfed the United States, largely because of the dominating profes-
sionalism paradigm.320 Although some may find this a regrettable relic of
the nineteenth century, I disagree.
The traditional rule of the legal profession is that lawyers should not
be in a mixed practice with nonlawyers.321 The rationale for the rule is
that this might make for decision making in the delivery of legal services
that is governed by a nonlawyer or influenced by the interests of nonlaw-
yers.322 In other words, American lawyers and society have been unwill-
ing to allow law firms to be operated by businesspersons and unwilling
to place lawyers in a situation that might override the attorney’s profes-
sional judgment. Model Rule 5.4, for example, provides that legal fees
not be shared with a nonlawyer,323 that lawyers not be in partnership
with nonlawyers “if any of the activities of the partnership consist of the
practice of law,”324 and that persons recommending or paying the lawyer
not “direct or regulate the lawyer’s professional judgement in rendering
such legal services.”325 In addition, Model Rule 5.4(d) provides that:
                                                                                                                                                
318. See  Bill Ibelle, Allstate Tells Car Crash Victims, ‘You Don’t Need a Lawyer’: Plain tiffs’
Attorneys Fight Back, with Little Success, LAWS. WKLY. USA, Mar. 24, 1997, at B1.
319. See  John E. Morris, King Arthur’s March on Europe: Arthur Andersen Is on a Mis-
sion to Conquer the Continent’s High-End Legal Markets, AM . LAW., June 1998, at 49.
320. As one observer explains:
In most of the industrialized world, lawyers are prohibited from practicing in part-
nership or sharing profits with nonlawyers. In practice, that hasn’t stopped Ander-
sen or its Big Five competitors in professional services from setting up law firms, or
merging or affiliating with existing ones. To comply with the law, the law practices
remain owned by their lawyers. Typically, some of these will be Andersen SC [Ar-
thur Andersen’s umbrella organization, arranged as a Swiss societe cooperative]
partners. But not always.
Id. at 52.
Andersen-like acquisitions of American law firms have not resulted in the U.S. because of the
more stringent prohibition on non-lawyer ownership or control and because of the U.S. law-
yer’s culture of independence developed under the professionalism paradigm.
321. See  GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM H ODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 5.4 (2d
ed. 1998); CHARLES W. W OLFRAM, M ODERN LEGAL ETHICS  § 14.1 (1986).
322. See  H AZARD & HODES, supra note 321, § 5.4:102; WOLFRAM, supra note 321, § 14.1.
323. See  RULE 5.4(a).
324. RULE 5.4(b).
325. RULE 5.4(c).
1999]                         E M B R AC I N G  D E SC E N T  99
A lawyer shall not practice with or in the form of a professional corpo-
ration or association authorized to practice law for a profit, if:
(1) a nonlawyer owns any interest therein, except that a fiduciary rep-
resentative of the estate of a lawyer may hold the stock or interest of
the lawyer for a reasonable time during administra tion;
(2) a nonlawyer is a corporate director or officer thereof; or
(3) a nonlawyer has the right to direct or control the professional
judgment of a lawyer.326
Model Rule 5.4 has been substantially adopted in all of the states but
is subject to significant variation in technical format and in the degree of
restrictions placed on lawyers.327 States differ in their particular rules
about limited liability corporations or partnerships, but in essence they
have all permitted lawyers to do business in this form, provided that
lawyers are in charge of law firms, no matter what the organizational
structure.328 The American Law Institute’s Restatement of Law Govern-
ing Lawyers expresses this sentiment by saying that “a non-lawyer may
not own any interest in the firm, and a non-lawyer may not be empow-
ered to or actually exercise the right to direct or control the professional
activities of a lawyer in the firm.”329
This historical separation of law and business to safeguard lawyer in-
dependence is under increasing stress.330 The organized bar is currently
debating a proposed liberalization of Model Rule 5.4331 to e xpressly per-
mit situations similar to the de facto mega-law firms of Arthur Andersen
and other accounting groups.332 In addition, the continuing concerns
about in-house counsel and insurance defense remain, illustrating the
                                                                                                                                                
326. RULE 5.4(d).
327. See  STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. S IMON, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS at xxxi (1998). “[W]e see significant variation among jurisdictions . . . [in the area
of] relationships between lawyers and nonlawyers (Rule 5.4) . . . .” Id.; see also id. at 300-04
(setting forth the specific differences among the jurisdictions).
328. See  H AZARD & HODES, supra note 321, § 5.4:201.
329. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11.
330. See  Larry Bodine, Avoid ‘Business Deals’ with Clients: $1.4 Million Verdict Against
D.C. Lawyer, LAWS. W KLY. USA, July 29, 1996, at B17; see also  Stephen Gillers, The Anxiety of
Influence, 27 FLA. S T. U. L. R EV. 123 (1999); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Conflict of Two Roles, NAT’L
L.J. , Mar. 25, 1996, at A21 (focusing on conflicts in the context of a single representation and
raising concerns that are applicable to ongoing conflict potentially created when lawyer is part
of larger organization that may have interests different than those of the legal client); Darryl
Van Duch, Bullish on Spinoffs: Entrepreneurial Lawyers Remain Undaunted by Potential
Ethical Pitfalls, NAT’ L L.J. , Aug. 10, 1998, at A1.
331. See  GILLERS & SIMON, supra note 327 , at xiv-xv (noting that ABA Ethics 2000 Com-
mittee is re-examining several issues of law firm organization and delivery of services in light of
changes in the market of law practice).
332. See  John E. Morris, The Global 50, AM . LAW., Nov. 1998, at 45, 47 (ranking the
world’s largest law firms and the legal capacity of accounting firms). Arthur Andersen has ap -
proximately 1,500 attorneys spread over 27 countries in its organization and, despite its “March
on Europe,” is not even the largest accounting/law firm. See Morris, supra note 319. Pricewa-
terhouseCoopers is listed as having 1,663 lawyers in 39 countries. See id. Only two law firms
(Baker & McKenzie at 2,300 lawyers and the British firm Clifford Chance with 1,795 attorneys)
are larger. See id.
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robustness of business influence on the delivery of legal services. 333
There is similar tension in the rules and regulations regarding permissi-
ble activity by individual nonlawyers or associations.334 The government
may, under some circumstances, be viewed as a nonlawyer attempting to
control lawyers with adverse impact on professional judgment and inde-
pendence.335
In general, however, the American professional norm has largely
been effective in keeping the delivery of legal services under the control
of lawyers, at least in the narrow sense. Although these restrictions on
non-lawyer partnering can be labeled protectionist or self-dealing, they
are, on the whole, consistent with “good,” public-regarding profession-
alism rather than narrow self-interest.336
Clients, particularly economically powerful commercial clients, in-
evitably have considerable effective control over lawyering. The legisla-
ture and the executive also have considerable effective control to the ex-
tent that this does not so infringe upon the judiciary that it constitutes a
violation of separation of powers. Thus, lawyers can only be so protec-
tionist, whatever their baser desires.
Without rules limiting the ability of financial forces to completely call
the tune in the practice of law, delivery of legal services could become yet
another operating division of modern business, subject to all the typical
temptations and excesses to which business decision making frequently
succumbs. For this reason, the bar, operating under the professionalism
paradigm, has traditionally separated lawyering from business in the or-
ganization of firms and the delivery of legal services; this remains a
positive benefit to clients and society. To the extent a proposed change in
lawyer regulation moves away from this protection of professional
judgment, it should be rejected.
                                                                                                                                                
333. See  supra text accompanying notes 297 -319.
334. See  Deborah L. Rhode, The Delivery of Legal Services by Non-Lawyers, 4 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS  209, 211 (1990); Deborah L. Rhode, Policing The Professional Monopoly: A Con-
stitutional and Empirical Analysis of Unauthorized Practice Prohibitions, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1,
60 (1981) (supporting lowered barriers to non-lawyer practice); Richard B. Schmitt, Advocates
Act as Lawyers, and States Cry ‘Objection!’, WALL ST. J., Jan. 14, 1999, at B1 (describing state
limitation of non-lawyer activity as advocates in securities arbitration, divorce, bankruptcy, and
insurance matters as well as concern that legal self-help books might constitute unauthorized
practice of law).
335. See  David E. Rovella, Low-Bid Contracts Divide Public Defenders: Old-Line Legal Aid
Lawyers Say Defendants Will Suffer; Others Say Things Are Fine , NAT’L L.J. , Dec. 8, 1997, at
A7.
336. Restrictions on non-lawyer control of lawyers are thus so dramatically different from
restrictions on law practice that the latter are substantially anticompetitive with no corre-
sponding element of public protection. See  Stephen Gillers, The High Cost of an ‘Ethical’ Bar,
AM . LAW., July/Aug. 1998, at 87 (citing examples of absolute bans on nonrefundable retainer
payments and firm departure or dissolution agreements that can be construed as restrictions on
an attorney’s “right to practice law” forbidden under Rule 5.6(a)). See, e.g., Birbrower, Montal-
bano, Condon & Frank, P.C. v. Superior Court, 949 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1998) (holding a nonresident
law firm engaged in unauthorized practice by performing legal services in California for a Cali-
fornia client under a fee agreement governed by California law, notwithstanding that nonresi-
dent lawyers were admitted in good standing elsewhere and were not accused of providing defi-
cient service); Debra Baker, Lawyer, Go Home: Firms Negotiating Multistate Deals Should
Take Heed of California Decision on Unauthorized Practice, A.B.A. J. , May 1998, at 22.
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G.   Other Examples
Even respected businesses routinely display as a matter of course
conduct lawyers should regard as improper or questionable. Unfortu-
nately, such behavior is frequently approved or ignored. It is restrained
or sanctioned only under extreme circumstances, normally as a result of
criticism from outside the business. As a result, one need not be a legal
chauvinist to state that business is simply less ethical than law, at least
by the yardstick developed for law.
Consequently, I find the thought of law subject to a business para-
digm a bit frightening. One need not look far to find for examples of con-
cern. Illustrations may be found in the Keating Five scandal; profes-
sional sports, where conduct which would be considered unethical if en-
gaged in by lawyers is frequently exhibited; the recent International
Olympic Committee scandals; and the media, as reflected in the suc-
cessful financing and marketing of Tom Brokaw’s The Greatest Genera-
tion.
1.   Keating Five Scandal
In 1989, it was revealed that Charles Keating, Chairman of the now-
defunct Lincoln Savings & Loan, had made substantial contributions to
five U.S. Senators. 337 These Senators had advocated rather strongly on
Keating’s behalf when Keating was seeking to force government regula-
tors to back off.338 The regulators had cause for concern: Lincoln Savings
& Loan failed not long after the efforts of the Keating Five. Sadly, many
of the Lincoln depositors were retirees who had entrusted the bulk of
their life savings to the institution. Keating was convicted of fraud but
served comparatively little jail time before his conviction was over-
turned.339
The fallout from this scandal included a Justice Department action
against the prestigious New York firm of Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays &
Handler.340 Kaye, Scholer and partner Peter Fishbein were said to have
gone beyond mere aggressive lawyering, and more than one observer
                                                                                                                                                
337. Alan Cranston, a Democrat from California, saw $800,000 of Keating money flow to a
favored foundation, while the others received substantial contributions of between $50,000
and $250,000 directly to their campaign funds. In addition to Cranston, the Keating Five in -
cluded Senators John Glenn, Democrat from Ohio, Donald Riegle, Democrat from Michigan,
Dennis DeConcini, Democrat from Arizona, and John McCain, Republican from Arizona. See
Dennis F. Thompson, Mediated Corruption: The Case of the Keating Five, 87 AM . P OL. SCI.
REV. 369 (1993); see also  Jill Abramson, Cranston Is Only “Keating Five” Member Who Is
Charged with Ethical Misconduct, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 1991, at A4; Richard L. Berke, Ethics
Unit Singles Out Cranston, Chides 4 Others in S & L Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES , Feb. 28, 1991, at A1.
338. See  supra note 337 .
339. See  Keating v. Hood, 922 F. Supp. 1482, 1485 (C.D. Cal. 1996), review denied 890
P.2d 1119; Adam Zagorin, Charlie’s an Angel: Charles Keating, Demon of the $500 Billion S &
L Fiasco, Is Now Innocent, Sort of, TIME , Feb. 3, 1997, at 36. Keating served 4.5 years of a 12-
year sentence for wire and securities fraud that was eventually set aside on technical grounds.
See John Lippman, Keating’s U.S. Conviction Is Overturned, WALL. ST. J. , Dec. 3, 1996, at A2.
340. See  Susan Beck, Keating’s Bouncer, AM . LAW., Jan./Feb. 1990, at 40; see also Susan
Beck & Michael Orey, They Got What They Deserved, AM . LAW., May 1992, at 67-81; Amy Ste-
vens & Paulette Thomas, How a Big Law Firm Was Brought to Knees by Zealous Regulators:
At Kay Scholer, Survival Prevailed over Principle as Partnership Pan icked, WALL. ST. J. , Mar.
13, 1992, at A1.
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viewed their representation as akin to aiding and abetting, while others
attributed any errors to simple inattentiveness.341 Ultimately, the case
was settled, with the firm and its malpractice carrier paying $41 million
in settlement,342 and the Keating lawyers paid for their alleged sins, not-
withstanding their ability to spread the loss to other lawyers via mal-
practice insurance coverage.343
By contrast, the political consequences of interfering with financial
institution solvency regulation are harder to discern. Senators Cranston,
Riegle, and DeConcini retired shortly after this episode and did not at-
tempt a re-election campaign that might have tested the degree of politi-
cal punishment for such advocacy.344 Senators Glenn and McCain not
only escaped the scandal relatively unscathed but prospered. Senator
Glenn quickly regained his folk hero status as a former astronaut, bur-
nished the legacy with a tour of duty on a space station, and retired in
1998 more popular than ever. 345 Senator McCain enjoys frequent favor-
able press and is now a presidential candidate.346
While the claim of some observers that American politics is little
more than a system of open, legalized bribery347 may be somewhat hy-
                                                                                                                                                
341. The merits of Kaye Scholer’s conduct have divided prominent legal ethicists. Compare
WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF J USTICE  (1998); Simon,  “Thinking Like a Lawyer” About
Ethical Questions, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (1998); and Simon, Ethics, Professionalism, and
Meaningful Work, 26 HOFSTRA L. R EV. 445, 470-71 (1997) with Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The
Client Fraud Problem as a Justinian Quartet: An Extended Analysis, 25 H OFSTRA L. R EV. 1041
(1997); and Hazard, Lawyers and Client Fraud: They Still Don’t Get It , 6 GEO. J. LEG. ETHICS
701 (1993). Simon, a Stanford law professor, criticizes Hazard, a University of Pennsylvania law
professor and former Director of the ALI, for having submitted an expert witness affidavit con -
cluding Kaye Scholar conduct was ethical, but Hazard defends the affidavit and disputes
Simon’s analysis. For further discussion, see Donald C. Langevoort, Where Were the Lawyers?
A Behavioral Inquiry into Lawyers’ Responsibility for Clients’ Fraud, 46 VAND. L. REV. 75
(1993).
342. See  William H. Simon, The Kaye Scholer Affair: The Lawyer’s Duty of Candor and
the Bar’s Temptations of Evasion and Apology, 23 L. & SOC. INQUIRY  243, 244 (1998); see also
Douglas M. Branson, No Contest: Corporate Lawyers and the Perversion of Justice in Amer-
ica, 48 CASE W. R ES. L. REV. 459, 464 n.18 (1998) (book review) (discussing prominent firm of
Jones, Day, Reavis & Pogue, which paid $51 million in a similar case to settle claims arising
from S & L crisis); Peter C. Kostant, When Zeal Boils Over: Disclosure Obligations and the
Duty of Candor of Legal Counsel in Regulatory Proceedings After the Kaye Scholer Settle-
ment, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 487 (1993); Stevens & Thomas, supra note 340 (reporting government
allegations and successful settlement, but also portraying firm in more sympathetic light as
being punished merely for zealous representation of a problematic client).
343. See  Stevens & Thomas, supra note 340.
344. See  John Jacobs, Editorial, Gov. Gray Davis Embarks on a Political Honeymoon,
SACRAMENTO BEE , Jan. 5, 1999, at B7, available in  LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File (noting
Cranston was an honored guest at the new California Governor’s inaugural, where he enjoyed a
standing ovation); Dave Lesher, Davis Sworn in, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1999, at A1.
345. See  Timothy R. Gaffney, Group Plans Soaring Tribute, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Apr. 20,
1999, at 1A available in LEXIS, News Library, Daydnw File; Rick Kushoran, At Last, Love,
SACRAMENTO BEE , Mar. 22, 1999, at C1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sacbee File (noting
that Glenn continues to enjoy hero status).
346. See  Amy Silverman, The Pampered Politician, PHOENIX NEW TIMES , May 15, 1997, at
1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Phnxnt File (noting that “in 1990, pundits agreed that
McCain’s political career was over,” but that this has been forgotten by press and public).
347. See  Editorial, Airwave Avarice, L.A. TIMES , Dec. 7, 1998, at B4; Editorial, Ripped Off
by the Bankers, CAP. TIMES  (Madison, Wis.), Mar. 23, 1999, at 8A, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Captms File; Molly Ivins, Party on: There Are Issues for Debate in the State GOP but
No One Is Talking, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, June 11, 1998, at 9, available in LEXIS, News
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perbolic, the manner in which the Keating Five scandal, after so much
public outcry, was so quickly forgotten and forgiven by the electorate
and the media is disheartening. One might conclude that servitude to
money and powerful business interests has become business as usual for
both Congress, which has power to censure and expel members, and the
voting public that takes it all in defeatist stride: There appear to be few
suspensions from practice or disbarment from the political bar.348
Thus, although the Keating Five episode and the Savings & Loan de-
bacle is a black eye for politicians and lawyers alike, it serves to illustrate
that even though lawyers can look bad under a professionalism para-
digm, professionalism’s disciplinary architecture may have more teeth
than that of politics. Further, one must keep in mind that, to a large de-
gree, the corruption of politics is orchestrated by businesspersons acting
as businesspersons are supposed to act—self-interestedly for profit.
Given these consequences, why are Pearce and others attracted to a
business paradigm? Is the idea to lower the performance of lawyers be-
low that reflected in the Keating Five matter?
2.   “Professional” Sports
One might question whether “professional” sports is governed by the
business paradigm. It seems clear, however, that these athletes are not
governed by the professionalism paradigm; this group does not satisfy
any of the traditional criteria used to define what it means to be a profes-
sional. While zone defenses have become increasingly sophisticated and
playbooks may be thicker, the complexity of the skills and knowledge re-
quired does not rise to the requisite level. Nor is there evidence of any
autonomy-for-altruism trade-off by the paid athlete. On the other hand,
few can doubt that pro sports has become big business today. Even in a
world of strikes and contract holdouts by star players, calling the ath-
letes autonomous professionals is a stretch.349
For purposes of the professionalism and business paradigms, how-
ever, what matters is the degree to which this segment of the business
community demonstrates the qualities society requires in lawyers: loy-
alty, judgment, fidelity and candor to the system, to name a few.
A short look at both the trading block and the free agency market
makes inquiry into the concept of loyalty in sports a short discussion.
The increasing mobility of lawyers has created problems in this area,
such as, for example, the “hot potato” phenomenon, but the frequency
with which today’s professional athletes switch teams makes the legal
community’s difficulties pale in comparison. Furthermore, where law-
yers improperly jump ship, there are rules that may be enforced and
                                                                                                                                                
Library, Fwstel File (all comparing U.S. political system to one of legalized bribery via campaign
contributions).
348. Only one of the Keating Five, DeConcini, was a lawyer—and a former prosecutor at
that, as Pima County attorney. See  ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS (1998). On one hand, this
gives some hope for thinking that most lawyer politicians might have recognized the inappro-
priateness of zealously and mindlessly advocating for the personal benefit of large con tributors
in regulatory or adjudicatory matters. More likely, it is only coincidence.
349. Ironically, unionization has historically been seen as inconsistent with professional
status.
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malpractice actions that can be prosecuted. In comparison, the anti-
tampering rules and forced player compensation in the pro leagues are
not trivial, but neither are they substantial.
It is in the areas of candor and duty to the system, fairness and hon-
esty, however, that professional sports provides the best window into the
culture of community operating without the benefit of the professional-
ism paradigm. In any pro football game one is almost certain to see a re-
ceiver fielding a pass on the bounce but falsely pretending to the referee
that the ball was cleanly caught before it hit the ground.350 This kind of
misrepresentation—to the referee, the other players, the fans in the sta-
dium, and the television audience—evidences professional sports’ weak
sense of commitment to the integrity of the system. Instances of pass
interference, receivers pushing off to get free, and holding by the offen-
sive line, among other transgressions, are all too common. The “smart”
players are those who clutch and grab most artfully so as to escape de-
tection.351 Worse, when caught in the act, the perpetrator’s response is
frequently to protest and deny. Candor toward the tribunal indeed.
The same philosophy can be seen in professional basketball and ice
hockey. In basketball, players routinely protest indisputably correct
calls, displaying thespian skills rivaling those of the gridiron. Hockey
players work to perfect the subtle hooks, trips, and holds that neutralize
opposing offensive threats; in fact, it was frustration with these sorts of
practices that drove Pittsburgh Penguins superstar Mario Lemieux into
premature retirement.352
The athletes have made an art of learning what they can get away
with, and they have no qualms about using it in order to gain advantage
over an opponent. Misrepresentation to the referee is just part of the
game. This should not be surprising in a field which produced aphorisms
like:
• “Winning isn’t everything; it’s the only thing.” (football);353
                                                                                                                                                
350. I borrow this illustration from Prof. Stephen Carter’s address to Yale Alumni at the
1996 American Association of Law Schools Annual Meeting (Jan. 10, 1996) (San Antonio,
Texas). Carter related the story of watching football with his son and attempting to field the in -
nocent lad’s inquiry regarding why the player would so blatantly lie to the referee about catch -
ing a ball that clearly had been trapped. A colleague of Carter’s suggested that the answer to the
question involved another question: “What are the rules about playing by the rules?” In effect, I
am suggesting that in pro sports (and many business environments), the metarule is not to play
by the rules when one can get away with it. This distinguishes pro sports, I hope, from practi c-
ing law.
351. For example, celebrated Denver Broncos star linebacker Bill Romanowski is reported
to illegally grab the opposing tight end on nearly every play to impede the receiver. See  Gerald
Eskenazi, Romanowski Still on a Hitting Streak, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 27, 1999, at D2. In the cul-
ture of pro football, Romanowski is not vilified for chronic cheating. He is celebrated for his art
in escaping detection. See id.
352. See  Cammy Clark, Irked Lemieux Threatens Retirement, ST. P ETE. TIMES , Apr. 7,
1994, at 6C; NHL May Discipline Lemieux, RECORD (Bergen Co., N.J.), Feb. 5, 1992, at C5,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Njrec File; Mario Lemieux Retires, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr.
28, 1997, at S1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Indpnt File (Lemieux criticizes League’s tol-
erance for clutch and grab hockey, calling it a “garage league” (often reprinted as “garbage
league” in press) and eventually retires from this and chronic back problems).
353. Attributed to Green Bay Packers Coach Vince Lombardi. See  Furman Bisher, ‘Catfish’
Hunter Remains a True Sports Legend, ATLANTA J. & CONST., Feb. 11, 1999, at G9; Tom McE-
wen, Lightning Detour , TAMPA TRIB., Jan. 24, 1999, at 11.
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• “Nice Guys Finish Last” (baseball);354 and
• “If you can’t beat ‘em in the alley, you can’t beat ‘em on the ice
(hockey, of course).355
In this regard, professional sports is the ultimate business and ath-
letes are the ultimate businessmen. In pro sports, there is no ambiguity
about advertising effectiveness, market penetration, quality control, or
position vis-a-vis rivals. The game is either won or lost (or tied) and
league standings are in plain view. The ethic of the enterprise is success
and nearly any price can be paid for success. This ethic has no concern
for violating rules, only for avoiding detection. It encourages hard play
and forgives transgressions of the rules in pursuit of victory. Thus, the
question arises: If this is what takes place under a business paradigm,
why advocate adopting this organizing ethos for law?
3.   Lessons from Modern Journalism
Recently, Tom Brokaw, the well-known NBC news anchor, also be-
came a best-selling author. His book, The Greatest Generation,356 de-
scribes the trials and triumphs of the cohort of Americans who won
World War II, rebuilt much of the world in the wake of war, and drove
the ensuing fifty years of prosperity and progress in the United States. It
was released in late 1998 and immediately soared to the top of the New
York Times bestseller list.
Because of Brokaw’s long association with NBC, it is not surprising
that NBC-related television programs have paid a good deal of attention
to the book. Brokaw has, for example, made guest appearances promot-
ing the book on the Today show (twice), Late Night with Conan
O’Brian, Dateline NBC , Hockenberry, and Tim Russert, and was an on-
                                                                                                                                                
354. Said by manager Leo Durocher. I did not discuss baseball skullduggery in the text.
Typically it is not as prevalent, save for spitballs by the pitcher, which are by definition hard to
detect and prove since pitchers seldom are ejected for fouling the ball, but use of the spitter is
widely rumored. However, baseball also has its trapped flyballs and tagged baserunners claim-
ing to be safe when the video replay clearly shows otherwise.
355. Generally attributed to “Terrible” Ted Lindsay, a Detroit Red Wings Center during the
1950s who was both a prolific scorer and an extremely physical player known to in flict cuts re-
quiring stitches on the opposition. According to hockey folklore, however, Lindsay’s stickwork
paled beside that of teammate Gordie Howe. Despite his talent for rearranging the faces of op -
ponents, Howe is one of hockey’s all-time stars and heroes, largely because he is the second-
leading goal scorer of all time. See  Kelley Teahen et al., 100 Who Made an Impact: Who Are the
100 Most Important People of the 20th Century?, LONDON FREE PRESS , Jan. 1, 2000, at D2,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Londfp File (naming Howe as one of 100 most influencial
people of the 20th century and describing him as “notable for scoring records and a fierce pair
of elbows”). Howe appears to be popular with fellow players as well as fans, which illustrates
the culture of machismo in the sport and the degree to which violations of the rules are toler-
ated. See, e.g., Mike Heika, Hockey Legend Reflects on His Career, the NHL, Hull’s Goal, Being
a Parent, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Dec. 16, 1999, at K499, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Dalnws File (interviewing Hockey great Wayne Gretsky, who named Howe as his favorite
player). Compare basketball, which is not without its own stars renouned for playing rough.
See, e.g. , Gordon Monson, Malone’s ‘Bows Are Just Part of the Package: In Malone’s World,
Elbows Happen , SALT LAKE TRIB., May 27, 1999, at E1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Sltrib
File (saying, of Utah Jazz player’s elbows: “Sometimes they knock a guy into Never-Never Land.
Sometimes, they crack a dome. Sometimes, they gash a player’s face . . . .”) .
356. TOM BROKAW, THE GREATEST GENERATION (1998).
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line chat guest on MSNBC.com.357 Some of this is, I suppose, to be ex-
pected. Logrolling for friends and colleagues is a time-honored tradi-
tion.358 What is not generally known is that NBC owns part of the book,
just under twenty-five percent. Clearly, this gave NBC “a huge incentive
to gear up the network’s in-house publicity machine to pitch the title.”359
In other words, NBC used its journalistic platform to promote a
product it would profit from, but apparently failed to disclose the con-
nection.360 Brokaw and NBC, however, appear to regard the royalty-
sharing arrangement, publication and marketing of the book as a home-
run with no ethical concerns. Brokaw has been quoted as saying, “I don’t
think there was any subterfuge” in the promotion of his book.361
Similarly, ABC news anchor Peter Jennings co-authored The Century,
a retrospective look at the American experience that is being heavily
promoted by and tied in with the network, which is running a program
based on the book. “For the networks, which have been scrounging for
new sources of revenue to offset declining viewership, book deals are a
logical next step.”362
But is it ethical? Or, put in a less emotionally loaded manner: are
these book-TV star arrangements consistent with good journalism--
“professional” journalism, so to speak? Brokaw appears to be correct in
saying there was no “subterfuge” by the network, but neither does there
appear to have been any disclosure or any attempt to maintain neutral-
ity.
A substantial degree of journalistic perspective and impartiality is
immediately sacrificed when networks that are supposed to be in the
business of reporting and sifting the news determine that the most
newsworthy books on the market just happen to be those from which the
network stands to profit. At the very least, plain, full, and frequent dis-
closure seems necessary363 when supposedly objective journalism be-
comes a source of outside profit. Unfortunately, however, although there
                                                                                                                                                
357. See  Kyle Pope, NBC Boosts Brokaw Book and Gets Boost Back , WALL ST. J., Jan. 25,
1999, at B1.
358. But the bounds of ordinary logrolling may have been breached:
NBC employees have gushed about it [the book] on the tube. “I mean only to pay
tribute to you here and not embarrass you,” Matt Lauer, co-host of “Today,” told
Mr. Brokaw during one of his appearances on the program. “But your book is
breaking all kinds of sales records. Have you had a chance to stop and think why?"
Id.
359. Id.
360. At least it appears there has been no voluntary disclosure of NBC’s financial in terest
on programs promoting the Brokaw book. According to a newspaper account, NBC "has kept its
involvement in the Brokaw book a relative secret," although when queried, NBC appears to
have been forthcoming with this information to the Journal reporter. Id. According to Brokaw,
the network was given a stake in the book’s profits because the book utilized the work of NBC
researchers who had worked with Brokaw on a film documentary regarding World War II and
the Normandy Invasion. See id. A portion of the book’s proceeds will be donated to a scholar-
ship fund established by Brokaw for children of NBC News employees. See id..
361. See  Pope, supra note 357 .
362. Id.
363. ABC presumably would disagree and distinguish its situation with the Jennings book
on grounds of an obvious pecuniary connection between the book and the television program,
“The Century.” Mr. Jennings’ agent was quoted as saying, “Believe me, you’d have to be brain-
dead not to make the connection.” Id.
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is a relatively well-formed body of journalistic ethics, there seems to be
no internal professional norm frowning upon these kinds of financial
interests, despite their potential to cloud journalistic judgment. Non-
NBC print media has implicitly criticized the Brokaw-NBC arrange-
ment,364 but that appears to be the extent of media reaction.
Thus, even in journalism, arguably a profession, commercialization
appears to have reduced ethical consciousness. By contrast, rules and
norms of lawyer professionalism frown on financial ties that cloud pro-
fessional judgment, forbidding them or at least requiring disclosure and
consent.365 These norms are both self-enforced and privately enforced by
rival counsel. Sanctions and civil liability may be available as well, al-
though criminal liability is rare.
VI.   CONCLUSION: THE CONTINUING NEED FOR THE
PROFESSIONALISM PARADIGM
The business paradigm proposal makes for most provocative reading,
and the Pearce salvo is particularly noteworthy. It also avoids the diffuse
fuzziness of other many of the other, less radical, proposals for fixing
lawyer deficiencies, most of which call in vague and nostalgic terms for a
return to past norms and behavior. Rather than harking us back to Atti-
cus Finch, Pearce points us toward the future, which apparently will look
more like (choose your favorite or most threatening): Warren Buffett, Al
Dunlap, Bill Gates, Michael Milken, Ron Pearlman, or Ted Turner.
One cannot help but applaud Pearce’s clarity of vision and articula-
tion of a more well-formed and distinct action plan for addressing to-
day’s widely perceived malaise of the legal profession. The problem, of
course, is that Pearce’s plan is to fix the legal profession by having it
cease to be a profession. It is tempting to label this the regulatory
equivalent of asphyxiating a patient to put a stop to her pain.
Alternatively, business paradigm blueprints, and in particular the
Pearce Proposal, become so compromised that the new world order
looks suspiciously similar to the old world order. Any regime for regu-
lating lawyers is likely to be better if it begins with the proposition that
attorneys are something different than garden variety businesspersons
and the law is something different than the floor of a mercantile ex-
change.
The business paradigm thesis, however, must be addressed on its
own terms. Appeals to nostalgia and platitudes about professionalism
are a poor defense against the rising tide of legal commercialism. Waiv-
ing the Atticus Finch flag is simply not an effective and persuasive means
of defending a professionalism paradigm for lawyers. One lawyer-
economist has observed that changes in the legal services market have
made inside counsel the “segment of the profession most likely empow-
ered to play” the role of lawyer as gatekeeper and that since “a necessary
condition for professionalism is market power,” lawyers “had better start
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paying attention to those who have it.”366 Both inside counsel and those
paying them such attention will likely enjoy greater perspective serving
the public interest when they operate under the ethos of professional-
ism—not because of the romantic attractions of the professionalism
paradigm but because of its practical tools for enhancing the three key
concerns: client loyalty, duty to the system, and independent judgment.
Giving the law-as-business thesis what I hope is its due, I continue to
find it as frightening as the polemics of any anti-lawyer tract. I say this, I
hope, not out of reflexive defense of tradition or hostile reaction to pro-
posed change. Rather, the law-as-business “cure” is likely to be worse
than any disease currently infecting the legal corpus. Pearce sees lawyers
failing to fulfill lofty professional ideals and proposes that law be con-
structed as a business rather than as a learned profession. This is not
very different from local law enforcement coping with a juvenile delin-
quency problem by repealing the bulk of the laws violated by the delin-
quents. Making this pivot surely will reduce at least the officially re-
ported rate of crime and juvenile delinquency—but it hardly makes for a
better society.
My disagreement with the business paradigm is also that it fails to
appreciate the ways in which law is rightfully differentiated from busi-
ness. In light of those differences, the business paradigm is particularly
troublesome in that it fails to appreciate the degree to which human be-
ings can follow self-interest to the detriment of society if permitted and
not restrained by an infrastructure encouraging and enforcing socially
responsible behavior.
For entrepreneurs, business managers, advertisers, lay workers, and
customers, the pursuit of self-interest probably does lead to socially op-
timal outcomes, or at least outcomes that are better than those enjoyed
under a planned economy. Adam Smith made a convincing case for this
300 years ago. The fall of the Soviet Union and the prosperity of the
West in the late twentieth century seems to confirm Smith’s vision.367 To
the extent that self-interest gets out of hand, the external restraint of the
law (e.g., antitrust, securities fraud, tort, etc.) appears to be a solution
preferable to stifling the spirit of private enterprise and gain that has fu-
eled modern economic development.
For lawyers, judges, and lawyers acting in government, politics, and
academia, an ethic of unbridled self-interest is suboptimal or counter-
productive. A duty of zealous representation is imposed on lawyers and
is supported by a system that attempts to protect the attorney-client re-
lationship from outside influences, prohibits conflicts of interest (or at
least requires disclosure and informed consent), bars arrangements that
cloud the analysis and judgment of counsel, and so on. A similar duty to
the courts, the judicial system, and to the political system at large is also
imposed on lawyers. Metaphorically, lawyers—in all walks of the profes-
sion—may not pretend to have caught the ball that bounced on the
                                                                                                                                                
366. Ronald J. Gilson, supra note 5, at 916.
367. But today’s “wild west” Russia also underscores the need for regulatory infrastructure.
See  Kronman, Legal Professionalism, supra note 91, at 5 (“Even the freest market requires
framing conditions that stabilize it . . . .”).
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ground.368 Lawyers must be candid to the tribunal and, in many in-
stances, disclose adverse authority and blow the whistle on client crime,
fraud, perjury, or intent to injure. These lawyer roles and the different
contexts in which legal services are rendered often create tensions and
difficulty in discerning the right resolution of questions of legal ethics.
Resolving these tensions in turn, requires more of the legal system than
simply standing aside and letting the chips fall as they may in a contest
that stresses survival of the fittest.
In short, law is different than business. Law needs a different organ-
izing precept than business and a different set of norms—norms of pro-
fessional responsibility rather than economic gain. It is no accident that
over the centuries law has evolved a system of lawyer-centered ethical
rules in a professionalism paradigm. Current strains on the system of le-
gal ethics and the concept of professional roles simply are not severe
enough to sustain a claim for radical change. There is no fundamental
anomaly unresolvable by the system. Rather, the system of lawyer pro-
fessional responsibility is under de facto attack by business-centered
forces at odds with the requisite professional norms. This attack needs to
be repulsed and the fortress of professional responsibility solidified. Ad-
vocates of a business paradigm want to dismantle the fortress too soon
and replace it with a structure inappropriate for the task. Rather than
giving in to the worst modern trends affecting the law and rationalizing
it as a “paradigm shift,” lawyers and society should rage against any dy-
ing of the light of professionalism, even as society adapts the practice of
law to modern times.369
Perhaps most of all, law needs a regulatory construct that seeks out
the best in human nature rather than its most profitable or self-
interested. At the very least, a regulatory system must seek to elicit be-
havior from the regulated that serves society well in light of the goals at
issue. The business paradigm may square well with human nature (i.e.,
greed) but that is precisely its problem. Lawyers are supposed to sur-
mount greed, at least enough to put client loyalty first and serve the sys-
tem adequately. The business paradigm offers insufficient incentive to
elicit this behavior while the professionalism paradigm helps to define
and seek the desired behavior. Peer group pressure can be a powerful
force for good or evil, as discovered by young Julian English in the Ap-
pointment in Samarra excerpt that began this article.
On a symbolic level as well, the professionalism paradigm better
serves lawyers, their clients, and society. Group identity can be a pow-
erful force in resisting outside pressures, including political pressure or
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Rage, rage against the dying of the light.” Do Not Go Gentle into That Good Night , reprinted in
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economic duress or temptation. Lawyers are likely to resist these outside
influences more successfully if they think of themselves as professionals
held to professional standards. Despite the aura of protectionism that
has surrounded much professional activity, the separate, arguably ele-
vated status of the professional can be a powerful force for improving the
conduct of professionals. Even in an era where successful businessper-
sons become folk heroes, the business paradigm offers no such beacon of
guidance.
Law’s modern problems demand a response delivered from lawyers
operating within the behavior-enhancing model of professionalism
rather than an inapt, unformed, and arguably debased business con-
struct. Spurning a professional’s self-concept for that of business not
only debases lawyers but also threatens society.
